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1. Introduction 
 
Perhaps one of the less understood phenomena accompanying the increased 
globalization at the beginning of the 21st century has been a shift in the comparative 
advantage of high-wage countries towards knowledge-based economic activity. An important 
implication of this shift in this comparative advantage is that much of the production and 
commercialization of new economic knowledge is less associated with large traditional 
corporations and more associated with high-tech entrepreneurial firms found in innovative 
regional clusters, such as Silicon Valley, Research Triangle and Route 122. Only a few years 
ago the conventional wisdom predicted that globalization would render the demise of small 
firms and the importance of geographic location. Yet the obsession of policy-makers around 
the globe to “create the next Silicon Valley” reveals the increased importance of 
entrepreneurial firms taking advantage of geographic proximity and regional agglomerations.  
The purpose of this paper is to explain why and how a new type of public policy has emerged 
– the strategic management of places – and the central role that entrepreneurship plays in this 
new policy. 
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2. What is Entrepreneurship? 
 
While it has become widely acknowledge that entrepreneurship is a vital force in the 
economies of developed countries, there is little consensus about what actually constitutes 
entrepreneurial activity. Scholars have proposed a broad array of definitions, which when 
operationalize, have generated a number of different measures (Hebert and Link, 1989). 
Herbert and Link (1989) have identified three distinct intellectual traditions in the 
development of the entrepreneurship literature. These three traditions can be characterized as 
the German Tradition, based on von Thuenen and Schumpeter, the Chicago Tradition, based 
on Knight and Schultz, and the Austrian Tradition, baased on von Mises, Kirzner and 
Shackle. The Schumpeterian tradition has had the greatest impact on the contemporary 
entrepreneurship literature. The distinguishing feature from Schumpeter is that 
entrepreneurship is viewed as a disequilibrating phenomenon rather than an equilibrating 
force. In his 1911 classic treatise, Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklungen (Theory of 
Economic Development), Schumpeter proposed a theory of creative destruction, where new 
firms with the entrepreneurial spirit displace less innovative incumbents, ultimately leading to 
a higher degree of economic growth. Even in his 1942 classic, Capitalism and Democracy, 
Schumpter (p. 13) still argued that entrenched large corporations tend to resist change, forcing 
entrepreneurs to start new firms in order to pursue innovative activity: “The function of 
entrepreneurs is to reform or revolutionize the pattern of production by exploiting an 
invention, or more generally, an untried technological possibility for producing a new 
commodity or producing an old one in a new way…To undertake such new things is difficult 
and constitutes a distinct economic function, first because they lie outside of the routine tasks 
which everybody understand, and secondly, because the environment resists in many ways.” 
Despite the Schumpeterian emphasis on the process of starting a new enterprise as the 
defining entrepreneurial activity, there is no generally accepted definition of entrepreneurship 
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for the developed countries of the OECD (OECD, 1998). The failure of a single definition of 
entrepreneurship to emerge undoubtedly reflects the fact that it is a multidimensional concept. 
The actual definition used to study or classify entrepreneurial activities reflects a particular 
perspective or emphasis. For example, definitions of entrepreneurship typically vary between 
the economic and management perspectives. From the economic perspective, Hebert and Link 
(1989) distinguish between the supply of financial capital, innovation, allocation of resources 
among alternative uses and decision-making. Thus, an entrepreneur is someone encompassing 
the entire spectrum of these functions: “The entrepreneur is someone who specializes in 
taking responsibility for and making judgemental decisions that affect the location, form, and 
the use of goods, resources or institutions” (Hebert and Link, 1989, p. 213).  
By contrast, from the management perspective, Sahlman and Stevenson (1991, p.1) 
differentiate between entrepreneurs and managers in that, “entrepreneurship is a way of 
managing that involves pursuing opportunity without regard to the resources currently 
controlled. Entrepreneurs identify opportunities, assemble required resources, implement a 
practical action plan, and harvest the reward in a timely, flexible way.” 
The most prevalent and compelling views of entrepreneurship focus on the perception 
of new economic opportunities and the subsequent introduction of new ideas in the market. 
As Audretsch (1995) argues, entrepreneurship is about change, just as entrepreneurs are 
agents of change; entrepreneurship is thus about the process of change. This corresponds to 
the definition of entrepreneurship proposed by the OECD, “Entrepreneurs are agents of 
change and growth in a market economy and they can act to accelerate the generation, 
dissemination and application of innovative ideas….Entrepreneurs not only seek out and 
identify potentially profitable economic opportunities but are also willing to take risks to see 
if their hunches are right” (OECD, 1998, p. 11). 
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While the simplicity of defining entrepreneurship as activities fostering innovative 
change has its attraction, such simplicity also masks considerable complexity. 
Entrepreneurship is shrouded with complexity for at least two reasons. The first reason 
emerges because entrepreneurship is an activity crossing multiple organizational forms. Does 
entrepreneurship refer to the change inducing activities of individuals, groups of individuals 
such as networks, projects, lines of business, firms, and even entire industries, or even for 
geographic units of observation, such as agglomerations, clusters, and regions?  
Part of the complexity involved with entrepreneurship is that it involves all of these 
types of organizational forms. No single organizational form can claim a monopoly on 
entrepreneurship. 
The second source of complexity is that the concept of change is relative to some 
benchmark. What may be perceived as change to an individual or enterprise may not involve 
any new practice for the industry. Or, it may represent change for the domestic industry, but 
not for the global industry. Thus, the concept of entrepreneurship is embedded in the local 
context. At the same time, the value of entrepreneurship is likely to be shaped by the relevant 
benchmark. Entrepreneurial activity that is new to the individual but not the firm or industry 
may be of limited value. Entrepreneurial activity that is new to the region or country may be 
significant but ultimately limited. By contrast, it is entrepreneurial activity that is new across 
all organizational forms, all the way up to the global, that carries the greatest potential value. 
Thus, one of the most striking features of entrepreneurship is that it crosses a number 
of key units of analysis. At one level, entrepreneurship involves the decisions and actions of 
individuals. These individuals may act alone or within the context of a group. At another 
level, entrepreneurship involves units of analysis at the levels of the industry, as well as at 
spatial levels, such as cities, regions and countries.  
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3. Globalization and the Strategic Management of Places 
 
The role of entrepreneurship in society and has changed drastically over the last half 
century. During the post-World War II era, the importance of entrepreneurship and business 
seemed to be fading away. While alarm was expressed that small business needed to be 
preserved and protected for social and political reasons, few made the case on the grounds of 
economic efficiency. This position was drastically reversed in recent years. Entrepreneurship 
has become the engine of economic and social development throughout the world. The role of 
entrepreneurship has changed dramatically between the traditional and new economies. 
During the post-war period a generation of scholars spanning a broad spectrum of 
academic fields and disciplines devoted their research to identifying the issues involving this 
perceived trade-off between economic efficiency on the one hand and political and economic 
decentralization on the other. Scholars responded by producing a massive literature focusing 
on essentially three issues: (i)What are the  gains to size and large-scale production? (ii) What 
are the economic welfare implications of having an oligopolistic market structure, i.e. is 
economic performance promoted or reduced in an industry with just a handful of large-scale 
firms? and (iii) Given the overwhelming evidence  that large-scale production resulting in 
economic concentration is associated with increased efficiency, what are the public policy 
implications? 
This literature produced a series of stylized facts about the role of SMEs during the 
post-war economies in North America and Western Europe: 
(1) SMEs were generally less efficient than their larger counterparts. Studies 
from the U.S. in the 1960s and 1970 revealed that SMEs produced at lower levels of 
efficiency, leading Weiss (1976, p. 259) to conclude that, “On the average, about half of total 
shipments in the industries covered are from suboptimal plants. The majority of plants in most 
industries are suboptimal in scale, and a very large percentrage of output is from suboptinal 
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plants.” Pratten (1971) found similar evidence for the United Kingdom, where suboptimal 
scale establishments accounted for 47.9 percent of industry shipments. 
 
(2) SMEs provided lower levels of employee compensation. Empirical evidence 
from both North America and Europe found a systematic and positive relationship between 
employee compensation and firm size (Brown, Hamilton and Medoff, 1990 and Brown and 
Medoff, 1989). 
(3) SMEs were only marginally involved in innovative activity. Based on R&D 
measures, SMEs accounted for only a small amount of innovative activity. 
 
(4) The relative importance of SMEs was declining over time in both North 
America and Europe 
In the post-war era, small firms and entrepreneurship were viewed as a luxury, 
perhaps needed by the west to ensure a decentralization of decision making, but in any case 
obtained only at a cost to efficiency. Certainly the systematic empirical evidence, gathered 
from both Europe and North documented a sharp trend towards a decreased role of SMEs 
during the post-war period. 
Thus, it was particularly startling and a seeming paradox, when scholars first began to 
document that what had seemed like the inevitable demise of SMEs actually began to reverse 
itself starting in the 1970s. Loveman and Sengenberger (1991) and Acs and Audretsch (1993) 
carried out systematic international studies examining the re-emergence of SMEs and 
entrepreneurship in North America and Europe. Two major findings emerged from these 
studies – first, the relative role of SMEs varies systematically across countries, and secondly, 
in most European countries and in North America, SMEs began increasing their relative 
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importance starting in the mid-1970s. In the U.S. the average real GDP per firm increased by 
nearly two-thirds between 1947 and 1980, from $150,000 to $245,000, reflecting a trend 
towards larger enterprises and a decreasing importance of SMEs. However, within the 
subsequent seven years, by 1987, it had fallen by about 14 percent to $210,000, reflecting a 
sharp reversal of this trend and the re-emergence of SMEs (Brock and Evans, 1989). 
Similarly, SMEs accounted for one-fifth of manufacturing sales in the U.S. in 1976, but by 
1986 the small-firm share of sales had risen to over one-quarter (Acs and Audretsch, 1990). 
The reversal of the trend towards large enterprises towards the re-emergence of SMEs 
was not limited to North America. In fact, a similar trend was found to take in Europe as well. 
For example, in the Netherlands the business ownership rate fell during the post-war period, 
until it reached a trough of 0.085 in 1982. But this downward trend was subsequently 
reversed, rising to a business ownership rate of 0.10 by 1998 (Audretsch et al., 2002). 
Similarly, the small-firm employment share in manufacturing in the Netherlands increased 
from 68.3 percent in 1978 to 71.8 percent in 1986; in the United Kingdom from 30.1 percent 
in 1979 to 39.9 percent by 1986; in (West) Germany from 54.8 percent in 1970 to 57.9 
percenty by 1987; in Portugal from 68.3 percent in 1982 to 71.8 percent in 1986; in the North 
of Italy from 44.3 percent in 1981 to 55.2 percent by 1987, and in the South of Italy from 61.4 
percent in 1981 to 68.4 percent by 1987 (Acs and Audretsch, 1993). An EIM documents how 
the relative importance of SMEs in Europe (19 countries), measured in terms of employment 
shares has continued to increase between 1988 and 2001 (EIM, 2002b). 
As the empirical evidence mounted documenting the re-emergence of entrepreurship 
as a vital factor, scholars began to look for explanations and to develop a theoretical basis. 
The early explanations (Brock and Evans, 1989) revolved around six hypotheses: 
1. That technological change had reduced the extent of scale economies in 
manufacturing 
David B. Audretsch: Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth: The Role of Public Policy 
 12
2. Increased globalization had rendered markets more volative as a result of 
competition from a greater number of foreign rivals 
3. The changing composition of the labor force, towards a greater participation 
of females, immigrants, and young and old workers may be more conducive to smaller rather 
than larger enterprises, due to the greater premium placed on work flexibility 
4. A proliferation of consumer tastes away from standardized mass-produced 
goods towards stylized and personalized products facilitates niche small producers 
5. Deregulation and privatization facilitate the entry of new and small firms 
into markets that were previously protected and inaccessible 
6. The increased importance of innovation in high-wage countries has reduced 
the relative importance of large-scale production and instead fostered the importance of 
entrepreneurial activity. 
More recently, Audretsch and Thruik (2001) have deveoped the explanation for the re-
emergence of entrepreneurship in Europe and North America based on increased 
globalization, which has shifted the comparative advantage towards knowledge-based 
economic activity. Conventional wisdom would have predicted that increased globalization 
would present a more hostile environment to small business (Vernon, 1970). Caves (1982) 
argued that the additional costs of globalization, that would be incurred by small business 
“constitute an important reason for expecting that foreign investment will be mainly an 
activity of large firms.  
Certainly the empirical evidence by Horst (1972) showed that even after controlling 
for industry effects, the only factor significantly influencing the propensity to engage in 
foreign direct investment was firm size. As Chandler (1990) concluded, “to compete globally 
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you have to be big.” Gomes-Casseres (1997, p. 33) further observed that, “[s]tudents of 
international business have traditionally believed that success in foreign markets required 
large size. Small firms were thought to be at a disadvantage compared to larger firms, because 
of the fixed costs of learning about foreign environments, communicating at long distances, 
and negotiating with national governments.”  
According to Audretsch and Thurik (2001), SMEs did not become obsolete as a result 
of globalization, but rather their role changed as the comparative advantage has shifted 
towards knowledge-based economic activity. This has occurred for two reasons. First, large 
enterprises in traditional manufacturing industries have lost their competitiveness in 
producing in the high-cost domestic countries. Second, small entrepreneurial enterprises take 
on a new importance and value in a knowledge-based economy. 
The loss of competitiveness by large-scale producers in high-cost locations is 
manifested by the fact that, confronted with lower cost competition in foreign locations, 
producers in the high-cost countries have three options apart from doing nothing and losing 
global market share: (1) reduce wages and other production costs sufficiently to compete with 
the low-cost foreign producers, (2) substitute equipment and technology for labor to increase 
productivity, and (3) shift production out of the high-cost location and into the low-cost 
location. 
Many of the European and American firms that have successfully restructured resorted 
to the last two alternatives. Substituting capital and technology for labor, along with shifting 
production to lower-cost locations has resulted in waves of Corporate Downsizing throughout 
Europe and North America. At the same time, it has generally preserved the viability of many 
of the large corporations.  
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The experience has not been different in Europe. Pressed to maintain competitiveness 
in traditional industries, where economic activity can be easily transferred across geographic 
space to access lower production costs, the largest and most prominent German companies 
have deployed two strategic responses. The first is to offset greater wage differentials between 
Germany and low-cost locations by increasing productivity through the substitution of 
technology and capital for labor. The second is to locate new plants and establishments 
outside of Germany. What both strategic responses have in common is that the German 
flagship companies have been downsizing the amount of employment in the domestic 
economy. For example, Siemens increased the amount of employment outside Germany by 50 
percent, from 108,000 in 1984/85 to 162,000 in 1994/95. Over the same time period it 
decreased the amount of employment in Germany by 12 percent, from 240,000 to 
211,000.Volkswagen increased the amount of employment in foreign countries by 24 percent, 
from 78,000 in 1984 to 97,000 in 1994. Over the same time period, it decreased employment 
in Germany by 10 percent, from 156,000 to 141,000. Similarly, Hoechst increased the number 
of jobs outside of Germany by 9 percent, from 78,925 in 1984 to 92,333 in 1994. The number 
of Hoechst employees in Germany fell over that same period by 26 percent, from 99,015 to 
73,338. And BASF increased employment in foreign countries by 34 percent, from 29,966 in 
1984 to 40,297 in 1994. Domestic employment by BASF fell by 17 percent over that same 
time period, from 85,850 to 65,969. 
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Employment in Large German Firms
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These examples are not isolated but rather typical of the wave of downsizing in 
Germany in the 1990s that has resulted in levels of unemployment – four million -- not seen 
since the Second World War. As Table 1 shows, between 1991 and 1995 manufacturing 
employment in German plants decreased by 1,307,000 while it increased in foreign 
subsidiaries by 189,000 (BMWi, 2000). In the chemical sector, the decrease of domestic 
employment was 80,000, while 14,000 jobs were added by German chemical companies in 
plants located outside of Germany. In electrical engineering employment in German plants 
decreased by 198,000. In automobilies employment in Germany decreased by 161,000, while 
30,000 jobs were added outside of Germany. 
 
 
 
 
David B. Audretsch: Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth: The Role of Public Policy 
 16
Table 1: Change in employment figures in western Germany and at foreign 
subsidiaries (1991-1995, in thousands) 
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The German impact of corporate downsizing in Germany in the 1990s was registerd 
not just by individual firms and industries but also by particular regions. For example, 
Stuttgart, which is home to Daimler-Chrysler (at the time Daimler-Benz), experienced an 
increase in manufacturing employment throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and into the 1990s. After 
reaching a peak of around 480,000 in 1991, manufacturing employment fell by more than 
one-third, to around 350,000 by the mid-1990s. 
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This wave of corporate downsizing triggered cries of betrayal and lack of social 
conscience on the part of the large corporations.1 But it was a mistake to blame the 
corporations for this wave of downsizing that has triggered massive job losses and rising 
unemployment in so many countries. These corporations were simply trying to survive in an 
economy of global competitors who have access to lower cost inputs. 
Much of the policy debate responding to the twin forces of the telecommunications 
revolution and increased globalisation revolved around a perceived trade-off between 
maintaining higher wages but suffering greater unemployment versus higher levels of 
employment but at the cost of lower wage rates. There is, however, an alternative. It does not 
require sacrificing wages to create new jobs, nor does it require fewer jobs to maintain wage 
levels and the social safety net. This alternative involves shifting economic activity out of the 
traditional industries where the high-cost countries of Europe and North America have lost 
the comparative advantage and into those industries where the comparative advantage is 
compatible with both high wages and high levels of employment – knowledge based 
economic activity.  
Globalization has rendered the comparative advantage in traditional moderate 
technology industries incompatible with high wage levels. At the same time, the emerging 
comparative advantage that is compatible with high wage levels is based on innovative 
activity. Thus, the regional response to globalization has been the emergence of strategic 
management policy – not for firms, but for places. As long as corporations were inextricably 
linked to their regional location by substantial sunk costs, such as capital investment, the 
competitiveness of a region was identical to the competitiveness of the corporations located in 
                                                 
1 As the German newspaper, Die Zeit (2 February, 1996, p. 1) pointed out in a front page article, “When Profits 
Lead to Ruin – More Profits and More Unemployment: Where is the Social Responsibility of the Firms?” the 
German public has responded to the recent waves of corporate downsizing with accusations that corporate 
Germany is no longer fulfilling its share of the social contract.  
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that region. A quarter century ago, while the proclamation, “What is good for General Motors 
is good for America” may have been controversial, few would have disagreed that “What is 
good for General Motors is good for Detroit.” And so it was with U.S. Steel in Pittsburgh and 
Volkswagen in Wolfsburg. As long as the corporation thrived, so would the region. 
As globalization has rendered not only the degree to which the traditional economic 
factors of capital and labor are sunk, but also shifted the comparative advantage in the high-
wage countries of North America and Europe towards knowledge-based economic activity, 
corporations in traditional industries  have been forced to shift production to lower-cost 
locations. This has led to a de-linking between the competitiveness of firms and regions. The 
advent of the strategic management of regions has been a response to the realization that the 
strategic management of corporations includes a policy option not available to regions – 
changing the production location. 
 
4. The Emergence of Entrepreneurship Policy 
 
During the Post World War II era, there was considerable concern about what to do 
about the existing firms and industrial structure, but little attention was paid to where they 
came from and where they were going (Audretsch and Thurik, 2001). Oliver Williamson’s 
classic 1968 article “Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs,” became 
something of a final statement demonstrating what appeared to be an inevitable trade-off 
between the gains in productive efficiency that could be obtained through increased 
concentration and gains in terms of competition, and implicitly democracy, that could be 
achieved through decentralizing policies. But it did not seem possible to have both, certainly 
not in Williamson’s completely static model. 
The fundamental policy issue confronting Western Europe and North America during 
the post-war era was how to live with this apparent trade-off between concentration and 
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efficiency on the one hand, and decentralization and democracy on the other. The public 
policy question of the day was, How can society reap the benefits of the large corporation in 
an oligopolistic setting while avoiding or at least minimizing the costs imposed by a 
concentration of economic power? The policy response was to constrain the freedom of firms 
to contract. Such policy restraints typically took the form of public ownership, regulation and 
competition policy or antitrust. At the time, considerable attention was devoted to what 
seemed like glaring differences in policy approaches to this apparent trade-off by different 
countries. France and Sweden resorted to government ownership of private business. Other 
countries, such as the Netherlands and Germany, tended to emphasize regulation. Still other 
countries, such as the Untied States, had a greater emphasis on antitrust. In fact, most 
countries relied upon elements of all three policy instruments. While the particular instrument 
may have varied across countries, they were, in fact, manifestations of a singular policy 
approach – how to restrict and restrain the power of the large corporation. What may have 
been perceived as a disparate set of policies at the time appears in retrospect to comprise a 
remarkably singular policy approach (Audretsch and Thurik, 2001). 
In Europe Servan-Schreiber warned of the “American Challenge” in the form of the 
“dynamism, organization, innovation, and boldness that characterize the giant American 
corporations” (1968, p. 153). Because giant corporations were considered to be the engine of 
growth and innovation, Servan-Schreiber advocated the “creation of large industrial units 
which are able both in size and management to compete with the American giants” (1968, p. 
159). According to Servan-Schreiber (1968, p. 159), “The first problem of an industrial policy 
for Europe consists in choosing 50 to 100 firms which, once they are large enough, would be 
the most likely to become world leaders of modern technology in their fields. At the moment 
we are simply letting industry be gradually destroyed by the superior power of American 
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corporations.” Ironically, the 1988 Cecchini Report identified the gains from European 
integration as largely accruing from increases in scale economies. 
Public policy towards SMEs was oriented towards preserving what was considered to 
be inefficient enterprises, which, if left unprotected, might otherwise become extinct. 
Preservationist policies were clearly at work in the creation of the U.S. Small Business 
Administration. In the Small Business Act of July 10, 1953, Congress authorized the creation 
of the Small Business Administration, with an explicit mandate to “aid, counsel, assist and 
protect…the interests of small business concerns.”2 The Small Business Act was clearly an 
attempt by the Congress to halt the continued disappearance of small businesses and to 
preserve their role in the U.S. economy 
By contrast, entrepreneurship policy is a relatively new phenomenon. An important 
distinction should be made between the traditional SME (small business) policies and 
entrepreneurship policies. SME policy typically refers to policies implemented by a ministry 
or government agency charged with the mandate to promote SMEs. The actual definition of 
SMEs varies considerably across countries, ranging from enterprises with fewer than 500 
employees in some of the most developed countries, such as the United States and Canada, to 
fewer than 250 employees in the European Union, to 50 employees in many developing 
countries. The actual SME policy takes the existing enterprises within the appropriate size 
class as exogenous, or given, and then develops instruments to promote the viability of those 
enterprises. Thus, SME policy is almost exclusively targeted towards the existing stock of 
enterprises and virtually all of the instruments included in the policy portfolio are designed to 
promote the viability of the SMEs. 
By contrast, entrepreneurship policy has a much broader focus. The definition 
introduced by Lundstrom and Stevenson (2001, p. 19) for OECD countries is certainly 
                                                 
2 http://www.sba.gov/aboutsba/sbahistory.html 
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applicable in the context of the European Union, “Entrepreneurship policy consists of 
measures taken to stimulate more entrepreneurial behavior in a region or country…We define 
entrepreneurship policy as those measures intended to directly influence the level of 
entrepreneurial vitality in a country or a region.” 
There are at least two important ways that distinguish entrepreneurship policy from 
SME policy (Lundstrom and Stevenson, 2002). The first is the breadth of policy orientation 
and instruments. While SME policy has a focus on the existing stock of SMEs, 
entrepreneurship policy is more encompassing in that it includes potential entrepreneurs as 
well as the existing stock of SMEs. This suggests that entrepreneurship policy is more 
focused on the process of change, regardless of the organizational unit, whereas SME policy 
is focused exclusively on the enterprise level. Entrepreneurship policy also has a greater 
sensitivity to framework or environmental conditions that shape the decision-making process 
of entrepreneurs. While SME policy is primarily concerned with one organizational level – 
the enterprise, entrepreneurship policy encompasses multiple units of organization and 
analysis. These range from the individual to the enterprise, and to the cluster or network, 
which might involve an industry or sectoral dimension, or a spatial dimension, such as a 
district, city, region, or even an entire country. Just as each of these levels is an important 
target for policy, the interactions and linkages across these disparate levels are also important. 
In this sense, entrepreneurship policy tends to be more systemic than SME policy. However, 
it is important to emphasize that SME policy still remains at the core of entrepreneurship 
policy. 
The second way distinguishing entrepreneurship policy from traditional SME policy is 
that virtually every country has a ministry or governmental agency charged with promoting 
the viability of the SME sector. These ministries and agencies have by now developed a well 
established arsenal of policy instruments to promote SMEs. However, no such agencies exist 
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to promote entrepreneurship. Part of the challenge of implementing entrepreneurship policy is 
that no country has yet to introduce an agency mandated with the charge of promoting 
entrepreneurship. Rather, aspects relevant to entrepreneurship policy can be found across a 
broad spectrum of ministries and agencies, ranging from education to trade and immigration. 
Thus, while SMEs have agencies and ministries that champion their issues, no analogous 
agency exists for entrepreneurship policy.  
Just because entrepreneurship is positively linked to performance does not 
automatically justify public policy intervention. Rather, the mandate for public policy 
intervention is the result of three fundamental sources of market failure – network 
externalities, knowledge externalities, and learning externalities. 
 Network externalities result from the value of an individual’s or firm’s capabilities 
being conditional upon the geographic proximity of complementary firms and individuals. As 
Porter (2000) pointed out, local proximity is essential for accessing these knowledge 
spillovers. This makes the value of an entrepreneurial firm greater in the (local) presence of 
other entrepreneurial firms.  The value of any individuals or firms capabilities is therefore 
conditional upon the existence of partners in a network   Firms and workers place a greater 
value on locations within clusters which contain complementary workers and firms than on 
those outside of clusters. Such market failure can occur where there is a potential for 
geographic clustering, sectoral linkages, or networks. 
The second source of market failure involves knowledge externalities. As Arrow 
(1962) documented, knowledge, which involves new ideas,  is inherently a public good, so 
that its production generates externalities. However, as Porter (2000) pointed out, local 
proximity is essential for accessing these knowledge spillovers.  
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The second source of market failure emanating from entrepreneurship is that positive 
economic value for third-party firms and individuals is created even in entrepreneurial firms 
that fail.  The high failure rate of new-firm startups has been widely documented and 
described above in this paper, and the failure rates in knowledge-based activities are 
especially great. This is not surprising since knowledge activities are associated with a greater 
degree of uncertainty. However, the failure of a knowledge-based firm does not imply no 
value was created by the firm; evidence suggests that ideas created by failed firms and 
projects often become integral parts of successful products and projects in successful firms.  
The externalities sometimes associated with failed firms, also creates a market failure 
in the valuation of (potential) new enterprises by private investors and policy makers. 
Whereas the private investor can only appropriate her investment if the particular firm 
succeeds, a failed firm that generates positive externalities contributes to the success of other 
third-party firms. The private investor, however, does not appropriate anything from the 
original investment. Likewise, individual firms and workers would have no incentive to invest 
in the development of a cluster, which is the creation of other entrepreneurial firms, due to 
their inability to appropriate returns from such a cluster.  
From the public policy perspective, on the other hand, it does not matter which firm 
succeeds, as long as some firm(s) do, and growth, along with the other benefits accruing from 
entrepreneurship, is generated for the locale. 
The third source of market failure involves the learning or demonstration effect 
emanating from entrepreneurial activity. This is particularly valuable in regions where 
entrepreneurship has been noticeably absent and no strong entrepreneurial traditions exist. 
Entrepreneurial activity involves not just the firm or individual responsible. Rather, others 
will observe this activity and the results of entrepreneurship. Other people will learn that 
entrepreneurship is a viable alternative to the status quo. As a result of this demonstration 
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effect, others will be induced to also develop entrepreneurial strategies. Thus, there is a strong 
and compelling positive externality associated with entrepreneurship, particularly in areas 
with no strong entrepreneurial traditions. 
Thus, the market failures inherent in entrepreneurship – network externalities, 
knowledge externalities and demonstration or learning externalities --result in a gap in the 
valuation of entrepreneurial activities between private parties and the local public policy 
makers. Entrepreneurial activity, combined with the propensity for knowledge to remain 
localized, results in a new policy mandate for cities, regions, provinces and countries. It also 
results in a fundamental mandate for the role to serve as a partner to business, enabling and 
fostering the development of new and small entrepreneurial firms.  By filling these gaps left 
by market failure, public policy can create a virtuous entrepreneurial circle, where 
entrepreneurs become networked and linked to each other, and strong role models of 
entrepreneurship exist for others to emulate.  
As the comparative advantage has become increasingly based on new knowledge, 
public policy has responded in two fundamental ways. The first has been to shift the policy 
focus away from the traditional triad of policy instruments essentially constraining the 
freedom of firms to contract – regulation, competition policy or antitrust in the U.S., and 
public ownership of business. The policy approach of constraint was sensible as long as the 
major issue was how to restrain large corporations in possession of considerable market 
power. That this policy is less relevant in a global economy is reflected by the waves of 
deregulation and privatization throughout Europe and North America. Instead, a new policy 
approach is emerging which focuses on enabling the creation and commercialization of 
knowledge. Examples of such policies include encouraging R&D, venture capital and new-
firm startups. 
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While the different types of entrepreneurship policies being implemented in the EU 
and US are two numerous to be identified and listed here, David Storey (2003) has identified 
examples of different types of entrepreneurship policies being undertaken in the EU and the 
U.S. In addition, he provides an assessment of the efficacy of the various types of policies 
undertaken. Illustrations of these policies are provided in Table 1. 
Table 1: Illustrations of Entrepreneurship Policies 
Problem Programme Description Country Success 
  Access to Loan 
Finance 
Loan Guarantee 
Scheme 
SMEs without access to own collateral 
obtain access to bank loans by state 
acting as guarantor 
UK 
USA 
Canada 
France 
Netherlands 
Yes, generally viewed as 
helpful, but small scale impact 
on the overall financing of 
SMEs in most countries 
 Access to Equity 
Capital 
Enterprise 
Investment Scheme 
Tax breaks for wealthy individuals to 
become business angels 
UK Unknown 
 Access to Markets Europartenariat Organisation of Trade Fairs to encourage 
cross-border trade between SMEs 
EU General satisfaction amongst  
firms that  participated 
Administrative 
Burdens 
Units established 
within government 
to seek to minimise 
administrative 
burdens on smaller 
firms 
Sunsetting Legislation  deregulation 
Units 
 
Netherlands 
Portugal, UK 
The view of small firms 
themselves is that bureaucratic 
burdens have increased 
markedly in recent years 
.Science Parks  Property based 
developments 
adjacent to 
Universities  
Seek to promote clusters of new 
technology based firms 
UK, France, 
Italy and 
Sweden 
Conflicting findings on impact 
of SPs on performance of firms 
. Managed 
Workspace 
Property provision 
to assist new and 
very small firms 
Often called business incubators, these 
provide premises for new and small 
firms on “easy- terms” 
World-wide General recognition that such 
initiatives are of value 
. Stimulating 
Innovation and 
R&D in small 
firms 
Small Business 
Innovation Research 
Program 
$1 billion per year is allocated via a 
competition to small firms to stimulate 
additional R&D activity 
USA Lerner implies SBIR enhances 
small firm performance, but 
Wallsten is unable to show it 
leads to additional R&D  
. Stimulating 
Training in small 
firms 
Japan Small 
Business 
Corporation (JSBC) 
JSBC and local governments provide 
training for owners and managers of 
small firms. The training programme 
began in 1963 
Japan Unknown 
Entrepreneurial 
Skills 
Small Business 
Development 
Corporations 
(SBDCs) 
 
Counselling is provided by SBDC 
mentors to small business clients who 
may be starting a business or be already 
trading   
USA This study finds SBDC clients 
have higher rates of survival and 
growth than might be expected. 
Reservations over these findings 
are found in the text 
. Entrepreneurial 
Awareness 
Entrepreneurship 
Education 
To develop an awareness of enterprise 
and/or an entrepreneurial spirit in society 
by incorporating enterprise into the 
school and college curriculum 
Australia, 
Netherlands, 
but leading area 
was Atlantic 
Canada 
Conventional assessments are 
particularly difficult here 
because of the long “lead times” 
. Special  Groups Law 44 Provides finance and mentoring advice to 
young people in Southern Italy, where 
enterprise creation rates were very low  
Southern Italy This is an expensive programme, 
but most studies show the 
survival rates of assisted firms to 
be well above those of 
“spontaneous” firms 
Source: Table taken (modified) from Storey (2003) 
 
The policy shift to enabling the creation and viability of knowledge-based 
entrepreneurial firms is evidenced by passage by the United States Congress of the Small 
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Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program in the early 1980s. Enactment of the SBIR 
was a response to the loss of American competitiveness in global markets. Congress 
mandated each federal agency with allocating around four percent of its annual budget to 
funding innovative small firms as a mechanism for restoring American international 
competitiveness (Wessner, 2000). The SBIR provides a mandate to the major R&D agencies 
in the United States to allocate a share of the research budget to innovative small firms. In 
2001 the SBIR program amounted to around $1.4 billion. The SBIR consists of three phases. 
Phase I is oriented towards determining the scientific and technical merit along with the 
feasibility of a proposed research idea. A Phase I award provides an opportunity for a small 
business to establish the feasibility and technical merit of a proposed innovation. The duration 
of the award is six months and can not exceed $70,000. Phase II extends the technological 
idea and emphasizes commercialization. A Phase II Award is granted to only the most 
promising of the Phase I projects based on scientific/technical merit, the expected value to the 
funding agency, company capability and commercial potential. The duration of the award is a 
maximum of 24 months and generally does not exceed $600,000. Approximately 40 percent 
of the Phase I Awards continue on to Phase II. Phase III involves additional private funding 
for the commercial application of a technology. A Phase III Award is for the infusion and use 
of a product into the commercial market. Private sector investment, in various forms, is 
typically present in Phase III. Under the Small Business Research and Development 
Enhancement Act of 1992, funding in Phase I was increased to $100,000, and in Phase II to 
$750,000. 
The SBIR represents about 60 percent of all public entrepreneurial finance programs. 
Taken together, the public small-business finance is about two-thirds as large as private 
venture capital. In 1995, the sum of equity financing provided through and guaranteed by 
public programs financing SMEs was $2.4 billion, which amounted to more than 60 percent 
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of the total funding disbursed by traditional venture funds in that year. Equally as important, 
the emphasis on SBIR and most public funds is on early stage finance, which is generally 
ignored by private venture capital. Some of the most innovative American companies 
received early stage finance from SBIR, including Apple Computer, Chiron, Compaq and 
Intel. 
There is compelling evidence that the SBIR program has had a positive impact on 
economic performance in the U.S. (Wessner, 2000; Lerner, 1999). The benefits have been 
documented as: 
• The survival and growth rates of SBIR recipients have exceeded those of firms 
not receiving SBIR funding 
• The SBIR induces scientists involved in biomedical research to change their 
career path. By applying the scientific knowledge to commercialization, these scientists 
shift their career trajectories away from basic research towards entrepreneurship. 
• The SBIR awards provide a source of funding for scientists to launch start-up 
firms that otherwise would not have had access to alternative sources of funding. 
• SBIR awards have a powerful demonstration effect. Scientists commercializing 
research results by starting companies induce colleagues to consider applications and the 
commercial potential of their own research. 
Sternberg (1996) has shown that a number of government-sponsered technology 
policies in four countries – Great Britain, Germany, the U.S. and Japan, has triggered the 
startup of new firms. The majority of the startup programs are targeted towards eliminated 
particular bottlenecks in the development and financing of new firms. Sternberg (1990) 
examines the impact that 70 innovation centers have had on the development of technology-
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based small firms. He finds that the majority of the entrepreneurs find a number of advantages 
from locating at an innovation center.  
The second fundamental shift involves the locus of such enabling policies, which are 
increasingly at the state, regional or even local level. The downsizing of federal agencies 
charged with the regulation of business in many of the OECD countries has been interpreted 
by many scholars as the eclipse of government intervention. But to interpret deregulation, 
privatisation and the increased irrelevance of competition policies as the end of government 
intervention in business ignores an important shift in the locus and target of public policy. The 
last decade has seen the emergence of a broad spectrum of enabling policy initiatives that fall 
outside of the jurisdiction of the traditional regulatory agencies. Sternberg (1996) documents 
how the success of a number of different high-technology clusters spanning a number of 
developed countries is the direct result of enabling policies, such as the provision of venture 
capital or research support. For example, the Advanced Research Program in Texas has 
provided support for basic research and the strengthening of the infrastructure of the 
University of Texas, which has played a central role in developing a high-technology cluster 
around Austin (Feller, 1997). The Thomas Edison Centers in Ohio, the Advanced Technology 
Centers in New Jersey, and the Centers for Advanced Technology at Case Western Reserve 
University, Rutgers University and the University of Rochester have supported generic, 
precompetitive research. This support has generally provided diversified technology 
development involving a mix of activities encompassing a broad spectrum of industrial 
collaborators. the Edison Technology Program of Ohio was established by the State of Ohio, 
as a means of transferring technology from universities and government research institutes to 
new firm startups. Carlsson and Brunerhjelm  (1999) explain how the Edison BioTechnology 
Center serves an important dual role as a “bridging institution” between academic research 
and industry and between new startups and potential sources of finance. The Edison Centers 
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in particular, try to link the leading universities and medical institutions, businesses, 
foundations, to civic and state organizations in Ohio in order to create new business 
opportunities. Numerous centers exist across the state. Similarly, the Edison Program has 
established a bridging institution to support polymer research and technology in Ohio. 
Carlsson and Brunerhjelm (1999) credit the program for the startup of new high technology 
firms in Ohio. 
Other examples of enabling policies are evidenced by the plethora of science, 
technology and research parks. Lugar and Goldstein (1991) conducted a review of research 
parks and concluded that such parks are created in order to promote the competitiveness of a 
particular region. Lugar (2001, p. 47) further noted that, “The most successful parks…have a 
profound impact on a region and its competitiveness.” A distinct exemplar of this effect is 
found in the Research Triangle Park in North Carolina.  
The traditional industries in North Carolina - furniture, textiles, and tobacco - had all 
lost international competitiveness, resulting in declines in employment and stagnated real 
incomes. In 1952, only Arkansas and Mississippi had lower per capita incomes. According to 
Link and Scott (forthcoming, p. 2), a movement emerged to use the rich knowledge base of 
the region, formed by the three major universities – Duke University, University of North 
Carolina-Chapel Hill and North Carolina State. This movement, though it initially consisted 
only of businessmen looking to improve industrial growth, ultimately fell into the hands of 
the Governor’s office, who supported the efforts through fruition (Link, 1995). Empirical 
evidence provides strong support that the initiative creating Research Triangle has led to 
fundamental changes in the region. Link and Scott (forthcoming), document the growth in the 
number of research companies in the Research Triangle Park as increasing from none in 1958 
to 50 by the mid-1980s and to over 100 by 1997. At the same time, employment in these 
research companies increased from zero in the late 1950s to over 40,000 by 1997. Lugar 
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(2001) attributes the Research Triangle Park with directly and indirectly generating one-
quarter of all jobs in the region between 1959 and 1990, and shifting the nature of those jobs 
towards high value-add knowledge activities. 
Such enabling policies are not restricted to the U.S. One of the most interesting 
examples of the new enabling entrepreneurship policy involves the establishment of five 
EXIST regions in Germany, where startups from universities and government research 
laboratories are encouraged (BMBF, 2000). The program has the explicit goals of (1) creating 
an entrepreneurial culture, (2) the commercialization of scientific knowledge, and (3) 
increasing the number of innovative start-ups and SMEs. Five regions were selected among 
many applicants for START funding. These are the (1) Rhein-Ruhr region (bizeps program), 
(2) Dresden (Dresden exists), (3) Thueringen (GET UP), (4) Karlsruhe (KEIM), and (5) 
Stuttgart (PUSH!). 
These programs promoting entrepreneurship in a regional context are typical of the 
new enabling policies to promote entrepreneurial activity. While these entrepreneurial policies 
are clearly evolving, they are clearly gaining in importance and impact in the overall portfolio 
of economic policy instruments. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Globalization has shifted the comparative advantage in the OECD countries away from being 
based on traditional inputs of production, such as land, labor and capital, towards knowledge. 
This has triggered a divergence between the competitiveness of firms and the competitiveness 
of locations. As the strategic management of firms dictated a response to globalization of 
outward foreign direct investment combined with employment downsizing at high cost 
locations, public policy has responded by developing the strategic management of places. 
Policy to promote entrepreneurship has emerged as playing a central role in the strategic 
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management of places, because entrepreneurial activity is the conduit between investments in 
knowledge and economic growth at the particular location. However, due to the two sources 
of market failure associated with investments in knowledge and entrepreneurial activity 
identified in this paper, private agents will tend to underinvest in entrepreneurial activity. A 
major goal of the strategic management of places is to pursue policies that will compensate 
for this market failure by promoting knowledge-based entrepreneurship as a vehicle for the 
employment growth and global competitiveness. 
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Introduction 
Entering global market has long been thought of as a business activity of large companies 
rather than of startups. Indeed not many young companies venture abroad in the early stages 
of their existence. Yet for startups in certain emerging (technological) sectors, globalisation is 
inevitable, and offers interesting opportunities. It is inevitable because high R&D expenditure 
can rarely be compensated by sales in the domestic market alone; finding foreign customers is 
therefore essential. Globalisation is also inevitable since in many technological sectors the 
necessary resources and potential partners are scarcely available and scattered around the 
globe. By combining such international resources and working with international partners 
startups can create products and services with a high added value. Early internationalisation or 
even a real global startup has become possible because technological innovations such as the 
Internet facilitate international activities and reduce its costs to a great extent. Moreover, 
increasingly, highly educated and well-travelled entrepreneurs possess the skills and the 
vision necessary to be internationally active. Early stage internationalisation therefore seems 
to be a logical consequence of starting a high tech venture. Still, only a small portion of all 
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high tech startups can indeed be considered global startups. Others are not able to fulfil their 
global potential. From experiences with ‘traditional’ spin-off programmes, such as the 
University of Twente’s Temporary Entrepreneurial Programme (Van der Sijde, Ridder, Van 
Benthem & Groen, 2002) and the GlobalStart project (EU-Paxis; IPS 2001 41038) we know 
that universities can and do play an important role in the creation and stimulation of 
international new ventures and in the facilitation of their development and reaching their full 
global potential. In this paper we explore how universities can do this. 
 
Characterising a Global Startup Company 
Based on our previous work (Wakkee, Kirwan and van der Sijde 2004, Wakkee, 2004) we 
introduce ten characteristics outlining what constitutes a global startup company.  
 
Characteristic 1: Global Startups often begin international activities even before the 
start of the actual (sales) operations. Evidence from our previous work shows that global 
startups engage in global activities during their startup period. Global startup companies tend 
to initiate activities involving foreign counterparts to identify and develop ideas, gain 
information, assemble resources and set up joint R&D or production activities, often even 
before the first sale has been closed or even before the firm is officially founded. In our 
perspective, this characteristic differentiates global startups from born global firms. ;A born 
global firm has been described as a  firm which begins international sales during its startup 
period and which develops these activities over time (e.g. Knight, 1997, Harveston, 2000) 
even if the activities remain limited to international sales in a small number of countries. 
 
Characteristic 2: Global Startups engage in international activities to pursue 
opportunities. Another characteristic of global startup firms is their entrepreneurial nature. 
This entrepreneurial nature is a reflection on the ability of the global startup to recognise and 
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exploit opportunities wherever they arise across the globe. Global startup firms proactively 
create and pursue opportunities regardless of international borders whereas the international 
activities of most other firms are initiated as a result of unsolicited orders from abroad. Also, 
in our perspective building a competitive advantage – is often mentioned as the purpose for 
early internationalisation (e.g. McDougall et. al., 1994; Dominguinhos, 2001)- may not 
always be the goal of starting internationalisation early on. The reasons for this are that 
startup may not necessarily compare their performance to that of their competitors, and /or 
even because in emerging industries no competitive regime has yet been established.  
   
Characteristic 3: Global Startups are involved in a wide range of formal and informal 
value-added activities across national borders. As previously mentioned, international sales 
are the most prevalent international activity mentioned in the literature (Rennie, 1993, Knight, 
1997, Harveston, 2000, Rasmussen et. al., 2000). Interviews with entrepreneurs however 
revealed that although  view sales as the most important international activity, case evidence 
showed that global startups typically are engaged in other cross border activities as well, e.g. 
collaborative R & D projects and utilising foreign (tangible and intangible) resources (Burgel 
& Murray, 1997). Given that the technology involved in many global start ups is so radically 
new, traditional marketing techniques may not suffice, firms have to employ new techniques 
to create awareness and acceptance of their products and many firms engage in cross border 
activities to achieve this.  
 
Characteristic 4: Global Startups use a variety of formal and informal network entry 
modes across national borders. The concept entry mode is frequently used in relation to 
international sales (direct export, use of domestic or international agents, setting up sales 
offices abroad (e.g. Johanson & Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975, Cavusgil, 1980). For instance, a 
company can use direct sales, agents, local distributors, or a local sales subsidiary to enter 
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different markets. The cases show that the use of different entry modes is not limited to 
entering sales markets but more general to entering various international networks whether 
these are related to sales, R&D, production or simply the exchanges of ideas and information 
across national borders. From the cases it seems that global startups use entry modes that 
range from cross-border activities that are directed from the domestic market, the use of 
intermediaries (e.g. sales agents or distributors), partnerships (e.g. joint R&D) or setting up 
foreign subsidiaries either through Greenfield operations or joint ventures 
 
Characteristic 5. Global Startups are active in a wide number of regions of the world. 
Global startup companies are truly globally active rather than ‘merely’ internationally active. 
With a few exceptions other authors have either not included a measure of global diversity at 
all (Cavusgil & Knight, 1996) or used a measure based on the number of countries (e.g. 
Kandasaami, 1998). However, in our view a firm that is active only in Europe even if it is 
active in 10 different countries in Europe can hardly be called a global startup. Case evidence 
shows that global startups are active in at least two regions, e.g. Europe and North America, 
while there is also evidence of companies active in Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, etc. 
 
Characteristic 6: Global Startups internationalise their activities following the 
presence of opportunities rather than following a pattern of increasing physical and cultural 
distance. Most companies follow patterns of internationalisation of moving their international 
activities from their home countries to those that are physically and culturally close and then 
increasingly distant. This pattern of increasing psychic distance has often been used to 
describe internationalisation processes in traditional internationalisation literature (Johansson 
& Wiedersheim-Paul, 1979). In the literature on international new ventures (e.g. Rennie, 
1993, McDougall et. al., 1994, Jones, 2001) as well as in our case studies, it has already been 
shown that international new ventures, including global startups do not follow such traditional 
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internationalisation patterns. Rather, reflecting the global vision of the founding 
entrepreneurs, global startups seek out and pursue opportunities wherever these exist and 
employ the same technique for their further internationalisation activities. That global startups 
follow these less traditional internationalisation patterns is sometimes borne out of necessity 
given that the opportunity do not exist on a local level.  
 
Characteristic 7: Global Startups are not necessarily high growth companies. Despite 
not being explicitly mentioned in the definitions of global startup companies many authors 
(e.g. Jolly et al., 1992; Oviatt and McDougall, 1994; Zahra and George, 2002) put forward 
that global startups are high growth companies. Examining the empirical evidence does not 
present a compelling argument one-way or the other. While examples exist of companies who 
have experienced rapid growth, evidence also exists of startup companies who remain small 
in terms of number of employees, and whose founders indicated that they were not interested 
in running large multinational firms. These companies employ strategic actions to avoid rapid 
growth, e.g. through international strategic alliances they can attract customers they could 
never handle without engaging in expansion of the company. There is further evidence of 
companies spinning off new business units in preference of growing the original one. Further, 
the lack of growth in some cases is a reflection on the research-intensive nature of the 
business. For these firms the period between the initiation of business activities and the 
generation of profits may be extensive, growth might only start after a considerable number of 
years. From this it can be concluded that while high growth is a characteristic of certain global 
startups it is not necessarily a defining characteristic of all global startup firms.  
 
Characteristic 8: Global startups are characterised by high levels of entrepreneurial 
orientation. The construct Entrepreneurial Orientation as developed by Lumpkin and Dess 
(e.g. Lumpkin and Dess, 1996, Lumpkin, 1998) was originally developed for more established 
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firms, to measure a firm’s track record with regards to innovativeness, risk taking, 
proactiveness and competitive aggressiveness. However, case evidence from the literature 
indicates that considerably high levels of entrepreneurial orientation (EO) can also be 
identified in global startups. Global startup companies are highly innovative, this is reflected 
in the types of products/applications of technology that they develop, an example of the level 
of a company’s innovativeness could be measured by the number of patents that that company 
owns. A further illustration of entrepreneurial orientation can be seen by those companies 
offering their technologies to other research groups at reduced market rates in return for 
academic output on the technologies. This proactive approach carries its own risk as some of 
the collaborating research institutes may become interested in entering the market themselves. 
However, this approach concurrently increases the innovative capacity of the firm as it 
reduces the need for investment in additional personnel or research facilities, while still 
affording the company the benefit from the outcomes of these external investigations. 
Whereas most high tech startups need to be innovative, proactive and risk taking in order to 
establish a position in the market, what makes global startups stand out is the fact that these 
firms also show these types of behaviour with respect to entering international markets. 
 
Characteristic 9: Internationally skilled and confident entrepreneurs, who may or may 
not have actual international business experience, typically found Global Startups. The 
descriptions in the literature suggest that born globals, international new ventures, and global 
startups firms are typically founded by entrepreneurs with considerable experience and skill in 
international operations (McDougall, et.al. 1994, Oviatt & McDougall, 1999; Harveston, 
2000). From the case descriptions it is evident that global startup companies are indeed 
founded and directed by a single entrepreneur or a team of entrepreneurs who strongly 
dominate the development of the company. The global vision associated with global startups 
is apparent in the founding entrepreneurs; from the beginning they identified the global nature 
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of their company’s opportunity. They realised that on the one hand their products would offer 
added value to customers around the world and that on the other hand, global activities were 
essential in setting up these activities. However, from examination of case material 
considerable variety exists with respect to the international experience of the founding 
entrepreneur(ial) team. Many founders have considerable experience in living and working 
abroad which is deemed to have had an impact on the development of the company. Yet, at 
least as many founders of successful global startups do not possess first hand international 
experience. Many founding entrepreneurs have a background in academia, while these 
entrepreneurs are lacking international work experience in an industry context; Universities 
are highly international organisations where students, staff and faculty members from foreign 
countries visit regularly and these scholars are used to participating in international 
conferences. This international culture may give these entrepreneurs sufficient confidence in 
which to operate internationally. Also, the (non-American) entrepreneurs were able to 
communicate in foreign languages (typically English and one other language). This too 
provided them with the confidence to set up international operations.  
 
Characteristic 10: Global Startups often rely on the relationship with a strong 
partner; this may be a commercial partner or a research institute. Although not identified in 
the literature the examples from the empirical investigation of the cases revealed one other 
important characteristic of global startups; in each of the cases the presence of a partner or 
network was a critical success factor. In many of the cases this partner was a research institute 
of a university or a financial investor/institution. In the cases these partners played an 
important role in providing the startup companies with access to such resources as finance, 
research facilities, intellectual property, etc., while also providing the new company with 
some legitimacy.  For the startups it would have been very difficult or even impossible to 
obtain such resources on their own or by other means and without these the companies could 
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simply not exist. The presence of the strong partner has been seen to have positive effects in 
helping startups establish their organisation and customer base, providing mentoring and 
coaching for those starting entrepreneurs with limited business experience and improving the 
level of credibility of the starting firms. However, firms must develop their network 
sufficiently so as not to be over reliant on any one partner.  
 
The university as a strong partner 
In the characteristics many implicit and explicit references to “networks” are made. The 
network of a firm consists of many different types of actors (individuals and organizations). In 
this contribution we focus specifically on the role of the university in helping the firm coping 
with its challenges. The reason for this is that many technology-based firms originate from a 
university. They are often the result of commercialising research results and/or many 
companies are founded by (former) staff members of a university (Jones-Evans, 1995; 
Klofsten & Jones-Evans, 2000). Research shows that the parent organisation often plays a 
critical role in the development of their spin-off (Autio, 1997). 
From an analysis of case studies on startup companies it can be seen that Global Startup 
companies usually have a relationship with one strong partner, e.g. university research group 
or a venture capitalist (Wakkee et al., 2004). This strong partner provides the new company 
with access to resources and information and also provides some legitimacy for the startup 
venture. Universities are often these “strong partners” and they have relationships with other 
support-offering actors (e.g. incubators, regional development agencies, etc.) and together 
these organisations can also support the new venture in their internationalisation and 
globalisation. In Figure 1 we present the expected starting position and development of the 
network of the potential global start up company. In the initial stage the firm has a strong 
relationship with an established player (strong partner) in the global market (black text). Over 
the course of time it is expected that this network will evolve into a situation where the tie 
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between the global start up company and its strong partner has lessened. At the same time the 
global start up company will have strengthened it’s ties with the other global market players 
enabling it to realise its global potential. We will briefly illustrate this with a case taken from 
Wakkee (2004) 
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Figure 1: The development of the Global Start Ups’ Network Over Time
OSO OSO
GPx 
GP1x 
LP 
PGSU = Potential 
Global Start Up 
SP = Strong Partner 
GP = Global Partner 
OSO = Other Support 
Organisation 
LP = Local Partner 
LP
Peter van der Sijde: Global startups and the role of universities 
 
 44
Short profile of the company.  X-Tech3 was founded in 1998 by a researcher and a former 
business consultant. Its main products are sound measurement devices based on a radical new 
technology. Because of the highly specialized nature of the product, the company operates in 
a niche market and competes mainly with suppliers of traditional microphones. In fact 
creating awareness, understanding and acceptance of the technology is one of the key issues 
for this company. By 2003 the company has operations in more than 25 different countries. 
These activities range from selling products directly, the setting up of a network of 
distributors to exchange of knowledge with researchers working at universities around the 
world. Interestingly, the company invites researchers around the world to work with the 
technology. This will not only increase the awareness of the technology but might also lead to 
the discovery or development of new applications. Therefore, this approach can be seen as an 
innovative way of outsourcing R&D. 
                                                 
3 The company has asked us not to reveal its real name. 
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The picture above of the network of the company in 1998 and 2003 illustrates the 
development of X-Tech’s network during this period. The network develops from a dyadic 
network – the company / entrepreneur and the university (research group) – into a complex 
network of technology providers, other universities and research institutes, clients, agents etc. 
It is not the intention of this paper to explain the picture in detail; interested parties are 
referred to Wakkee (2004). The picture is to illustrate some salient developments:  
• The original university is still a part of the network, but its role has changed. The 
starting network work consisted of the entrepreneur and the university, i.e. the strong 
partner. That the original university is deemed the strong partner is indicative of the 
role it played in the development of the startup company’s network. In 2003, the 
university still features in X-Tech’s network but not as it's only partner and not as it’s 
only university. X-Tech developed cooperation with many universities in the world 
who test their products in experimental situations. The tie with the university is 
weaker, but still present. 
• The company changed enormously: The original entrepreneur who started the 
company (in the 1998 picture indicated with “1”) is now part of a larger (but still a 
small) company. In the period from 1998 till 2003 it merged with another company (in 
the 2003 picture “11”, of which the original entrepreneur was also part) and that 
became eventually a new entity (in the picture 1”). This illustrates that the company is 
a dynamic entity that adapts to changes and pursues opportunities. 
• New organisations enter the network and others leave. Wakkee (2004) describes the 
development of the network in more detail. Some network relations are of a temporary 
nature (e.g. with subsidy providers on a specific development project). 
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About the role of universities 
The previous section could suggest that the role of the university is “just” to be the provider of 
networks and that its role a strong partner is “just” this. In some cases this is true and in others 
this is not. Going over each of the characteristics of the global startup, we can identify a role 
for universities. We will use the aforementioned characteristics of global startups to illustrate 
what role universities can play; we specifically highlight five of the ten characteristics: 
• Global Startups often begin international activities even before the start of the actual 
operations. 
All companies go through the stages of opportunity recognition, preparation for exploitation 
and exploitation. Most companies start international activities only in the exploitation stage; 
global startups already need to begin international activities during the phase of “opportunity 
recognition”. Universities can introduce the potential global startup to its international 
contacts and relations (universities, companies and capital providers) – if it is willing and able 
to do so. 
• Global Startups engage in international activities to pursue opportunities.  
Global startups pursue international opportunities and not local or regional opportunities. It is 
our opinion that the role of universities can support to the founding entrepreneurs of 
companies that have such a potential. Universities play an important role in achieving this 
task by indicating and emphasising the global nature of their opportunities. 
• Global Startups are involved in a wide range of formal and informal value-added 
activities across national borders. 
Global startups often are companies that commercialise products based on a disruptive 
technology. These technologies are in development and the global startups need to liaise with 
ancillary organisations e.g. other universities, research labs and companies, in order to get the 
greatest benefits from the technological developments. Universities are the first and most 
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important source for global startups in this regard. In addition, Universities can help identify 
the location of new knowledge and / or facilities at institutes around the world, if they are not 
able or willing to provide these on the site. 
• Global Startups are typically founded by internationally skilled and confident 
entrepreneurs, who may or may not have actual international business experience 
Experience shows that many (not all) entrepreneurs who start a company with global potential 
are graduates of a university. The role of the university could be to promote entrepreneurship 
and the commercialisation of research.  Also, stimulate international entrepreneurship, 
universities should foster a culture of international exchange and provide skills training 
programs at all levels of the organisation 
• Global Startups often rely on the relationship with a strong partner; this may be a 
commercial partner or a research institute 
This statement needs no further elaboration at this moment. 
 
Concluding remarks 
Above we have argued that in its quest to build  position on the market, a global startup needs 
to engage in a wide variety of activities, using various network entry modes in order to obtain 
and develop ideas, engage in R&D activities, create products and sell them on a global 
market. Lacking both resources, international networks and experience at the beginning of its 
startup process, a global startup cannot do this alone: having a strong partner is necessary. A 
university can be such a strong partner, but as outlined above, more than that. A university 
that fosters entrepreneurship among its students and staff, and opens up its resources 
(including networks) is more than a strong partner – it is the ideal partner for companies with 
global potential.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The key theme of this paper is that trained and experienced entrepreneurs are a critical 
resource for successful technology based start-ups. For this paper I have drawn on recent 
research at the Australian Graduate School of Entrepreneurship (AGSE) into technological 
innovation and entrepreneurship, which has resulted in the formation of spin-off companies 
from Australian publicly funded research institutions. Most of this research has been focussed 
on the class of spin-off companies in which there is a direct ongoing intellectual property link 
with the parent university or other research agency. Typically, such spin-offs have a strong 
equity component from the parent institution. Most of these companies will have their first 
private equity investor within their first five years of existence. In other words, they will be 
typically private equity capital driven, usually involving a business angel or friend, rather than 
a formal venture capital fund. In addition, I have drawn on many years of experience gained 
from working with inventors, discoverers, entrepreneurs and venture finance providers, in the 
Australian context. 
 The paper starts with a brief overview of the AGSE and its research and teaching 
focus, to provide a context for the comments in this paper.  We then review the relevant 
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classes and definitions of technology based start-ups based on research outcomes (and other 
sources of new technology) to illustrate how this class of companies relates to other types of 
spin-offs, which may well have different characteristics and differing needs and roles for 
trained and experienced entrepreneurs. Next we clarify what we mean by competent 
entrepreneurs and finally, the paper presents an outline of the now well-developed Master of 
Entrepreneurship program at AGSE. This program is offered as an example of an effective 
solution  to the challenge of producing appropriately trained and experienced entrepreneurs. 
 
CONTEXT – AGSE’S RESEARCH AND TEACHING ROLE 
 Swinburne University of Technology has been actively engaged in teaching and 
researching entrepreneurship for some 20 years. In 1986 the university started the first 
Australian post-graduate program in entrepreneurship, which quickly evolved into the current 
Master of Entrepreneurship and Innovation (MEI) degree. Some five years ago an Israeli 
group started to teach the MEI in Tel Aviv. Altogether, over 600 men and women have now 
graduated with this degree. Today, AGSE has some 300 MEI students, around 400 MBA 
students and just over 100 doctoral research students.  
 The research agenda at AGSE covers most aspects of entrepreneurship including 
opportunity creation and evaluation, venture creation and resource acquisition, and the 
challenges posed by rapid growth. Of particular current interest are issues to do with the 
development and evaluation of an entrepreneurial business plan,  exit strategy development, 
the assessment of innovation capability and the annual review of the state of entrepreneurial 
activity in Australia as part of the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor project. The GEM project 
also focuses on public sector policy in relation to entrepreneurship. Other and emerging 
research interests include the fields of indigenous entrepreneurship and social 
entrepreneurship. 
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 The specific research referred to in this paper on spin-offs forms part of an ongoing 
interest in the National Innovation System and the related field of extracting social value from 
publicly funded research. 
 
A TAXONOMY  OF TECHNOLOGY BASED START-UPS 
 Before summarising some of our recent research on technology-based start-ups, it will 
be useful to clarify the  language we use in this field. We have found the following terms 
helpful. 
Commercialisation Process – In the Australian context, commercialisation has a 
specific as well as a general meaning. In common usage, it means taking an innovation 
through the process of creating a marketable good or service (i.e. creating a product) and 
taking that product to the market (i.e. creating a base of customers who will buy the product). 
In the more specific case of tax-payer funded research in the universities, the CSIRO 
(Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation) and the CRC’s 
(Collaborative Research Centres), the term has come to refer to a whole host of activities 
undertaken by these institutions and others, to create social value (or wealth). Thus the 
“commercialisation process” has become an important part of the national innovation system, 
whereby publicly funded research is intended to create a return on investment. It is both 
important and useful to note, though beyond the scope of this paper, that the 
commercialisation objective has created a serious tension between those who view public 
sector research as being for the common good, and those who want it to create wealth for 
investors. 
Direct Research Spin-offs (DRSO’s) – Sometimes also called spin-outs, these are 
business ventures in which the parent body (university, etc), retains some equity position in 
return for its intellectual property contribution. These DRSO’s seldom end up in incubators, 
and often have parent institution research staff seconded to them, either temporarily or 
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permanently. These types of spin-offs have been the subject of  considerable research and 
policy attention. DRSO’s seem to be of two types: 
• Product companies – those which actually develop, produce and sell products 
to commercial markets. 
• Technology Asset Companies – those which restrict themselves to only 
produce intellectual property, which is sold or licensed to other users. 
Indirect Research Spin-offs (IRSO’S) – are typically opportunity driven and initiated 
by students, ex-students and/or staff of the parent organizations. These entities often do go 
though an incubation phase and have no equity held by the parent institution. They often need 
up to a year or so to decide whether or not to incorporate – and when unsuccessful often have 
considerable trouble getting un-incorporated (for legal and other reasons). This type of spin-
off, while quite popular, has received little research attention in Australia. 
Other opportunity-driven New Technology Small Firms (NTSF) – These are often 
mentioned in the research literature and are taken to include technology-based start-ups other 
than those described above. 
Technology Transfer Companies (TTC’s) -  these basically aim to sell consulting 
services and/or contract research services to industry, government and other buyers. In 
Australia there are several versions of TTC’s operated by universities and other research  
agencies. Their contribution to parent body income has been very varied. 
Holding Companies – these are structured to “hold” or own, various kinds of 
intellectual property on behalf of their research parent. In some respects, these entities are a 
response to the preference of external investors to have a simple structure in relation to IP 
ownership to negotiate with, rather than the usual complexity existing in public institutions. 
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SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 Given the peculiarities of the Australian innovation system we have also found it 
useful to differentiate between two kinds of “innovation”. Typically, in common usage, 
innovation refers to anything new (idea, invention, discovery etc.), irrespective of whether or 
not such an innovation will ever yield anything of value to society. This stands in contrast to 
the more specific terminology used by earlier writers on entrepreneurship, where the term 
innovation included the commercial exploitation of the new knowledge. Hindle (2002) has 
gone to some trouble to sort out this confusion and has proposed the use of ‘small-i’ 
innovation to refer to the former kind, and ‘big-I’ Innovation to the second kind. Using this 
distinction, Hindle has been able to make a significant contribution to the concept of 
entrepreneurial capacity and the use of this concept in national policy formulation. 
 Another theoretical issue that has been receiving attention at AGSE is the question of 
appropriate research methods for studying entrepreneurship. Campbell (2003) has presented a 
comprehensive review and analysis of the philosophical underpinnings of entrepreneurship 
research and further develops the argument that new venture creation is a highly non-linear 
process and is best understood through the use of holistic rather than reductionist methods. He 
particularly critiques the limitations of statistical methods, which he argues give only very 
limited insights into entrepreneurial activity. Campbell also mounts a strong argument that it 
is not very useful to try to study entrepreneurship without taking into account the central role 
of the entrepreneur. This theme is also taken up in research discussed below. 
 
TECHNOLOGY BASED START-UPS 
 One recent example of research in this field is that reported by Yencken and Gillin 
(2004a, 2004b), who discuss research on 25 spin-off companies from universities and other 
public research providers. They were interested to see if such spin-offs followed the processes 
described in the literature for opportunity driven start-ups, and to what extent it was readily 
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possible to identify the entrepreneur. Sixteen of the 25 cases proved to be analysable in this 
context, and these were classified into the three groups suggested by Bhide (2000), who 
classified new ventures into: 
1. Opportunity driven ventures, with a clearly identifiable entrepreneur. Examples from 
the university sector would include those ventures which are spin-offs based on 
university-developed knowledge, by ex students and/or staff, but which have no IP 
relationship with the parent university. Nine of the sixteen spin-offs were in this 
category, and in all cases the founding entrepreneur continued to be the critical driving 
force even though in several cases someone else had been appointed as the CEO. 
2. Venture capital driven enterprises, starting with a technology champion and typically 
quickly recruiting a surrogate entrepreneur as CEO.  These ventures are often Direct 
Research Spin-offs, and often raise the question of who and where is the entrepreneur. 
Two of the sixteen companies were in this category and for both of these companies 
the CEO was recruited from outside. 
3. Corporate ventures, well planned and resourced before being set free, with an 
experienced start-up manager, but not someone who looks like the opportunity driven 
entrepreneur. In Australia, this model is typical of CRC start-ups. Five of the sixteen 
companies were in this category. The parents of these spin-offs had well developed 
capacities to evaluate opportunities and to appoint an experienced start-up manager. 
 
The research identified the important role played by the start-up entrepreneur, whether 
original founder or surrogate. The authors argue that it is important in the case of spin-offs to 
pay particular attention to the key question – who is the entrepreneur? As the research 
indicates, the answer is not always self-evident. 
The authors stress that an important finding in relation to these spin-off companies is that 
the trigger leading to the identification and evaluation of the opportunity resided within the 
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university or other parent body and was closely related to the opportunity finder in the 
respective organisation. The authors suggest that encouraging research agencies to increase 
their rate of disclosure will enhance their capacity to create spin-offs. 
In another forthcoming paper, this time by Hindle and Yencken (2004), the authors 
attempt to articulate an integrated model for public research commercialisation. The authors 
argue that entrepreneurship is the engine of innovation and that “the accumulated tacit 
knowledge and culture of the entrepreneur are the resources essential to create wealth from 
research commercialisation, leading to technological innovation  and the creation of New 
Technology Based Firms. This piece, based on prior research at AGSE and on a critical 
review of the literature, also places the entrepreneur in a position of central importance – both 
for the opportunity recognition and evaluation task and the complex process of creating a 
viable new technology based venture. 
 
Some case examples 
At this stage, it might be useful to briefly comment on a few actual cases of new 
technology based ventures associated with Swinburne University, to give some examples of 
current practice. 
The first one arose from an internal business plan competition described further below. 
The technology relates to a medical diagnostic application and the project is at the stage of 
working up a funding proposal for external investors. The team consists of both technical 
innovators and an entrepreneur who is completing a Master of Entrepreneurship course. In 
this case, the initial equity split is 60% to the University and 40% to the student team, as 
“sweat equity”. If investors are found, these equity positions will of course be reduced.  
A second case example is a venture to commercialise some materials technology 
developed by the University. In this case, an external entrepreneur who knows the potential 
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market very well has been brought in as an equity partner with the University, which has 
negotiated an acceptable equity split with the external partner. 
In a third case example, a University developed technology will be commercialised with 
the participation of an external incubator, which will provide the initial business infrastructure 
to get the venture going and which has recruited an experienced entrepreneur to head up the 
project. In this case, the University retained 50% of the founding equity, the incubator 
operator received 25% and the start-up entrepreneur got 25% as sweat equity. 
A fourth example arises from research in psychology. In this case, an external 
entrepreneur has been found to lead the commercialisation process and he was allocated 40% 
of the founding equity. The researchers were allocated 35% and the University retained 25%. 
This project is well on the way to commercial success. 
These examples are typical of current commercialisation practice in our environment. 
There are many variations, with some using internal entrepreneurs and others using external 
ones. In all cases, the selection of the project leader, the entrepreneur, is now considered to be 
as important as the quality of the technical innovation and the  ongoing development of the 
technology. 
 
KEY COMPETENCIES OF TECHNOLOGY BASED ENTREPRENEURS 
 Arising from our work on technology based start-ups, including university spin-offs, 
we can identify a number of key competencies which are needed by entrepreneurs working in 
this field, whether they are initial champions or brought-in surrogate entrepreneurs. These 
competencies are: 
1. Previous experience in managing a start-up or other NTSF. This may have been 
acquired by working on a less complex technology start-up, or by being a significant 
participant in such a venture. 
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2. Speaking the same language as the researchers involved. The language of business 
and the language of science and technology are not the same. The entrepreneur has to 
be able to bridge this gap and be able to communicate effectively with both 
communities. 
3. Finding the resources needed and combining them to create synergy. Typically the 
technology members of the team are not competent to find risk capital and other 
resources (human, infrastructure and so on) needed to make the venture a success. 
4. Ability to live lean and to not give up when the going gets tough. Researchers used to 
operating in well-resourced and supported environments often find this a major 
challenge. 
5. Intellectual property protection and management. This may include not only patents, 
but also several other versions of IP, including the deliberate creation of confidential 
commercial information. 
6. Deal making. This is a critical competence for nearly all entrepreneurs and often is 
quite alien to researchers and inventors. 
7. Establishing credibility and networking with national and global players. Complex 
technological ventures often need the  support  of a broad spectrum of specialists from 
government, finance, industry and other sectors.  
8. Building strategic alliances. New ventures often succeed with the help of powerful 
friends – who may at some time in the future also be the means to a successful exit 
strategy. 
These insights into the competencies required of start-up entrepreneurs are of great use 
in designing and delivering appropriate training programs to enhance entrepreneurial 
skills and knowledge. Our approach to this task is discussed next. 
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TRAINING AND DEVELOPING ENTREPRENEURS & OTHERS 
 At AGSE we have accumulated experience in several types of entrepreneurship 
education and training.  These include familiarisation courses for non-entrepreneurs and 
comprehensive and professional programs for practicing entrepreneurs and their advisors.  
 
Familiarisation courses 
At the most basic level, we run courses for research and technology students and staff 
to familiarise them with the issues involved in commercialising new inventions, discoveries or 
other forms of intellectual capital. These types of courses run from one day to five days in 
duration and provide an overview of what is involved in assessing whether or not a 
technological innovation may have commercial applications, through the protection of IP, to 
what is involved in either selling or licensing the IP or taking it into a new special purpose 
venture. We have delivered such courses to staff and students within Swinburne University 
and also to similar audiences in other universities. The typical outcomes of such learning 
experiences are a better understanding of the challenges and complexities involved in the 
commercialisation process, and a greater sense of realism about the need for entrepreneurial 
capacity in that process.  
We also run familiarisation courses for non-academic staff of the university as part of 
a larger culture-change program aimed at helping the university to become more 
entrepreneurial in the broadest sense. These courses have also proven to be highly popular 
among staff and have resulted in a number of significant innovation initiatives being pursued 
in the university. 
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The Swinburne Venture Cup 
 Several years ago, the university introduced an annual business plan competition for 
students from the three levels of the university, namely technical college students, 
undergraduate students and postgraduate students. The prizes are significant and the 
competition has produced some really interesting new ventures. As part of the competition, 
participants are offered workshops in the fundamentals of assessing an opportunity and in the 
art of developing a viable business model and translating that into a winning business plan. 
The entries in the competition are judged by a panel of external experts, including business 
angels and venture capital providers. This initiative is run jointly between the AGSE and the 
university’s technology commercialisation unit. The Venture Cup generates a considerable 
level of excitement each year as teams are formed and venture ideas are shaped and developed 
into meaningful competition entries. The participating teams are typically comprised of 
students from several disciplines, bringing together the technical innovators and the more 
commercial entrepreneurial types. 
 
Professional programs 
 The highest level program run by AGSE is a full course-work master’s level degree – 
the Master of Entrepreneurship and Innovation, or MEI. As noted earlier, this has evolved 
over some 20 years and is now operating at a highly developed stage. As this has been a 
pioneering program, I will outline it in sufficient detail to give you a taste of what it is about.  
 The MEI was started with the aim of doing something about enhancing entrepreneurial 
capacity. It was well recognised in the eighties that Australia was quite good at generating 
new technological innovations (inventions, discoveries and so on), but lacked the ability to 
gain maximum commercial benefit from such innovation. A combination of academic and 
industry talent came together to craft a special purpose program that might address this need. 
It was recognised at the outset, that those who take a leadership role in the commercialisation  
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of innovation, tended to be different from those who were brilliant at coming up with new 
inventions and discoveries. At that time also (20 years ago), Australia was experimenting with 
its first serious effort to create a venture capital industry, and the stock market was enjoying a 
boom in “high tech” new ventures. In ’97 the stock market crashed and a few years later the 
Australian economy  went into a severe recession, which did not turn around till the mid 
1990’s. In spite of these vicissitudes, the MEI program survived and continued to evolve. 
 Today, the MEI is considered to be, to professional entrepreneurs, what the MBA is to 
professional corporate executives. A growing number of entrepreneurs and their organizations 
(such as the Young Entrepreneurs Organisation, or YEO) are recognising the need for the 
development of a profession of ethical, serial entrepreneurs. The underpinning driving forces 
seem to be very similar to those which led to the creation of professional programs in 
management,  accounting, marketing and other business related professions. The key forces 
are the rapidly growing body of knowledge needed to underpin a profession, the research base 
to keep that body of knowledge alive and growing, the increasing complexity and 
specialisation of knowledge needed to start a new venture in a global context and the growing 
public recognition of the need for ethical and competent behaviour among entrepreneurs. How 
then is the MEI structured and taught? More comprehensive details are available from the 
AGSE website via the university’s portal at www.swin.edu.au.  Here I will present a brief 
overview. It is important to recognise, however, that we do not attempt to make entrepreneurs 
out of people who have no  entrepreneurial talent. We assume that those taking the MEI 
program have sufficient entrepreneurial talent and motivation to undertake such a task, in 
much the same way that architecture schools assume that their students have the requisite 
latent talent and drive. 
 With the above in  mind, an outline of the program goes as follows. The underpinning 
assumptions are that entrepreneurs go about their work of creating and developing new 
enterprises (whether business or social) in three broad stages. The MEI similarly has three 
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stages, each one mirroring the entrepreneur’s tasks. Each stage consists of four subjects, or 
courses. Thus the full MEI requires the student to successfully complete 12 subjects. 
The first stage recognises that entrepreneurs start by creating or discovering what 
looks like an opportunity. As is well known, not all things that look like opportunities are 
indeed viable, and many an entrepreneur has wasted much time and other people’s money in 
the pursuit of false opportunities. By contrast, experienced and knowledgeable entrepreneurs 
are able to assess opportunities and walk away from those which are not going to work. So the 
core subject in Stage 1 is “Opportunity Evaluation”, in which students learn a disciplined 
method for identifying and evaluating opportunities. As an aside, this subject is also proving 
to be of considerable interest to a much wider audience than that of professional 
entrepreneurs. The other three subjects in Stage 1 provide additional foundation knowledge 
and skills in the areas of “guerrilla marketing” (creating markets with very limited resources), 
the fundamentals of venture finance and the foundations of organization creation (knowing 
self and others and how to create an effective organisation). 
Once an entrepreneur has a viable opportunity, the next task is that of procuring 
resources, creating an organization and creating a customer base. Stage 2 of the MEI focuses 
on these and related issues. The core subject for this stage deals with understanding business 
models, business strategy and learning how to craft an effective entrepreneurial business plan. 
Our own research and that of others has shown that entrepreneurial business plans are not the 
same as those for existing business units in established corporations. In essence, the 
entrepreneur has to  craft a business plan to sell something that does not yet exist and which 
may not have anything else to compare it with. This reality creates special challenges for the 
entrepreneur not faced by an executive putting up a case for growth finance to further develop 
an already operating business. The other three subjects in Stage 2 again supplement and add 
to the core theme. We have another organisation subject dealing with the special people-
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related challenges of an often rapidly growing organisation. For many start-up ventures this is 
the biggest hurdle to be overcome. Often, the start-up team is inappropriate to manage the  
larger enterprise and critical human resource decisions need to be made. Another subject deals 
with more advanced issues in finance and financial management, and with legal and 
regulatory issues faced by the entrepreneur. The fourth subject in this stage focuses on the art 
of maintaining a high  level of creativity and innovation in a new venture, something which 
often suffers badly as the organisation  becomes more complex. 
In Stage 3, we deal with those matters that face an entrepreneur after a successful 
start-up and when the enterprise may become too complex or too routine for the entrepreneur 
to remain competent or motivated. In this stage we deal specifically with the challenges of 
developing an effective exit strategy, or transition strategy to a professionally managed 
enterprise. The core subject in this stage deals with how growing ventures are evaluated from 
the outside, and with the options open to an entrepreneur to exit or transition. These include 
the strategies of an Initial Public Offering (IPO), or trade sale, or other means of increasing 
equity to required levels. Other subjects in this third stage include a third level of organisation 
study, dealing with high level leadership and governance issues, a subject dealing with 
negotiating skills and a subject dealing with the art of corporate entrepreneurship and 
innovation, which we view as a critical component of maintaining competitive  viability as the 
enterprise matures.  
These three stages and twelve subjects make sense to students as soon as they are able 
to see the overall design of the program. The individual subjects have undergone considerable 
modification over the years, but the three-stage model has remained as the key design 
principle behind the program.  
Recently, we have added an optional fourth stage to the program, allowing students to 
choose to do an “honours” version of the MEI. In this fourth stage, students could choose to 
further elaborate their program of studies by either taking additional electives, or by doing a 
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four-subject-equivalent minor research thesis. We have found that a significant minority of 
students want to do research in the entrepreneurship field and this recent addition to the 
program provides such an opportunity. 
  
CONCLUSION 
 Research at AGSE has added to the existing knowledge about the  factors that are 
important in ensuring the success of technology-based start-ups. Both our research and that of 
others and our direct experience in working with inventors and discovers has provided further 
support to the view that highly competent technical innovators are seldom able to act as the 
start-up entrepreneurs for technology based ventures. We have also found that such innovators 
may be quite receptive to learning about the complexities of the enterprise creation process, 
but are not themselves suitable to be trained to be effective entrepreneurs. The talent, skill, 
knowledge-set and values of successful inventors and discoverers tend to be quite different 
from those of successful entrepreneurs. There seems to be little point in trying to make good 
researchers into mediocre entrepreneurs. 
 By contrast, the entrepreneurship education and training programs developed and 
delivered by the AGSE have demonstrated both the need for and the effectiveness of 
professional level  education for appropriately  talented latent and/or emerging entrepreneurs. 
An effective national innovation system will recognise and support all three critical factors of 
the wealth  creation process – technological innovation, venture finance and the development 
of a strong cohort of trained and experienced entrepreneurs. 
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ABSTRACT 
Generating knowledge through research is the start of a process that should lead to innovative 
products and processes. But in Europe many primary research results remain unexploited. 
VALOR is designed as the precursor of a full ERA-NET on the generation of spin-off 
companies – one of the most widely-used means through which research results are 
applied. Many national programmes to encourage spin-offs focus on specific aspects rather 
than tackling the entire sequence, from research to production. VALOR will benchmark 
programmes and identify good practices, as the basis for the subsequent ERA-NET to develop 
joint programmes for the optimum guidance and support of spin-off companies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 The following text is taken from an EU publication on ERA-NET and the VALOR 
programme. For further information please visit www.eubuero.de/arbeitsbereiche/eranet or 
www.cordis.lu/coordination/home.html. 
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VALOR is a nine-month project aiming to lay the foundations for a full ERANET dealing 
with practical support for the development of spin-offs. The partners aim to get to the heart of 
the ‘European paradox’ – the yawning gap between Europe’s world-class academic research 
and its much less successful industrial innovation. Despite massive spending on research in all 
areas, much of the knowledge generated fails to result in commercially viable products and 
services. More needs to be done to bridge this gap before the EU’s Member States can 
become competitive, knowledge based economies. 
VALOR will not address all of the many ways in which basic research results are 
commercialised. It focuses on knowledge transfer and spin-offs – new, research-driven 
companies established to commercialise knowledge which was developed by, or through a 
close working relationship with, a university or research institute. Spin-offs from research 
establishments directly translate new knowledge into marketable products or services. As a 
result, they can make a substantial contribution to increasing employment and economic 
growth, while fostering and strengthening links between industry and science for the future. 
Spin-offs are naturally aware of the importance of knowledge application, and are open to the 
growing understanding of the factors which favour the foundation of successful enterprises.  
 
Knowledge exploitation 
The process of turning an interesting research result into a marketable product through a spin-
off company involves three definable stages. The first identifies the market potential of 
research results, the scientists with the entrepreneurial understanding to appreciate this 
potential, and other conditions for successful development such as the availability of seed 
capital and the regional climate for investment. The second stage is the incubation of the 
potential spin-off – concrete plans are made, with proof of the technical principle, 
development of a business plan and strategies for marketing, intellectual property protection 
and early stage finance. The third stage introduces the product to the market, and involves 
3rd International GET UP Workshop on University Based Start-Ups 
29 – 31 October 2004, Jena  
 69
research into competition, finding customers and expanding investment to finance the pre-
profit growth phase. Market introduction is crucial, and increasingly requires a European 
approach, since neither spin-offs nor venture capitalists are any longer interested in purely 
national markets.  
 
Enterprise culture 
VALOR is examining the importance of stimulating, through each of these stages, a culture of 
entrepreneurship in universities and research centres, and will define the critical factors for 
the improvement and success of future spin-offs. The project aims to enhance the 
effectiveness of the whole exploitation process, recognising that many national spin-off 
programmes are geared to just one or two aspects. In some Member States support initiatives 
are so numerous that they overlap, and spin-offs are often confused about where to find 
financial and other support.  
 
Learning from others 
Most national and regional programmes started independently and have only recently 
exchanged experiences, although some studies have shown the benefits of co-operation. 
VALOR sets out to stimulate exchange of knowledge and experience on spin-off creation, 
defining good practices and objectives for the quality and scope of spin-off and incubator 
programmes. This will be achieved through workshops on each stage of the process, 
consultation with governments, research institutes, universities, research-based firms, banks 
and investors. It will look at the problems facing spin-offs and identify indicators that can 
enable managers to assess and compare their programmes with others. Success can be 
measured not only by the number of spin-offs created or the number of patents held, but in 
terms of economic performance and growth after several years. Good practices will then be 
selected to enable programme managers to make improvements. Although VALOR involves 
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only five partners, they aim to identify more from other EU Member States, Acceding 
countries and Associated states, which can contribute to the subsequent ERA-NET. 
Not confined to a single research topic, VALOR and the ERA-NET which succeeds it will be 
open to all involved in spin-off generation as a means of knowledge exploitation. The ERA-
NET will take the study of the spin-off process further by developing new joint activities – 
perhaps through the convergence of existing programmes, or by developing new joint 
incubator programmes among partner organisations. The tools and methods it develops will 
also be invaluable to other ERA-NETs, as well as to national and international research 
programmes.
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ABSTRACT 
The University Miguel Hernandez (Elche, Spain) is carrying out a specific programme to 
encourage and support entrepreneurship in the academic environment. This programme is 
based on two european projects, “Embryo” and “Global Start”, both developed with the 
financial support of the 5th Framework Programme of the European Commission, through the 
EC Programme “Promotion of Innovation and Encouragement of SME Participation”. 
 
This university programme starts on the basis that there is a great potential of business and job 
creation through the improvement of tools and mechanisms to transfer university’s 
technological and innovative potential to the social and economic agents that are able to make 
use of it, creating new firms and promoting qualified employment. 
 
The main objective of the programme is to help university entrepreneurs to start-up their 
businesses, taking into account four basic elements: 
 
• Research groups, who bring their research results and can take part in the 
entrepreneurial activities. 
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• Entrepreneurs working on business projects. 
• The University, which provides the needed infrastructure for the programme. 
• The network, made up by entrepreneurship support entities of the region, investors, etc, 
to support the university programme. 
 
The programme is being a useful instrument in our university to promote and transfer 
information between technology developers and potential users, fulfilling the gaps in business 
management skills and knowledge showed by technology oriented researchers. 
 
1. UMH OVERVIEW 
The University Miguel Hernández (UMH) was established in 1997 offering 18 degrees to 
4.000 students with the aim of focusing not only on education, but also on research and other 
services. Nowadays, the UMH has 31 degree courses offered to more than 10.000 students in 
the fields of Experimental and Technical Science, Health Science, Social Science and, Arts. 
The objectives of the UMH for the next years are to achieve 15.000-20.000 students as well as 
the implementation of 14 new degree courses. 
 
At the research level, the university has roughly 250 researchers, grouped into 60 lines of 
research and into relevant Institutes and Centers such as the Neuroscience Institute, the Center 
of Molecular and Cellular Biology, the Bioengineering Institute, the Operations Research 
Center and the Center for Drug Research. 
 
Although main administration offices are located in Elche, the UMH is organised in four 
campuses located at different places of the province of Alicante (East coast of Spain). 
 
See figure 1 
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The economy of the region is one of the most dynamic economies in Spain and it favours the 
enterprise setting-up. This entrepreneurial culture facilitates the development of the UMH as 
an entrepreneurial university, creating strong links between the university and the economic 
fabric of the region, as also working out in other European universities (Anderson, 1999; 
Testar et al. 2002; Gómez et al. 2002a; Marcos, 2002; Conesa et al. 2002). 
 
Taking into account this specific setup, the entrepreneurship in the university is framed in a 
mixed structure made up by an academic research group and a specific office to support 
entrepreneurs, also effective in other universities (Solé et al, 2002). The academic group is in 
charge of studies and the development of new methodology for promoting the 
entrepreneurship, and the office for entrepreneurs is in charge of implementing the day by day 
of the university programme focused on entrepreneurs. 
 
2. ORIGIN OF THE PROGRAMME FOR ENTREPRENEURS: KEY 
 INTERNATIONAL PROJECTS 
International projects are taking an important role at the UMH, since have allowed the 
development of relationships with foreign organisations to exchange experiences and apply 
new knowledge to improve entrepreneurship at the university. In this sense, two international 
projects, “Embryo” and “GlobalStart”, are playing a key role. These projects have the financial 
support of the 5th Framework Programme of the European Commission, through the EC 
Programme “Promotion of Innovation and Encouragement of SME Participation”. 
 
2.1 Embryo Project  
The university carried out from 2000 to 2002, the project titled “Development of Embryo 
firms for the transfer of technology from universities” (Embryo Project). Also in this project 
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participated the University of Twente (The Netherlands), who is recognized as one of the 
entrepreneurial universities in Europe. 
 
Focused on the creation of university spin-offs, the target of Embryo Project in the University 
Miguel Hernández was the idea to link the objectives of two university services. One 
addressing to researchers (The Technology Transfer Office) and the other to students and 
graduates (Observatory of Employment), matching them into the Embryo Firm concept 
(Figure 2): “a framework where a research group of the university and a student with 
entrepreneurial profile are matched in order to set up a spin-off using technology and/or 
knowledge developed by the university” (Gómez et al, 2002b) 
 
See figure 2 
 
The project was focused on the following target groups: 
 
• Final year students, specially those with an entrepreneurial profile and related from the 
technical departments, such as Industrial Engineering, Telecommunication, 
Biochemistry, Environment Sciences, Statistics, etc. 
• Graduates and PhD candidates with an incipient research experience and knowledge of 
technologies, but with a need for support, consultancy and facilities, to allow them to 
look for business opportunities for spin-off company creation. 
• Lectures and other researchers from the different institutes and research centres, who 
might have technological opportunities with great potential for generating a spin-off 
company. 
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The process to facilitate the setting up of new companies in Embryo consisted in providing 
support to the above target groups (Figure 3), and the infrastructure, developed with Embryo 
project, has been one of the benefits for the current support programme for entrepreneurs at 
our university. 
 
See figure 3 
 
Also Embryo had a starting up effect of the entrepreneurship at our university, since during 
the project more than 450 people have enrolled in entrepreneurial courses, of which roughly 
75 people were involved in business projects and currently, the methodology is applied at the 
UMH to help entrepreneurs in the early stages of development of business projects. 
 
In addition, the work scheme developed with Embryo, facilitates the interaction between the 
involved social agents in the development of a network of entrepreneurship in the region. 
 
2.2 GlobalStart Project 
This project, where the UMH is currently involved, is titled “New concepts to stimulate the 
creation of global university start-ups across an european spin-off programme“, and attempts 
to support academic spin-offs addressed to a global market (GlobalStart DPR, 2002). 
 
GlobalStart project is based on the idea of global start-ups are a rather new phenomenon in 
the field of start-ups, since most starting companies focus, at first, on the market immediately 
surrounding them (the local, regional, and sometimes the national market, depending on the 
size of the country). This type of new venture is defined on the context of the project as “a 
firm that from its inception seeks to derive a significant competitive advantage from the 
combination of resources and the sale of outputs in multiple countries”. 
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GlobalStart is running since July 2003 participating eight organisations of European Union 
countries including two new joined countries. It is co-ordinated by the University of Twente 
(The Netherlands), and, in addition of UMH, the partners are: University of Salamanca 
(Spain), University of Leuven (Belgium), University of Warwick (England, United 
Kingdom), Finance Wales (Wales, United Kingdom), University of Brno (Czech Republic) 
and University of Tartu (Estonia). 
 
The main objectives of the project are: 
 
• Create a collaborative network of spin-off programmes, in order to support spin-off 
programmes focused on global start-ups and develop tools to: 
- Implement a quality system solution oriented to university spin-off 
programmes. 
- Develop a marketing and promotion guide for university spin-off programmes. 
- Develop a system of indicators to track technological entrepreneurship in 
academic organisations. 
 
• Development of procedures to facilitate the support to start-ups in a global 
environment, (e-platform, operational database, etc.). 
 
This project will help our university to improve the management of the current programme for 
entrepreneurs. 
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3. SHAPING THE ENTREPRENEURSHIP SUPPORT AT THE UNIVERSITY 
The university has shaped the current entrepreneurship support system making use of results 
derived from above international projects (Galiana and Mira, 2002). These results allowed our 
university: 
 
• to implement a useful methodology for the promotion and creation of new ventures, 
• to improve the organisation and use of the university resources, 
• to develop a network involving entrepreneurship support entities, financial entities 
and, 
• to improve the support offered to entrepreneurs as better economical and non-
economical facilities (infrastructures, advisement, etc.). 
 
In this way, the current entrepreneurship in the UMH is outlined in the following picture: 
 
See figure 4. 
 
This figure shows the key basic elements concerning the entrepreneurship support in our 
university. With the two international projects described as mainstays, the different pyramid 
levels show target groups of the programme for entrepreneurs: undergraduates graduates, 
lecturers, researchers and PhD candidates from the different institutes and research centres of 
the UMH, who might have technological opportunities with great potential for generating a 
spin-off company; nascent entrepreneurs with a business idea; and new firms and spin-offs 
finally created by nascent entrepreneurs. 
 
Around the pyramid we find the main elements implied in supporting target groups: the 
Technology Transfer Office (OTRI) which is in charge of keeping in touch with the 
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researchers; the Observatory of Employment, which is in charge of keeping in touch with 
graduates and undergraduates as well as to support nascent entrepreneurs; the UMH 
entrepreneurship network, made up by entities which UMH holds relationships to encourage 
and support the entrepreneurship; and the Scientific Park project which will provide new 
university firms with improved infrastructures. 
 
3.1 Support offered by the programme for entrepreneurs 
The mission of the OTRI is to promote and foster the research activity of the UMH as well as 
to contribute to the diffusion and transfer of the generated knowledge to the society. In this 
way, the OTRI has a double task: acts as a service in charge of the technical and 
administrative management of the research activities developed in the university, and is a link 
between the university and its socio-economical environment, promoting the relationships and 
collaborations among the research groups, institutions and companies through R+D actions 
and technological support. 
 
In the entrepreneurship context, following the Embryo methodology, the OTRI is in charge of 
keeping in touch with researchers, to identify, evaluate and protect the capabilities and 
knowledge generated with potential to be transferred to the economical sector through 
business creation. 
 
On the other hand, the Observatory Of Employment is a unit created in 1997 which holds 
relationships with graduates and undergraduates, with the objective of increasing their 
employability, through improving their labour experience (internship programme), access to 
employment (managing job offers and developing workshops to facilitate employment search) 
and self-employment (through the programme for entrepreneurs). 
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The Observatory of Employment is in charge of organising the human and financial resources, 
and planning and carrying out the activities of the programme for entrepreneurs: developing 
the promotion plan, tracking of outcomes, establishing and managing of relationships with 
entities of the entrepreneurship network, etc. 
 
The programme has developed a route for nascent entrepreneurs with a business idea and 
interested in start up a business. Just like the attendance to conferences, the entrepreneurs who 
access at the route to develop the business plan can be rewarded with academic credits. The 
entrepreneur’s route is outlined in the following picture: 
 
See figure 5. 
 
Nowadays, about 15% of students are enrolled in some of the activities of the programme, and 
the communication with them is carried out through a system based on mobile's messages 
combined with the website to provide complete information about programme for 
entrepreneurs activities. 
 
3.1.1  Motivation and awareness creation: 
The activities included in the annual plan of promotion of the programme for entrepreneurs are 
mainly entrepreneurship motivation conferences and workshops, as well as the regular  
services to entrepreneurs. These activities are supported with diffusion materials (brochures, 
posters, handbooks for business creation, etc.) and a website of restricted access for university 
entrepreneurs. In this website, the students can find general information about the support 
activities of the programme for entrepreneurs, enrol the events organised as well as useful 
information related to the start-up of a business (funds, business plans models, cases of 
successful university start-ups, etc.). 
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These activities are developed in the four campuses in a regular basis with the participation of 
businessmen and entrepreneurship support entities of the region. The main activities are: 
 
• Informal meetings among potential entrepreneurs to discuss about general subjects of the 
business start up process. 
• Conferences focused on subjects related to start-up companies. 
• Workshops to present successful experiences in creation of start-ups, in order to show 
good practice and references to potential entrepreneurs. 
• Organisation of the business ideas awards “Innova-Emprende” (Innova-Start-up) 
addressed to university students. 
 
3.1.2 Advisement and mentoring: 
The programme provides support to entrepreneurs and their technological projects as: 
development of business plan, training in technological and business management, facilities 
and access to infrastructures (lab space and equipment, offices, etc.), advise on firm’s 
internationalisation, advise on IPR, access to entrepreneurial networks and to financial 
resources (risk capital, business angels, financial entities, etc). 
 
This advise is provided by both the programme entrepreneurs’ experts and external advisors 
of private consulting companies involved as stakeholders of the entrepreneurship network of 
the university, offering the possibility of receiving specific advise of important consulting 
firms in different areas: legal, economical, technical, industrial property protection, quality 
management, etc. 
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3.1.3 Training and resources to start-up a business: 
The students involved in the itinerary are trained with courses and workshops related to 
business creation, business management, marketing and entrepreneurial skills. This training is 
organised and developed with the collaboration of stakeholders of the entrepreneurship 
network. To drawn up the business plan, the students are provided with the necessary 
infrastructure and facilities, located at the office of the Observatory of Employment.  
 
The students with a viable business plan are oriented on bureaucratic procedures to start-up 
the business and to apply for public funds. Also, the programme for entrepreneurs acts as a 
link between the new business and the incubator of the business innovation center (BIC) of 
Elche and the set up businesses receive advise by the programme for entrepreneurs. It tracks 
these new ventures in order to know their necessities and support them. 
 
3.1.4 Research activities on university entrepreneurship: 
On a regular basis, the research group focused on entrepreneurship carries out studies related 
with the entrepreneurship at the UMH, as well as studies related to business creation in the 
local environment. In this sense, besides the participation in Embryo and GlobalStart projects, 
they are taking part in a project called “Alicante Emprende”, belonging to the european 
initiative EQUAL, with the objective of encouraging and supporting entrepreneurship in the 
local environment (Gómez et al 2003) 
 
Also a new initiative of this researches is the participation in the Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor 2004 (GEM Project) at regional level, in order to know and quantify the 
entrepreneurship in the region comparatively with other participant regions, and to extract 
lessons to improve the regional support for entrepreneurs. 
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3.2 Entrepreneurship Network 
As we have seen in previous sections, the entrepreneurship network has a relevant role in the 
programme for entrepreneurs (Uninova, 2004), providing it with complementary resources 
and services to support nascent entrepreneurs and new firms: training, incubator, access to 
financial resources, etc. Also, the collaboration of the university with stakeholders has 
produced a great number of contacts for future initiatives for improving the entrepreneurship 
support. 
 
See figure 6. 
 
The network is made up by entities related to promotion and support of the entrepreneurship 
and technology transfer, such as development agencies, business innovation centers, 
technological centers, universities as well as private consulting firms, financial entities and 
potential business angels: 
 
• IMPIVA (Instituto de la Mediana y Pequeña Empresa Valenciana), the regional 
development agency of the regional government, which develops the promotion of 
industrial policies focused on small and medium enterprises support programmes to  
innovation. IMPIVA offers several services, and has a network of technical facilities to 
support innovation. Among its programmes, a plan for micro-SMEs and for the creation of 
enterprises can be highlighted. 
 
• Technological centers. Private and non-profit-making associations of enterprises, focused 
on promote technological innovation, research and development in regional industry, and 
to increase competitiveness and product quality of companies. The Valencia Community 
has 24 centres, 15 headquarters and 9 technical units. 
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• The Business Innovation Centers (BICs) of the region act as incubators of entrepreneurial 
initiatives, promoting innovation and diversification. They give technical support that 
allows to reduce the entrepreneurial risk and to increase the possibilities of success of these 
initiatives in the most difficult steps of the setting up. 
 
• Local Development Agencies (LDAs) are autonomous organisms of the city councils. 
They give support to local entrepreneurs and promote the specialisation and innovation in 
the local industry. Many of the biggest towns in the region have their own Local 
Development Agency. The UMH keep special relationships with the LDAs of Elche and 
Alicante. 
 
• IVAJ (Instituto Valenciano de la Juventud): a public entity, which has a business creation 
programme, including grants, for entrepreneurs under 30 years old. 
 
• Local business associations like JOVEMPA (Association of young entrepreneurs of the 
province of Alicante) or COEPA (Confederation of Entrepreneurs of the province of 
Alicante). 
 
• Chamber of Commerce of Alicante: It provides a whole support system to the 
entrepreneur through its programme “Prop Emprendedores”, from new business creation’s 
facilities to secure future viability. 
 
• Private consulting firms offering customised advisement to nascent entrepreneurs in 
different areas: legal, economical, technical, industrial property protection, quality 
management, etc. 
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• The international stakeholders of the network are mainly universities and organisations 
involved in the international projects where UMH is taking part. These organisations have 
an experimented university spin-off programmes (TOP-University of Twente, WSP-Wales 
Spin-out Programme, the EFS-University of Warwick and the programme of the Catholic 
University of Leuven) from north to south European regions with high-economic and 
enterprise potential in a global market. 
 
4. FUTURE PROSPECTS 
The future challenges of the programme are focused on improving the entrepreneurship levels 
and meeting new requirements of the business creation environment in academic 
organisations. 
 
The commitment of the university with the entrepreneurship is showed in its Strategic Plan 
(2003-2007). In this plan, the UMH has drawn up actions to achieve objectives as the creation 
of a scientific park. This project is starting and giving its first steps like the contacts with the 
industrial sector and social entities of the regional environment. The scientific park will be 
focused on the research and technology transfer for the main industrial sector of the close 
region (footwear, logistic, food and metal) as well as to provide office and lab space to new 
technology based firms of the university. 
 
Furthermore, first contacts with potential business angels are being developed and the 
participation in new international projects are being evaluated as key point for continuous 
learning, shaping and improving on entrepreneurship knowledge at UMH. 
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FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 1. UMH location 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.- The Embryo Firm concept (Gómez et al 2002b). 
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Figure 3. Process to develop the Embryo firms at UMH (Gómez et al 2002b). 
 
 
Figure 4. Outline of the entrepreneurship at UMH. 
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Figure 5. The programme for entrepreneur’s route (Gómez et al 2002b). 
 
 
 
Figure 6. The entrepreneurship network at the university. 
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Summary 
The goal of the project “Implementation of Safety and Health in Entrepreneurship-
Education”4 was to raise the awareness for safety and health at the workplace, especially 
during the education of potential entrepreneurs as well as students. The other goal was also to 
implement the developed lectures in the curricula of the partner universities and on other 
institutions. 
It aims to support the improvement of safety standards in smaller and middle-sized 
companies. In actuality, safety and health are often not taken seriously enough even though 
these are important economic and competition factors. 
The project was coordinated by the German company IBH (Innovation und Bildung 
Hohenheim GmbH), a 100 % - subsidiary of the University of Hohenheim and the Spanish 
project partner SIPCRE the Spanish project partner SIPCRE, a subsidiary of the University of 
Valencia.  Both of them are also working together in other international entrepreneurship 
networks, for example “TRANSACT” and “Gate2Growth”. 
 
                                                 
4 The project was financed by the EU organization OSHA (European Agency for Safety and Health at Work). 
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The idea of IBH and SIPCRE was to create two different parts of a safety and health training 
module. Then to translate these two parts in the other language and disseminate it. 
 
1. Description of the activities  
By conferring with experts and entrepreneurs from the laboratory and office areas, the current 
status has been determined. At the end a conception for the application has been formulated. 
The following activities have been carried out: 
 
Formulation and execution of two training modules 
Goal: Raise the level of consciousness for safety and health in the laboratory and office 
workplace and implement it in (university) lectures. 
 
Target group 
• People that have not yet founded companies (pre-founders) 
• Founders of small-sized companies 
• Students of entrepreneurship education 
• Participants of entrepreneurship seminars 
• People in Germany and Spain 
 
Training module  
Two different training modules including instructions have been formulated and these have 
been implemented in the form of seminars that took place in the respective countries. 
 
IBH formulated a two-hour-long module for the laboratory.  
With the topic: “Work in the laboratory and stay healthy and safe” two seminar units were 
carried out at the University of Hohenheim and the University of Tübingen. The invitations 
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and folders containing information about university and entrepreneur institutions were mailed 
to universities whereby a special emphasis was placed on the area of biotechnology. 
In the seminar, entrepreneurs expose to practical experience. Professional advisors reported 
about what the path to a healthy and safe laboratory looks like and how it can be travelled 
while avoiding the stumbling blocks. They also gave information about those who give 
support to starting entrepreneurs along the way and what services they offer. 
In addition the new Internet portal www.sh-ee.org was introduced. 
A folder with the following contents was given out: 
• Government safety organisation folder 
• Handout from the Website 
• Names of the project contact persons 
• Attendance list 
• Questionnaire 
• Company founder information from the government safety organisation 
 
SIPCRE formulated two-hour awareness-raising modules for the office in Spanish and 
English languages including presentation material, two video films, student’s manual, 
teacher’s manual. 
 
Development of the module started in February 2003, and the prototype for this first edition 
was ready by the end of April 2003. Along this development period, they could identify 3 
stages:  
• The workshop’s objective is to make company founders and entrepreneurs aware of 
the relevance of implementing a labour risks prevention scheme in the office 
environment of their enterprises 
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• including in their business plans as well the actions required to protect workers and 
company founders  
• to identify the resources needed to carry out that protection in a preventive way. 
 
SIPCRE, S.L. has participated with them in collaboration with Programme IDEAS from the 
Polytechnic University of Valencia. SIPCRE has developed, imparted and organized the 
training activities and has made it available to Programme IDEAS’ company founders and 
MBA students at the Polytechnic University of Valencia, so that they may benefit from the 
activities. 
 
2. Products 
2.1 Training modules 
Slogan: Laboratories are healthy and safe! 
 
Laboratories are especially sensitive work areas. The potential dangers are significantly 
higher here than in a “normal” workplace. This means avoiding the following special dangers: 
biological, chemical and machine-related. 
 
IBH sharpens the consciousness of the entrepreneur. The results are designed to assist in 
general all of those interested and especially addresses potential entrepreneurs from the Life 
Sciences: biologists, chemists, bio-technicians, pharmacists, etc. But also those, who are 
already in the middle of the planning phase or those, who are on the market will still find 
further important suggestions. 
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The seminar “working without risks” 
The training modules are carried out in seminar-form. Hereby, entrepreneurs talk about their 
own experiences and answer the participants’ questions afterward.  
At past events the importance of, aside from keeping rules and regulations, paying attention to 
employee attitude toward this subject has become apparent. The following aspects came 
especially to light: 
 
Thorough education and individual assessments of danger people could be sensitized for that 
topic. 
In this way the consciousness about the importance of safety and health will be kept awake. 
The steps that lead to a healthy and safe laboratory workplace are explained by professional 
advisors further along in the seminar.  
The web presentation guides through the confusingly complex subject matter. Above all, the 
thorough collections of links make accessing information easier.  
 
Time 
16:00 - 
18:00 
Activity Materials 
Introduc-
tion 
Welcome and presentation of the course, the 
European project and the teacher 
Overhead sheet 
Part 1 Introduction and determination of the topic Overhead sheet 
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Part 2 
Report of experiences from a biotech starter 
company 
 
 
Introduction to a biotech company. 
Biological test procedures involving testing the impact 
of toxins on the environment 
 
PowerPoint 
presentation 
 
Presentation of practical examples from the laboratory 
along the following points:  
• Deficiencies caused by organisation 
• Deficiencies caused by workplace arrangement  
• Danger caused by materials 
• Danger caused by fire/ explosions 
• Biological danger 
 
 
• What are the special company responsibilities? 
• What are the special co-worker responsibilities? 
• Joint company and co-worker responsibilities 
 
 
Part 3 Input from the safety engineer Lecture, checklists 
 
Introduction to an engineering company dealing with 
management systems for work-related, environmental, 
radiation and health protection 
Integration of the company into the social system of 
health and work protection through optimised transfer 
of legal and administrative regulations into the areas of 
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health and safety, as well as in consumer and work 
protection  
  
 
Provision and explanation of fitting checklists dealing 
with the topics:  
• Safety evaluation of laboratory workplaces 
• Work procedures for handling contaminated 
products 
• Evaluation of safety levels in laboratories 
 
Part 4 Introducing important institutions 
Overhead sheet, 
Handout 
 
Introduction of the government safety organisations 
and their duties 
 
 
Information for entrepreneurs of biotechnological 
companies 
 
Part 5 
Presentation of the website 
• Regulations 
• Organisations 
• Checklists 
• Literature 
• Abbreviations 
Handout 
Part 6 
Closing the event 
 
• Handing out the evaluation questionnaire  
• Passing around the attendance list 
Questionnaire, 
attendance list  
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Training module office  
Programme IDEAS (the entrepreneurship programme of the Universidad Politécnica de 
Valencia) has added this training module to its Entrepreneurship Support Workshops Scheme. 
Development of an training module for safety and health at the office workplace.  
 
SUBJECT KEY MESSAGES MATERIAL 
Opening  
Welcome 
Presentation of the course 
Pre-test evaluation 
 
Objective: 
Attracting the 
whole group’s 
attention. 
Questions to sensitize: 
• What aspects of this subject make you 
worry? 
• How many of you have ever thought 
about creating a company? 
• How many of you have already created a 
company? 
• How many of you have ever worried 
about health and safety at the office? 
• How many of you have made anything in 
the “health and safety at the office” 
arena? 
• How many of you have read the labour 
risks prevention law? 
• How many of you know the infractions 
contemplated in the law? 
Pre-test  
questionnaire 
Power Point slides 
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Make some “on the spot” statistics from the 
answers. 
Obligatory 
law 
Objective: 
Making 
people aware 
of the 
obligation. 
Contents: 
• Fundamental law and norms 
• Responsibilities and penalties (minor, 
serious and very serious infractions) 
Power Point slides. 
Photocopies of 
Spanish law 
Even looking 
nice, it can be 
risky 
 
Objective: 
Reflection 
about 
appearance 
and safety.  
Question for dynamism:  
• When visiting an office, who pays 
attention to safety aspects? 
Demonstration of 
videotape 
 
Risky factors 
 
Objective: 
Learning to 
notice the 
risky factors 
at the office. 
• Workplace and installations 
• Chemical and biological agents 
• Work post conditions - equipment and 
postures 
• Environmental conditions 
• Psycho-social and organization conditions 
Demonstrative 
videotape 
Register sheet 
(auditing annex) 
Power Point slides 
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Responsibility 
of  the 
company, 
businessmen 
and founders 
themselves  
Question for dynamism:  
What’s your responsibility as company founders? 
Who are you responsible for?  
• Your workers 
• Your clients 
• Your suppliers 
• Your partners 
• Yourself 
• Everybody in your workplace or who 
receives your products/services 
 
How can you execute your responsibility properly? 
Actions to prevent risks: 
• Plan risks prevention 
• Evaluate risks 
• Promote health and positive attitudes 
towards self safety and the safety of 
everybody working in the company 
• Informing 
• Training 
• Organize work and introduce new 
technologies  
• Implement risks control systems 
• Implement and maintain an updated 
emergency plan 
Power Point slides 
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Bibliographic 
and internet 
references 
• List List 
Evaluation 
and closing 
• Post-test (knowledge valuation) 
• Satisfaction level of the course  
Test 
 
 
2.2 Web presentation  
The website builds up the core of the project. It offers broad information and detailed 
checklists. It is multilingual, because the target group represents peoples from German, Spain 
an many English speaking persons. 
 
Goals: 
• The raising of consciousness and sensibility of potential founders of companies for 
safety and health when setting-up a company and at the workplace 
 
• Make access to important information about the topic of safety and health at the 
workplace easier for those concerned and interested. 
 
Relevant and numerous information sources have been prepared for the laboratory and office 
workplaces. Here one may find laws, ordinances, regulations, organisations, checklists, 
literature, many links and contact persons. General information that is relevant for other 
countries has been translated. 
 
For example the part “Laboratory workplace“ at www.sh-ee.org was divided into five 
sections: 
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Rules: This menu item contains links to important laws, ordinances and technical rules all 
related to the topic of laboratory workplaces. With a mouse-click you can access the exact 
terms printed in the regulations. 
On the first level, laws are the conversion of European rights to the national level. Laws 
formulate goals and ground rules.  
Concrete information about each law can be found in the ordinances. They form the next 
level, whereby there are most often a number of ordinances for each law. The third level is 
composed by the technical rules. They contain direct operational instructions as they are used 
in the average work environment and are accordingly numerous. They form the foundation of 
a “regulation”-triangle that has a middle made of ordinances and the law on top as a pinnacle.  
In this way the European law finally breaks through the entire cascade of regulations.  
 
Organisations: Here you will find contact persons who can further help you with general 
information, extra tips or special consultation on the topic of safety and health in the 
laboratory.  
 
Checklists: What can and must be considered when furnishing, equipping and running a 
laboratory? Those who go through the checklists raise the chance of performing the job 
correctly!  
 
Literature: Here you will find links to selected books.  The links lead you directly to the 
publishers’ homepages where one can usually find ordering information.  
 
Abbreviations: This list helps you to become acquainted with the judicial terminology. Here 
you will find officially-used abbreviations for all listed German laws, regulations and rules. 
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3. Feed back of the target group 
The response based on the completion of the training units was positive in both countries.  
The following specifics came to light: 
More than half of the participants in Stuttgart und Tübingen stated, that they had only basic 
knowledge about the necessity of safety and health in the laboratory.  
The guest speakers were received very positively. They were experts in their areas and knew 
the material well. The response about the website was also very good. A website with such 
main topics and such an information spectrum had not existed until then. 
In the passed around questionnaires different suggestions were given for future events, for 
example:  
• Documentation: practical examples 
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• It would be interesting to know, if one has the opportunity as a student to evaluate the 
safety of one’s own University’s laboratory 
• How one may deal with chemical as well as biological material 
 
The feedback from some participants was for example: 
• “Excellent module” 
• “The video films are excellent didactic tools” 
• Links and references to public institutions related with H&S are very useful. “If the 
objective was to raise our awareness about H&S and our responsibilities, we got it”. 
 
The Spanish partner did a pre and a post test to evaluate the rising of know how by the people 
attending the courses. 
 
Description: 
To make this evaluation, a short questionnaire has been developed and is given to the 
attendants twice along the workshop: 
• At the beginning to know the attendants’ initial knowledge of the topic 
• At the end of the training action, to detect any increase in their knowledge of the topic 
 
These were the questions in the questionnaire: 
1. Express using your own words the information you have about the norms that 
reglement labour risks prevention. 
2. Who must carry out the labour risks prevention law? 
3rd International GET UP Workshop on University Based Start-Ups 
29 – 31 October 2004, Jena  
 105
3. What kind of infringements does this law contemplate? Please specify their 
classification and criteria of it. 
4. Which sanctions does this law impose? 
5. Please enumerate the factors that must be taken into account in order to prevent labour 
risks at the office. 
6. What aspects should a company owner contemplate to exercise properly his/her 
responsibility about labour risks prevention?  
7. Please describe the positive aspects that can derive from implementing a health and 
safety at work system at your office. 
 
They did totally four courses or so called “editions” with the following results: 
 
COM P ARATI VE EVALUATI ON -  P RE- TES T
0,00
1,00
2,00
3,00
4,00
5,00
6,00
7,00
8,00
9,00
10,00
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Edi tion 1
Edi tion 2
Edi tion 3
Edi tion 4
 
 
Marcus Witzke: The project “Safety and health in entrepreneurship education” as an example for 
international cooperation of universities 
 
 106
COM P ARATI VE EVALUATI ON -  P OS T- TES T
0,00
1,00
2,00
3,00
4,00
5,00
6,00
7,00
8,00
9,00
10,00
Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Question 5 Question 6 Question 7
Edi tion 1
Edi tion 2
Edi tion 3
Edi tion 4
 
 
4. Difficulties  
There were no basic difficulties over the course of the project. It was not possible to attract 
the number of participants originally anticipated even though the course had been widely and 
extensively advertised. 
A great reason for that is most certainly that the target group was limited from the beginning. 
The number of people that work in laboratories is much smaller than the number of those that 
work in an office. 
The awareness for the necessity of safety and health at the workplace is not yet pronounced 
for this target group, in some parts, only barely existent. It doesn’t have priority as do finance 
and acquisition for example. 
Only very few people become independent in the area of biotechnology. 
The awareness among potential founders is only marginally sensitized to the topic of safety 
and health. This means that this area must be more heavily advertised using especially the 
currently developed products. According to the Spanish partners, it proved to be challenging 
in the office area as well on the first run to attract the planned number of participants. In order 
to solve this problem the following provisions have been made: 
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• Strengthened personal contact and personal addresses 
• The integration in subsequent lectures 
• Thorough training programme at university further educational academies  
• Creating general awareness of this topic 
 
5. Continuing 
The results will be disseminated further by both partners. The following actions have been 
taken to continue the implementation. 
 
Lectures: At  the University of Hohenheim the chair of Agricultural engeneering is interested 
in implementing parts in his lectures. 
 
NewCome.de (www.newcome.de): the official Internet portal for founding and company 
succession. The portal offers branch topics, target groups and regional-specific detailed 
information and services for founders, successors, and consigners in Baden-Württemberg. 
NewCome.de is a central meeting point on the Internet for these target groups. There the 
project is already presented and links are released. 
 
Guss (Gesund und sicher starten) (Starting healthy and safely).  
Goal of this cooperative project is to support aspects of safety and health in starting 
companies. This project creates close cooperation and at future events, the training modules 
and the website will be solicited for using mouse pads and brochures. 
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Programme IDEAS (the entrepreneurship programme of the Universidad Politécnica de 
Valencia) has added this training module to its Entrepreneurship Support Workshops Scheme. 
It is estimated to impart one H&S workshop each quarter, starting on 4Q03. 
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Abstract 
The paper, inserted in the growing literature on the economic and legal impact of university 
patenting, aims to analyze the recent legal and institutional changes in Germany regarding 
patenting and commercialization of university inventions.  It compares them with the 
respective U.S. legislation and provides a critical view on empirical data about numbers of 
patents and start-up rates.  From a German point of view, the paper shows several economic 
and legal dilemmas that go along with entrepreneurship by university patents, and explores 
possible solutions.  Finally, it draws conclusions and suggestions for a university policy 
destined to the enhancement of university patents usage for new firm formation. 
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I. Introduction 
Universities play an important role in today’s knowledge society.  They have a central 
function in production of basic and applied research outcomes since academic research in fact 
covers the whole range of knowledge generation activities.  Therefore, universities are 
traditionally considered as a principal source of innovation and technological change.  Recent 
economic literature focuses attention to spillovers from university research (Romer, 1986; 
Dasgupta and David, 1987; Jaffe, 1989), which is crucial to economic activity increasing the 
efficiency of private sector and the total factor productivity (Barker, 1985; Adams, 1990; 
Rosenberg and Nelson, 1994). 
In latest years, these spillover effects have been channeled throughout the commercialization 
of university-generated knowledge.  Within this context, patents are shifting in the midpoint 
of public policy discussion regarding the role of universities in a future innovation system.  
The importance of patents as a unique and highly visible mechanism for transferring 
technological knowledge to the private sector (Archibugi, 1992; Basberg, 1987) is due to a 
variety of reasons.  First, they are a classic and traditional as well as internationally 
recognized legal instrument for the protection of technological knowledge. Its widespread 
application surpasses easily all other intellectual property rights.  (DPMA, 2004; USPTO, 
2003).  Second, because patents confer a series of exclusive monopoly rights that provide on 
the one hand effective protection against imitation and misuse, on the other strong incentives 
to put money in research if the investor can appropriate the economic returns from the 
respective results (Arrow, 1962).  Given the fact that the majority of university inventions are 
embryonic and additional development is need to get them ready for commercial exploitation 
(Jensen and Thursby, 2001; Shane, 2004), incentives to encourage the necessary private 
investments are essential to transform these inventions into economic values.  In addition to 
that, economic literature has shown empirical evidence of the benefits of knowledge 
spillovers from university patenting (Jaffe, 1989; Acs, Audretsch and Feldman, 1992, 1994). 
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Different ways are imaginable for the commercialization of university patents, namely 
licensing or sale to established as well as to start-up companies.  However, due to their limited 
financial resources, start-up firms scarcely will be in the position to pay royalties or purchase 
a patent.  Therefore, a vehicle to exploit university patents throughout start-ups is making an 
equity investment in them.  This implies that universities bring their intellectual property 
rights as a minority share in newly founded firms, waiving royalties during the first years of 
its existence.  There are multiple advantages of this proceeding.  For universities, the sale of 
these business shares once the start-up has successfully established promises the generation of 
a higher return on capital than a short-term licensing or sale.  Moreover, in doing so, 
universities promote entrepreneurial activities and contribute, so far, to economic growth.  
They also promote a real and rapid transposition of research outcomes into new marketable 
products and services, as established enterprises frequently are unable or because of “not here 
invented” syndrome not willing to embrace innovations, which could render their existing 
technologies obsolete (Bielig and Haase, 2004).  For start-up firms, equity participation 
releases them initially from royalty or purchase price payments and attenuates so liquidity 
constraints new firms face with (Goldfarb and Henrekson, 2003). 
In view of the extraordinary importance of university start-ups based on the 
commercialization of patents, the article in following section II explains the recent legal and 
institutional changes in Germany concerning university inventions.  The results suggest that in 
German “top down” new university policy there are still some significant differences in 
legislation compared with U.S. legislation that served as an example.  Section III examines 
the however imperfect empirical data from German Patent Exploitation Agencies 
(“Patentverwertungsagenturen” – PVA) and compares them with the respective data set of the 
Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM), indicating a huge divergence in 
terms of numbers on German and US university patents and their use for founding start-up 
companies.  In section IV, the paper discusses several economic and legal dilemmas regarding 
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entrepreneurship on patents emanating from university research, and explores possible 
solutions.  This includes the question whether patents from public funded research should be 
placed at exclusive disposal of start-up companies.  The paper reveals that the “experimental 
privilege” in German Patent Act mitigates these exclusion effects limiting the patent scope to 
only commercial purposes, so that universities are allowed to continue researching patented 
inventions.  Further, it deals with the conflict between traditional publication and new 
exploitation strategies throughout entrepreneurship on patents that may be solved 
reintroducing a “grace period” in European patent laws.  Finally, German fixed and relatively 
high university inventor's share is stressed since it may obstacle new firm formation.  The 
paper suggests that inventor’s share should not refer to gross income and not be defined on 
federal but on university level, according to the quality of invention and its commercialization 
expectations.  Moreover, university inventors should be more actively involved in decisions 
regarding patent exploitation strategies. 
Section V provides concluding remarks and observations, which by virtue of the highly 
exploratory character of this article only can be suggestive.  After all, the results are destined 
to enlarge the growing literature on the economic and legal impact of university patenting 
(Adams, 1990; Henderson, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 1998; Thursby and Kemp, 2002; Siegel, 
Waldman and Link, 2003; Adams and Griliches, 1998), but seen from a German perspective. 
 
II. Recent legal and institutional changes in Germany 
In the face of the challenge to foster commercialization of scientific research output from the 
academic sector, German policymakers have reinforced the efforts to adapt legislation and to 
erect the necessary infrastructures.  Although links between universities and industry, 
especially in former Eastern Germany, have certain tradition, a series of measures underlines 
the intention of German government to intensify this relationship promoting technology 
transfer to the private sector and the commercial exploitation of university inventions.  A first 
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step towards this novel development portrays the amendment of the Federal Framework Act 
regarding universities (“Hochschulrahmengesetz” – HRG) in 1998.  Herein, § 2 (7) HRG 
codifies knowledge and technology transfer as a further central function of German 
universities. 
Beyond it, particular attention has attracted the recent renewal of the Federal Act governing 
employee inventions (“Gesetz über Arbeitnehmererfindungen” – ArbNErfG) .  Prior to this 
revision, all rights on inventions resulting from academic research made by university 
professors retained to the latter (“Hochschullehrerprivileg”).  Hence, they could decide solely 
about legal protection and commercial exploitation of their findings, but at the same time 
carrying all expenses and risks in case of patenting and commercialization.  In accordance 
with the new § 42 ArbNErfG this university professor privilege was abolished, conferring the 
property rights on inventions arising from on-campus research to the universities rather than 
to the academic inventors.  Furthermore, these inventions have to be reported to the university 
administration within a two-month period before their publication, which permits their 
commercial evaluation and legal protection.  In case of patenting the inventor’s share amounts 
to 30% of gross income generated by the commercial exploitation of the university-owned 
invention. 
In 2002, the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (“Bundesministerium für Bildung 
und Forschung” – BMBF) launched an action plan, the so called “exploitation offensive” 
(“Verwertungsoffensive”), to create an appropriate professional infrastructure on universities 
for patenting and exploitation of patents (BMBF, 2001).  In a first three-year period the 
universities were granted federal funding to create Patent Exploitation Agencies 
(“Patentverwertungsagenturen” – PVA), which offer expertise in legal and business sides of 
invention commercialization.  This initial financing will be successively reduced to get theses 
agencies self-funded by the returns of patent commercialization pursuits within following 
years.   The intended effects of these measures are on the one hand to give faculty staff strong 
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incentives for inventive activities and their registration relieving them from complex, 
expensive as well as time consuming patenting process and marketable evaluation of 
inventions, on the other to expand knowledge and technology transfer throughout patents 
(Bartenbach and Volz, 2002; Bartenbach and Hellebrand, 2002). 
The model of this legal and institutional initiative in Germany – and also for similar measures  
in Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, Spain and Brazil (Goldfarb and Henrekson, 2003; 
Falck and Schmaltz, 2004) – was U.S. Public Law 96-517 (“Patent and Trademark 
Amendments Act”), the so-called Bayh-Dole Act, which became effective in 1981, as well as 
the 1984 passage of U.S. Public Law 98-620.  These laws instituted a uniform policy that 
allowed universities very broad possibilities to retain property rights to inventions deriving 
from government funded academic research and to charge royalties of their intellectual 
property.  The purpose of these acts was to keep the government out of the commercialization 
process and to incentive universities to set up their own technology transfer offices for the 
commercial exploitation of research outcomes (Henderson, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 1998; 
Mowery, Nelson, Sampat and Ziedonis, 2001).  In contrast to the later German legislation, 
this U.S. “bottom up” policy framework did neither dictate nor suggest specific rules and 
provisions opening space for experimentation in university policies (Goldfarb and Henrekson, 
2003).  In consequence, U.S. universities themselves have particular explicit regulations on 
reporting on inventions, assignment of patents, as well as inventor’s share and income 
distribution throughout their commercial exploitation. 
Even if the basic strategies – awarding property rights on inventions to universities rather than 
to the faculty inventor – are internationally converging, there remain some small but 
significant differences in German approach.  While U.S. model is particularly focused on 
setting a policy framework that allows universities to experiment best practice (Goldfarb and 
Henrekson, 2003), German “top-down” institutional setting, in turn, defines quite strictly 
entitlement of university patents and commercialization income distribution.  Next section 
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analyzes the available data set of German patent exploitation outcomes comparing them with 
the respective figures from of U.S. universities. 
 
III. Empirical considerations on university patents 
The record of German university patenting output is not only characterized by data 
constraints, it also varies considerably in view of the different studies and publishing 
institutions.  Neither the twenty recently established PVA nor BMBF place regularly and 
detailed numbers of patent applications deriving from universities at public disposal.  Thus, 
the respective data detection is difficult and its collection only approximate and incomplete.  
Some optimistic studies (Schmoch, Licht and Reinhard, 2000; BLK, 2000) estimate that every 
year about 2,000 up to 2,500 patent applications emanate from the academic sector.  This 
corresponds to just 4% of overall number of patent applications filed by German Patent and 
Trademark Office (“Deutsches Patent- und Markenamt” – DPMA), which in 2003 amounted 
to 64,518 applications (DPMA, 2004).  Others (Bartenbach and Volz, 2002; Post and 
Kuschka, 2003) proceed on the more realistic assumption that merely 2% of all DPMA patent 
applications arise from German universities, in figures about 1,250. 
In fact, recently published and presumably only official data communication of BMBF reveals 
that PVA registered 528 patent applications in second half-year of 2003, what means an 
increase of 17% within the previous 12 months (BMBF, 2004).  This corresponds to 
approximately 1,000 or 1.5% of all DPMA patent applications per year.  In comparison, in 
fiscal year 2003 solely Siemens AG with 3,949 (DPMA, 2004) filed about four-times more 
patent applications than the total of all German universities.  Regarding start-up activities 
based on university patent commercialization, in Germany there exists no systematic and 
official data record at all.  One empirical study (BMBF, 2002) shows that on average 50 start-
ups per year utilize university patents.  Supposing realistic patent grant rates of 40% up to 
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50% allows the conclusion that nearly 10% of all German university patents are 
commercialized by founding start-up firms. 
In the USA, since 1991, AUTM surveys annually its members and publishes the collected 
data on university patenting and licensing in a Licensing Survey.  While in 1980 there were 
only 300 patent applications (Abramson, Encarnação, Reid and Schmoch, 1997) from the 
academic sector, in 1991 already 1,643 and in 2002 exactly 7,741 patent applications were 
reported by 219 U.S. universities or related institutions, an annual increase of 13.6% 
compared with 2001.  Herewith, U.S. universities contribution amounts to 2.3% to totality of 
patent applications in USA (USPTO, 2003).  Concerning the foundation of start-up 
companies, 312 of such new firms were created with equity investment in 2002.  Throughout 
the establishment of new companies an average of just 10% of U.S. university patents is 
regularly commercialized (AUTM, 2003). 
It is worth to notice that according to the AUTM surveys university patenting and its 
commercial exploitation have exploded over the last twenty years.  At first glance, this 
propensity appears to be an important response to the legal changes in U.S. university and 
public policy in 1980 and 1984 (Link, Scott and Siegel, 2003; Shane, 2004).  In spite of that, 
some researchers found that these alterations, above all the Bayh-Dole Act, have exercised 
only little effect on university patenting (Henderson, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 1998). In 
contrary, they have been especially due to governmental efforts and judicial decisions towards 
stronger intellectual property rights as well as to the growth in federal financial research 
support (Jaffe, 1999; Mowery, Nelson, Sampat and Ziedonis, 2001, 2002). 
In contrast, even tough in terms of international scientific publication measures German 
professors and researchers are well positioned,  their university patenting performance has 
still huge deficits (Haase and Lautenschläger, 2004).  Compared with other developed 
countries, Germany entered quite lately and labouredly into a new university innovation 
policy.  Although university patenting and corporation with private sector in Germany began 
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quite some time ago, up to now, the response to the legal and institutional changes is rather 
modest and delays in gathering momentum.  Referring to start-ups based on university 
patents, the proportion in Germany is indeed similar to the USA, but in absolute figures, the 
current output from German universities corresponds only to a sixth part of the respective 
U.S. performance. 
These large differences are owed to a variety of reasons.  Legal, economic, and cultural 
aspects influence them.  Next section deals with some of the dilemmas that have an important 
effect on founding start-ups on university patents, seen from a German perspective. 
 
IV. Several dilemmas regarding entrepreneurship on university patents 
1. Scientific knowledge as private vs. public good 
With regard to legal protection of academic inventions and their commercial exploitation, a 
dilemma lies in the question if public funded patents could be exclusively placed at the 
disposal of a start-up company, while other participants in the market remain excluded from 
the use of the patented technology.  Herein, the fundamental issue consists in whether these 
patented findings have to be considered private, defined by both rival usage and exclusion of 
others from possession, or public good, in economic theory characterized by non-rival usage 
and non-exclusion.  Because of specific reputational reward system of international scientific 
community, where an early and non-costly public disposal of research outcomes is crucial for 
obtaining recognition, but also due to particular characteristics of German universities, where 
research is predominantly public financed and teaching is free of charge, scientific knowledge 
is generally considered public good (Bielig and Haase, 2004).  Obviously, such attitude may 
extend to legal protected technological knowledge, so far also to university patents. 
This stands in conflict with the in section II. mentioned legal initiatives, which also allow 
German universities to appropriate the property rights on inventions resulting from academic 
research and their commercialization for own benefits.  This privatizing may restrict, at the 
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same time, the public access to scientific research outcomes, which in fact degrades 
significantly the effectiveness of the entire research system (David, 2003).  Nevertheless, 
German patent law, as well as most European ones, provides a solution that can considerably 
mitigate those negative effects.  Namely, § 11 (1) of German Patent Act (“Patentgesetz” – 
PatG)  restraints the scope of the conferred patent rights to purely commercial purposes, and § 
11 (2) PatG allows the experimental use of the patented invention, the so-called “experimental 
privilege”.  These provisions except private, non-commercial as well as experimental usage of 
patented technological knowledge from patent holder’s exclusion rights.  Hence, the meaning 
of § 11 (1) and (2) PatG is fundamental for research activities, because it embodies the idea 
that patents shall not obstacle R&D and, therewith, the scientific and technological progress.  
Furthermore, it is one basis that, at least in Europe, patenting in the academic sector is not 
shifting to a patent race following the principle “the winner takes all”. 
 
2. Publication vs. protection 
Another difficulty concerning the use of university patents for start-up activities – similar to 
those mentioned above – lies in the conflict between rapid publication interest by academic 
scientists and legal protection strategies attempted by university administration.  Although 
both concepts lead to a disclosure – in case of publication immediately, in case of patenting 
after 18 month – of new research outcomes, they are, especially in Europe, in a heavy 
contrast.  Scientific community is traditionally characterized by specific norms, participant’s 
acting and incentives, which it distinguish from other economic or social subsystems.  
Hereby, the evaluation of new knowledge depends on an active involvement of and 
interaction with other researchers, which either discard it if unreliable or confirm and bring it 
into conjunction with other knowledge inducing new findings.  In its central focus stands a 
specific, reputation-based and non-market reward structure that builds on “scientific priority” 
as well as quality and number of publications, rather than on gaining patents.  By this, being 
3rd International GET UP Workshop on University Based Start-Ups 
29 – 31 October 2004, Jena  
 119
recognized by the scientific community is crucial to receive tenure, to gain grants and to enter 
in networks (Buss and Wittke, 2001; David, 2003).  Regarding these circumstances, 
researchers often prefer an early publication, which is reinforced by high bureaucratical, 
temporal, and financial efforts that are going along with patenting, as well as the ignorance of 
legal protection possibilities (Bielig and Haase, 2004). 
This publication strategy not only acts against the new public policy on the enhancement in 
patenting and commercialization of academic research results; in Europe it even impedes their 
later legal protection, since in European patent law there exists no “grace period”.  European 
patent law requires the absolute novelty of an invention, for what reason a patent application 
made after the publication of the invention has to be rejected by the Patent Office, although 
this occurred by the same person.  In contrast, U.S. Patent Law provides a “grace period“ of 
12 months that makes such considerations obsolete. 
To solve this problem there are two possibilities: The (re)introduction of a “grace period” in 
European patent law or the promotion of the so-called “provisional patent application”.  The 
latter ensures patenting when an imminent public presentation of the invention i.e. at a 
conference is planned.  But owing to the fact that the (often rapid and low-quality) disclosure 
in the “provisional patent application” is decisive for further description of patent claims, this 
form of patent application indeed can only be conceived as an emergency measure. 
A better way to avoid an application failure due to the invention’s former publication consists 
in granting a “grace period”.  In such case, within a pre-established period of mostly 6 or 12 
months, which some time ago existed also in German Patent Law , an invention’s publication 
made by the original inventor does not hinder subsequent patenting.  Policymakers, therefore, 
should consider the (re)introduction of a “grace period” in European material patent law 
dispositions, whose absence means a significant disadvantage for European universities in 
obtaining patents for new technological findings. 
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At the same time, a special provision of German Federal Act governing employee inventions 
may obstacle the reporting and patenting of university inventions.  The so-called “negative 
publication clause”, determined in § 42 (2) ArbNErfG, grants university professors and 
researchers a right to keep their inventions secret.  This regulation is due to Art. 5 (3) German 
Constitution that guarantees, with regard to content, the independence in teaching and 
research of full professors at universities.  However, it offers a gap in German legislation on 
university inventions that does not exist in other countries and that is adverse to the main 
objective in the new university policy (Bartenbach and Hellebrand, 2002), which is the 
promotion of patenting of research outcomes and subsequent commercial exploitation 
throughout start-ups. 
 
3. Licensing and sale vs. equity participation 
In the presence of these new targets in university policy, other, especially economic 
constraints may influence university’s decisions on how to commercialize their intellectual 
property.  From an economic perspective, patenting is worth incurring only if the revenues 
from commercialization exceed the administrative and legal costs imposed by patenting.  
Although making equity investments in start-up firms throughout patents the universities 
could maximize their income, this way is also linked to greater risks than licensing or sale, 
because the return on capital may delay or suffer losses.  Moreover, financial subsidies 
offered by “exploitation offensive” of BMBF (BMBF, 2001) to create an professional 
infrastructure for patenting and exploitation of university patents go on at the most for six 
years.  However, experiences from USA demonstrate that the construction of such networks 
will take at least ten years.  For those reasons, German university administrations, which 
decide solely about commercialization strategy configuration, will prefer a rapid and more 
secure redemption of patenting costs by licensing and sale to established companies, rather 
than an equity participation in a start-up firm (Bielig and Haase, 2004). 
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This is underpinned by the fact that German university inventor’s share refers to gross instead 
to net income generated by commercial exploitation of the invention.  By means, they will 
receive their inventor’s share even if the economic returns from commercialization of their 
inventions do not lead to a redemption of research and patenting costs (Bartenbach and Volz, 
2002; Bartenbach and Hellebrand, 2002).  Hence, the willingness and motivation of German 
universities to bring their intellectual property in start-up firms is fairly limited, which stands 
in conflict to the objectives of new university policy. 
The analysis of German federal legislation governing employee inventions in section II. 
revealed that in case of patenting university inventors with 30% receive a fixed and relatively 
high share on income generated by the invention’s commercialization.  In comparison, the 
U.S. university inventor's share is not determined by federal law and varies in order to 
individual university policy dispositions.  Some studies show that the majority of U.S. 
universities have linear schedules of remuneration, or rather a fixed percentage in the range 
between 30% and 50%, discounting administrative and patenting costs (Thursby, Jensen and 
Thursby, 2001; Falck and Schmaltz, 2004).  Other U.S. universities have established non-
linear recompense schedules that depend on the level of income generated by invention’s 
commercialization (Lach and Schankerman, 2003). 
These extensive inventor’s shares on sales, licensing and equity participation revenues are 
destined to encourage inventive activities in academic institutions and reporting of respective 
inventions.  Some authors even proved that universities with higher inventor’s shares generate 
higher levels of license income, which signifies that academics respond to monetary 
incentives (Lach and Schankerman, 2003).  In spite of that, the distribution of a high 
percentage on invention’s commercial exploitation income to inventors may disincentive 
start-up activities.  Di Gregorio and Shane (2003) found that universities with lower 
inventor’s share of royalties are more likely to produce new firms.  On the other hand, 
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university policies of making equity investments in start-up companies have a positive effect 
on new firm formation. 
In consequence, the design of university policies regarding patenting strategies and inventor’s 
remuneration is crucial for the enhancement of start-up activities.  Thus, these policies in 
Germany should be flexibly defined on university level according to the quality of invention 
and its commercialization expectations (Bielig and Haase, 2004).  The definition of those 
commercialization strategies should go along with an active involvement and participation of 
university inventors, since they can assess the practical usage of their invention.  In addition 
to that, in doing so, universities can avoid further disputes with inventors in case of 
commercial exploitation failure or delay (BLK, 2000). 
 
V. Conclusion 
The recent legal and institutional changes in Germany concerning university inventions 
attempt to enhance patenting and commercial exploitation of university research outcomes.  
Even if their the main idea, awarding property rights on inventions to universities rather than 
to the faculty inventor, is similar to international tendency, there are still some significant 
differences in comparison with the respective U.S. legislation.  Thus, German approach 
represents an institutional, legal, and financial “top down” policy framework, especially on 
entitlement of university patents, commercialization income distribution and financial 
subsidies.  In spite of all efforts, comparing with other developed countries, German 
university’s numbers of patents and their use for founding start-up companies is rather modest 
and delays in gathering momentum. 
There are several economic and legal dilemmas and restrictions regarding entrepreneurship on 
university patents.  This includes the question whether patents from public funded research 
should be placed at exclusive disposal of start-up companies.  The paper reveals that the 
“experimental privilege” in German Patent Act mitigates these exclusion effects limiting the 
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patent scope to only commercial purposes.  Thus, universities are allowed to continue using 
patented inventions, which is fundamental for research activities, because it embodies the idea 
that patents shall not obstacle R&D and, therewith, the scientific and technological progress. 
Furthermore, the paper deals with the conflict between traditional publication and new 
exploitation strategies throughout entrepreneurship on patents, which may be solved 
reintroducing a “grace period” in European patent law.  At the same time, the so-called 
“negative publication clause” of German Federal Act governing employee inventions may 
obstacle the reporting and patenting of university inventions, since it grants university 
professors and researchers the right to keep their inventions secret. 
Finally, the duration of financial subsidies offered by BMBF “exploitation offensive” as well 
as the German university fixed and relatively high inventor's share should be considered since 
it may hinder new firm formation.  German university administrations will prefer a rapid and 
more secure redemption of patenting costs by licensing or sale to established companies, 
rather than an equity participation in a start-up firm.  It is important, therefore, that inventor’s 
share should not refer to gross income and be not defined on federal but on university level, 
according to the quality of invention and its commercialization expectations.  Moreover, 
university inventors should be more actively involved in decisions regarding patent 
exploitation strategies. 
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Abstract 
Based on the history of university based start-ups of China, this paper points out the necessity 
of integrating the start-ups into international network. It shows that university based start-ups 
of China usually have difficulties in linking with international network because of their own 
weaknesses and the barriers in the process of international cooperation.  To overcome the 
difficulties, the start-ups and the Chinese government are advised to take some measures.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the end of 1970s, the enterprises or ventures with the background of university supports 
have come forth in China. These university based start-ups are closely related to the 
development of Chinese universities and thus have their distinctive characteristics. The 
development of university based start-ups of China can be roughly divided into three stages: 
(1) From the end of 1970s to the middle of 1980s, products or services provided by most 
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university based start-ups were not involved much with high technology. (2) From the middle 
of 1980s to the early of 1990s, the start-ups manufactured high-tech products and expanded 
their scales to some extent by commercializing some inventions of universities. (3) Since the 
middle of 1990s, Chinese government has regarded the performance of university based start-
ups as one of indicators evaluating universities, and thus more and more universities has taken 
advantage of their strengths in preponderant disciplines to develop university based start-ups. 
A large volume of small and medium-sized high tech enterprises based on universities has 
sprung out. And at the same time, some start-ups with large scale, huge capital, and high 
technology come into being. High-tech start-ups have become the main body of university 
based start-ups and made a significant contribution to universities.  In 2002, 2216 university 
based high-tech start-ups of China had 53.9 billion RMB sales income and 1.8 billion RMB 
net profit, submitted 2.6 billion RMB tax and shared 0.7 billion RMB revenue with 
universities (Yang, 2002).     
 
The establishment and development of university based start-ups of China have been driven 
by both demand pull and supply push. On the one hand, the social demand pulls universities 
to establish start-ups. As most enterprises in China do not have strong ability to conduct R&D 
activities and there are not enough agencies to transfer technology, enterprises are hard to 
directly absorb universities’ inventions. Compared to other kinds of enterprises, university 
based start-ups are more likely to have much room to develop and to achieve technical 
innovation if the universities can capture their advantages in science and technology and grasp 
market opportunities. On the other hand, the development of university per se pushes the 
establishment of university based start-ups. In a planned economy, government funding was 
the major financial source for universities. However, government funding for universities is 
far less than that required in a market economy. Many universities have begun to run for-
profit enterprises directly.  For example, the Founder Company, which has a significant share 
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of the domestic software market in China, was begun at, and is controlled by, Peking 
University.  By directly engaging in market activities, universities have changed from the role 
of pure research or teaching institutions to active market players so as to obtain additional 
financial supports. Besides financial benefits, university based start-ups help universities to 
remove some of redundant staff and act as a base for university staff and students to apply 
their knowledge to real commercial world.  
In China, university based start-ups used to be regarded as an accessory of university, which 
restricted the development of the start-ups. With the development of market economy in 
China, the issue of how to properly position and manage university based start-ups has 
aroused the interests of both practitioners and academic researchers. Prior research (Bao, 
2001; Li, 2001; He, 2001) focused on the relationship between university based start-ups and 
universities or the competition between the start-ups and the domestic firms in the same 
industry. There is little research on university based start-ups’ involvement with international 
collaboration. After China’s entry into WTO, this neglected topic deserves the attention and 
exploration of researchers and practitioners, because the management of university based 
start-ups is conducted in a global environment. This paper will point out the necessity of 
integrating university based start-ups of China into international network by analyzing the 
benefits of international cooperation. It will show the difficulties that university based start-
ups of China usually have in linking with international network. To overcome the difficulties, 
the start-ups and the Chinese government are advised to take some measures.   
 
THE NECESSITY OF INTEGRATING UNIVERSITY BASED START-UPS INTO 
INTERNATIONAL NETWORK 
Integrating university based start-ups into international network means university based start-
ups of China should form stable and lasting relationships with foreign universities or firms 
through interactions or collaborations. International interactions or collaborations can be in 
Sizong Wu and Qinghai Li: Reflection on Integrating University Based Start-Ups of China into 
International Network 
 
 130
the form of academic communication, technology licensing, technical cooperation contract, 
joint R&D center, or joint venture. Through linking with international network, university 
based start-ups can accelerate the speed of technical innovation and operate in a global 
standard. 
 
To Enhance the Technology Level of University Based Start-Ups 
Compared to other organizations, universities usually have stronger capabilities in basic and 
applied research and more talents of science and technology. In China, about 60% technicians 
engaged in basic research and 70% technicians engaged in applied research are university 
staff. R&D funds of universities amounts to nearly 40% of the national R&D funds. By 
establishing start-ups, universities combine the process of creating technological fruits with 
that of absorbing the fruits and thus reduce transaction costs in technology transfer. A 
university based start-up can be regarded as a good form of university-industry combination. 
However, there is still much room for universities in China to enhance their capabilities in 
science and technology. Most universities lack long-term, large-scale, and creative projects 
and commercialize only 10% of their inventions (Li and Luo, 2003).    
Linking with international network will enhance university based start-ups in both creating 
and absorbing technological fruits. Through interacting and communicating with foreign 
researchers or technicians, people in university based start-ups could reach the academic and 
technical frontier to accumulate new technologies. Obtaining the information on R&D 
provided by international network, university based start-ups could avoid unnecessary 
investments on mature technologies, strengthen the contacts with international patentees, and 
speed up international technology transfer. Forming strategic alliance is another important 
way for university based start-ups to link with international network. A strategic alliance may 
bring complementary resources to each party. University based start-ups of China have 
abundant and cheap high-tech talents and reliable local market information, while foreign 
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organizations usually have advantages in technology and capital. Forming strategic alliance 
with foreign partners, university based start-ups of China could get enough financial or 
technical supports to achieve the innovation.  
 
To Enhance the Management Level of University Based Start-Ups 
The management of university based start-ups covers multiple processes (such as basic 
research, applied research, market research, product development, manufacturing, and 
marketing) and motivations to multiple groups of people (such as technicians, workers, and 
salespersons), which requires the start-ups to have quite great capabilities in management. At 
present, most university based start-ups are short of business talents who can play an active 
role in both technology and market innovation. And the coordination among departments and 
processes is not done well. Integrating into international network provides the start-ups with a 
learning mechanism, that is, learning by doing. Through international cooperation, the start-
ups could learn about advanced management approaches from foreign partners, synergize 
technology exploration and market exploitation, and operate business according to the global 
standard.  
 
To Expand University Based Start-Ups’ Markets 
Besides contributing technical and financial supports, integrating into international network 
provides university based start-ups with some intangible asset. To some extent, cooperating 
with famous foreign universities or multinational corporations can magnify a university based 
start-up’s reputation in the local market, since international cooperation demonstrates to the 
public that the start-up has some strengths or advantages to be selected as a partner by foreign 
organizations. Furthermore, cooperating with foreign organizations in R&D makes it possible 
for a start-up to produce products with super technical qualities. Hence, the start-up is more 
likely to build up their brand name and gain market recognition.  
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Prior research  (Johannisson et al., 1994; Sapienza et al., 1996; Hills et al., 1997) found that 
networking allows entrepreneurs to enlarge their knowledge of opportunities, to gain access to 
critical resources such as finance and to deal with business obstacles. Integrating into 
international network provides university based start-ups with social capital, that is, personal 
relationship with foreign professionals in the same industry or related industries. With such 
kind of social network, the managers in the start-ups broaden their visions and are sensitive to 
foreign market opportunities. And formal inter-organizational relationship may facilitate 
university based start-ups to enter foreign market. For instance, in 1997, IBM and Founder 
Corporation signed a contract for software development and global cooperation. Founder 
Corporation cooperated with IBM in developing software and at the same time sold its 
software through IBM’s global market channels.  
 
THE BARRIERS TO INTEGRATING UNIVERSITY BASED START-UPS INTO 
INTERNATIONAL NETWORK 
At present, there are not many university based start-ups of China closely integrated into 
international network. Start-ups carrying out international cooperation and interaction are 
usually based on famous universities. Even those start-ups based on eminent universities do 
not conduct international collaboration broadly and deeply. This situation is due to the current 
status of university based start-ups and the barriers in the process of international cooperation. 
 
Barriers Caused by the Current Status of University Based Start-Ups 
Ambiguous property right and nonstandard management mechanism. 
For most university based start-ups, universities are assuming their legal persons and 
intellectual contributions of university staff or technicians are not evaluated as a component of 
capital.  As the only owner of a start-up, a university has to undertake all the risks of the start-
up. There is no clear boundary between the university’s property right and the start-up’s 
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property right. Many universities interfere with the start-ups’ business decisions (Li, 2001). 
The top managers of a start-up are usually technical talents or even administrators of the 
university. Such kind of top managers lack of business experience. Commercially 
inexperienced academic inventors may focus too much on the technical aspects of the 
innovation to the detriment of business dimensions (Daniels and Hofer, 1993).  
As the university’s administration is not fit well with the objectives of the start-up, the start-
up is hard to operate in a market-oriented way. Ambiguous property right may cause some 
barriers to integrating a university based start-up into international network. Firstthe 
university’s interfere with the start-up’s business operation restricts  the start-up’s flexibility 
in dealing with the relationship with foreign partners. Second, because of not identifying 
intellectual contribution as a part of property right, technicians and managers in the start-up 
are not motivated to take initiative in international cooperation.  
The scales of university based start-ups go to extremes. 
There is a trend that the scales of university based start-ups go to extremes. On the one hand, 
some start-ups have developed dramatically and become large-sized enterprises in their 
industries. Currently, there are nearly 40 high-tech university based start-ups listed in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets. Take Founder Corporation as an example. Founder 
Corporation based on Peiking University now has fixed capital of 0.4 billion RMB, with 30 
subsidiaries and 7 joint ventures. On the other hand, most university based start-ups are small-
sized enterprises and with small amount of investment from universities. It is common for 
many universities that one invention brings about the establishment of one start-up.  
Large-sized start-ups and small-sized start-ups confront with different barriers in 
international cooperation. Large-sized start-ups are always in leading positions in local 
markets. These start-ups usually do not have pressing desire to improve technology or 
conduct international cooperation since they have stable profits and many potential domestic 
partners. Some large-sized start-ups diversify their businesses and do not focus on their 
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original technical expertise in one field. Diversification makes international cooperation hard 
to be carried out in depth. The problem with small-sized start-ups is that they usually focus on 
gaining short-term profits and often neglect long-term strategic planning. Because the 
development of small-sized start-ups only depends on one or few inventions rather than 
continuous creation process, small-sized start-ups have little attractiveness in technology 
development and thus have fewer chances to form international technological alliances.  
 
Barriers in the Process of International Cooperation 
The form of international cooperation is an important decision for university based start-ups, 
as it is closely related to the aim of collaboration and determines the way of gaining profits for 
each party. International collaborations conducted by university based start-ups are mainly in 
two ways: technology transfer and strategic alliance. The former strengthens exogenous 
technological innovation, that is, to acquire a source of technology and knowledge through 
introducing or imitating technology. The latter benefits endogenetic technological innovation, 
that is, to acquire a source of technology and knowledge through leveraging an enterprise’s 
own technological capability.  
Barriers in the process of technology transfer. 
Due to the proprietary nature of technology, there exists information asymmetry in the 
process of technology licensing. It is hard for university based start-ups to judge the degree of 
advancement of an introduced technology and to balance the royalty fees with potential 
benefits of the technology. And the purpose of technology transfer cannot be achieved until an 
introduced technology is assimilated and innovated by the receptor. According to a survey 
conducted by National Bureau of Statistics of China (Du, 2003), in 2001, the ratio of 
introduced technology over assimilated technologies in China’s high-tech industries was 1: 
0.047, which is much lower than that in Japan and Korea ( whose ratio was about 1:3). 
Lacking investment on assimilating introduced technology, university based start-ups tend to 
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fall into the trap of “introduce technology---- lag ----- introduce technology again ---- lag 
again”. 
Barriers in the process of strategic alliance. 
Strategic alliances formed between university based start-ups and foreign partners are 
involved with relatively tight cooperation in technology, manufacturing, or marketing. 
Therefore, mutual trust is indispensable to the success of strategic alliance. However, different 
national cultures and corporate cultures lead to differences in values and norms and thus 
always cause conflicts and distrust in the process of international strategic alliance. 
Sometimes, alliance partners do not reach the agreement on the degree of sharing knowledge 
and technology. If partners do not share the same strategic objective for an alliance, they may 
try to protect their own core competences so as to avoid the potential harm done by their 
partners. In addition, brain drain in the process of international cooperation is another worry 
of university based start-ups of China. Good working environment and welfare provided by 
foreign organizations have attractiveness to Chinese employees. The turnover of excellent 
researchers will be a great loss to university based start-ups.  
 
HOW TO ACCELERATE UNIVERSITY BASED START-UPS’ LINKING WITH 
INTERNATIONL NETWORK 
Adjust the Relationship Between Universities and the Start-Ups 
To carry out international cooperation proactively and effectively, university based start-ups 
should be on the right track of development by well dealing with the relationship with the 
universities that they based. The tangible and intangible assets that a university has invested 
on a start-up should be evaluated objectively so as to make the property right of the start-up 
clear. University based start-ups should be encouraged to operate independently in different 
forms. Large-sized start-ups with advanced technology can be reformed in a form of stock 
company or company of limited liability. Large-sized start-ups must standardize their 
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management and achieve further development by establishing three boards (that is, board of 
directors, board of supervisors, and board of stockholders) and implementing scientific 
decision procedures and effective motivation systems. Small-sized start-ups can be rented or 
sold so as to give the proprietors of start-ups more incentives and flexibility in business 
operation (Bao, 2001).  
 
Build Core Competence and Strengthen the Notion of International Cooperation 
University based start-ups ought to have a strategic planning and focus on building core 
competences. Depending only on mature technology can not guarantee the start-ups’ success 
in the long run because mature technology might be obsolete with competitors’ upgrading 
technology and the saturation of markets. University based start-ups should increase 
investment on R&D to generate more inventions. With the demand of pursuing new 
technological fruits, a start-up will have incentives to link with international network as 
international cooperation is a way to obtain a source of technological fruits. On the other side, 
the importance of building core competences lies in the fact that start-ups with core 
competences are more likely to be integrated into international network. The start-ups with 
core competences may have distinct technology resources or market resources which attract 
potential foreign partners. The start-ups with core competences may have clear objectives and 
abundant financial resources to introduce foreign technologies.  
 
Select Appropriate Form of Cooperation and Overcome Barriers in the Process of 
Cooperation 
University based start-ups should select an appropriate form of international cooperation 
according to their own situations. If tremendous expenses are needed to develop a technology 
internally, if introducing a products to market is impressing, then technology transfer can be 
used. If a start-up has great strengths in R&D or market development and can find ideal 
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foreign partners who can contribute complementary resources, then forming strategic alliance 
is a better choice.  
In the process of technology transfer, university based start-ups need to search new 
technology roundly and detect new directions of competitors’ technological innovation 
regularly. In this way, advanced technologies with great potential market value can be 
introduced. And the start-ups need to input more in assimilating introduced technologies so as 
to transfer introduced knowledge into their own capabilities.  In the process of international 
strategic alliance, it is essential to  integrate teams with different cultures. Members of one 
team are encouraged to communicate with members of another team with different culture.  
Managers engaging in an international alliance must be good at obtaining internal and 
external information and synergizing team members’ cultural differences. Managers’ good 
ability in communication and coordination is a key to avoiding conflicts.  
 
Establish a Good External Environment for International Cooperation 
In 2002, Chinese government’s eight departments, such as ministry of education, state 
economic and trade commission, and ministry of finance, jointly enacted and implemented 
“An Guidance to Peiking University and Qinghua University about Standardizing Their Start-
Ups’ Management”. The reform focuses on clarifying the property right and establishing a 
scientific management system for the two start-ups. It shows a direction to the development of 
other university based start-ups of China. Chinese government has approbated 6 universities’ 
technology transfer institutes as national centers of technology transfer.  State Economic & 
Trade Commission (2001) clear stated that one of main tasks for these national centers of 
technology transfer is to reinforce international cooperation in technological innovation, that 
is, to take an active part in international technology transfer, to facilitate assimilating 
introduced technology and developing technology, and to support Chinese students aboard to 
establish ventures or conduct R&D in China. All these measures taken by Chinese 
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government have good effects on integrating university based start-ups into international 
network.  
As a majority of university based start-ups of China is in technology-intensive 
industriesthe environment of high-tech industries will indirectly influence university based 
start-ups’ linking with international network.  Therefore, in addition to helping the start-ups to 
overcome barriers to international cooperation, Chinese government need to create a good 
external environment for technology-based enterprises. First, the government should enact a 
series of policies encouraging high-tech enterprises to innovate technology. For instance, 
high-tech enterprises should be allowed to have some preferential treatments in finance, or to 
get credit for exporting their products into global market. Second, through developing related 
agencies, the government need to establish a national service system for commercializing 
universities’ technological fruits. The national service system will provide university based 
start-ups with services or supports in technology information, venture capital, trade of 
technology property, and training of business talents. Finally, the government ought to 
reinforce some statutes or laws to protect intellectual property rights which are owned by 
partners of international cooperation.    
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Abstract 
The study applies Harvard’s Prof. M. Porter’s theory of competitive advantage and the cluster 
approach to the context of building the knowledge economy in a new EU member such as 
Lithuania. From a strategic and comparative international perspective, the study evaluates 
conditions for building a knowledge economy (e.g. The Sunrise Valley, Vilnius University) in 
Lithuania in the broader context of global and European integration. Porter’s “diamond” is 
used to evaluate Lithuania’s and other countries’ efforts at building the knowledge economy 
clusters; some broader strategic and some tactical/practical conclusions are offered, especially 
at the intersection of government, business, and society.  
 
 
Introduction: Theses for the Study 
As a Senior Knowledge Economy Advisor, I am now working on The European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) sponsored mission to advise The City of Vilnius re 
long-term capital development based on knowledge economy, related entrepreneurial 
development issues as exemplified by the Vilnius-based Sunrise Valley (SV) cluster. The SV 
is still a project in progress but elements of it, esp. The Laser Research Center (USD10 
million of international operations), Expla, biotech firms (e.g. Biotechna, with patents 
internationally), ITC firms, etc, are already well advanced, in some cases internationally. 
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Also, I have been occasionally advising the constituent stakeholders of  the SV cluster 
(Vilnius University, Vilnius University of Technology, Lithuanian Academy of Sciences, 
levels of government, various private interests, etc) re SV conceptual development, planning, 
and venture capital mobilization globally. In 2002, 10 Lithuanian political parties and 14 non-
profit organizations (representing business, academia, and youth organizations) signed a 
National Agreement concerning economic and social development. The priority of the 
National Agreement is the transformation of Lithuania's economy into a competitive 
knowledge-based economy, ensuring a variety of knowledge-based jobs as well as a 
compatibility of the education and science system with a developing knowledge-based society 
of Europe. Based on that Agreement, there are some forward-looking initiatives in Lithuania 
(e.g. Window to the Future, The Knowledge Economy Forum) that in some ways lead the 
new EU economies. Overall, Lithuania leads the new EU countries in terms of science & 
engineering graduates as a percentage of all university graduates. 
 
My above conclusions are based on my international comparative “hands-on” knowledge of 
such clusters in a number of transforming policy environments, e.g. City of Tampere, Finland, 
some Polish, Canadian, US clusters, etc, and on my research, graduate teaching, and PhD 
supervision in the fields of entrepreneurship, knowledge engineering & management, and the 
global economy in general.  
 
The Changing Institutional Wisdom 
As the conventional Bretton Woods wisdom has it, macro stabilization and privatization is 
important. This is a conditio sine qua non. But this is not enough by far. Moreover, the 
conventional wisdom inspired beliefs in the universal omnipotence of macropolicies, esp. the 
monetary policy, are misguided fallacies in some cases bordering on intellectual fraud. And 
not just "intellectual" in many cases, because such "wisdom" in large part underpinned the 
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financial scandals in the last years (Enron, Parmalat, etc). And the institutional fit of these 
policies matters a lot. The most important influences on the micro level are determined not by 
formal privatization but by the nature of institutions in any given region or society. 
 
Clusters: Definition 
The cluster is a business agglomeration producing the critical mass of geographically 
proximate and linked businesses, industries and institutions--from suppliers to associations to 
universities to government agencies--that enjoy unusual competitive success in a particular 
field or fields. Cluster members are linked by commonalities and complementarities. As the 
value of the cluster is greater than the sum of its parts (all individual companies or 
institutions, etc), clusters create synergy that raises productivity and competitiveness in the 
final analysis.  
 
From Macro to Micro 
Governments and macro institutions have traditionally (esp. in Europe, USA) focused on the 
importance of the role played by fiscal and monetary policies in the competitiveness of a 
region (Washington Consensus) in spite of the fact that it is microeconomic policy that creates 
prosperity in a region or country. 
A solid macro economic policy only paves the way for productivity, it does not improve it. 
This first diagram demonstrates how, through the application of micro economic policies, 
productivity can be improved. 
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The theory progresses with the introduction of innovation and the importance it has within an 
industry. The diagram depicts how the level of productivity of a region is mirrored in that 
region’s development (standard of living), where a steady, sustainable growth is required to 
maintain a high standard. In advanced regions like Europe, prosperity is influenced by a 
continuous rate of innovation, especially the sustainable innovation.  
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Prosperity in a region is created by the microeconomic foundations of competitiveness, which 
is based on the sophistication of its companies (including small and medium enterprises) and 
industries. However, as the business environment within which the firms operate determines 
this sophistication, the focus must be on improving the quality of the region’s business 
environment. 
The quality of the region’s business environment is embodied in four broad attributes that 
affect both productivity and the capacity to innovative on a sustainable basis. Prof. Michael E. 
Porter created the “diamond” in order to analytically present these four attributes.  
 
The Diamond Approach 
The four points of the diamond represent the four basic attributes that affect regional 
productivity and innovation. Each of the four attributes is self-reinforcing, has a unique and 
important role to play in the region’s business environment and they all operate together as a 
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system. These four attributes are: environment or context in which firms build their strategies 
and compete; what are the factor (input) conditions in which firms operate; what are demand 
conditions in which firms operate; what are related and supporting industries that firms 
collaborate with. 
The links among the four attributes of the diamond are presented below.  
 
The diamond is unique to each cluster as its structure is affected by the regional business 
environment, that is the regional configuration of factors and the strategy/attitude that each 
region exhibits towards competitiveness in today’s global economy. 
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Advantages of Clusters  
Clusters improve competitiveness (which results in improved productivity) in three ways; 
1. Improve productivity through improved access to specialized suppliers, skills, and 
knowledge.  
2. Innovation is more sustainable and given more importance as the need for 
improvement in processes of production is highlighted. And firms working together in 
the cluster can satisfy this need much better that otherwise the case would be.  
3. Once established, clusters will grow as a result of the creation of new firms and the 
entrance of new suppliers (incubation effect).  
Reasons for the growing importance of clusters and the cluster method of development  
• The growing number of people involved in economic development activities. The 
decentralization of decision-making processes to the regional, city, and local levels 
and the renewed importance of international organizations have left many new policy 
planners with the need to find new tools to define their policies.  
• The use of increasingly frustrating traditional industrial policies such as providing 
subsidies for uncompetitive industries (e.g. agriculture in the EU), attempting to build 
new industries from scratch and from above, and trying to attract incompatible 
(enclave-like) foreign investments are unproductive.  
• The globalization of markets. With the reduction in the number of barriers to trade 
(e.g. WTO processes in Cancun, Doha), producers can compete freely globally, esp. 
under the conditions of the global knowledge economy. Given this, regions realize that 
they must compete globally in the industries in which they enjoy a competitive 
advantage. Globalization is thus leading to a specialization of regional economies. 
Clusters support this trend by building on local differences, seeking endogenous 
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growth sources of regional economies, reinforcing the assets already present in the 
local economies, etc, and so fostering the bottom up approaches to development, as 
opposed to top down approaches. 
 
Recapitulation: 
The cluster method fosters high levels of productivity and innovation and lays out the 
implications for competitive strategy and economic policy. Economic geography in an era of 
global competition poses a paradox. In theory, location should no longer be a source of 
competitive advantage. Open global markets, rapid transportation, and high-speed 
communications should allow any company to source any thing from any place at any time. 
But in practice, location remains important to competition. The global economic map is 
characterized by what Prof. Porter calls clusters: critical masses in one place of linked 
industries and institutions - from suppliers to universities to government agencies - that enjoy 
unusual competitive success in a particular field or fields. Porter explains how clusters affect 
competition in three broad ways: first, by increasing the productivity of companies based in 
the area; second, by driving the direction and pace of innovation; and third, by stimulating the 
formation of new businesses within the cluster. Geographic, cultural, and institutional 
proximity provides companies with special access, closer relationships, better information, 
powerful incentives, and other advantages that are difficult to tap from a distance. The more 
complex, knowledge-based, and dynamic the global economy becomes, the more this is true. 
Competitive advantage lies increasingly in local things - knowledge, relationships, and 
motivation - that distant rivals cannot replicate very efficiently. This is the essence of thinking 
globally but acting locally.  
 
3rd International GET UP Workshop on University Based Start-Ups 
29 – 31 October 2004, Jena  
 149
Sources: 
Porter M.E., Clusters of innovation initiative: San Diego, New York 2001 
Dearing, A., Sustainable Innovation: Drivers and Barriers, online available at  
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/24/34/2105727.pdf, last visited 10.05.2004 
Department of Trade and Industry, A Practical Guide to Cluster Development and  
Business Clusters in the UK – A First Assessment, online available at http://www.dti.gov.uk/, 
last visited 10.05.2004 
 
Dougherty, D. & Hardy, C., Sustained production innovation in large, mature organisations: 
Overcoming innovation-to-organisation problems. Academy of Management Journal, 39(5), 
1120–1153, 1996 
 
Ehrenfeld, J.R., Ferrão, P. and Reis, I., Tools to Support Innovation of Sustainable Product 
Systems  in  Conceição, P. et al Eds.  Knowledge for Inclusive Development, Ch 17, 
Greenwood Publishing, 2002 
 
EU Leonardo da Vinci Initiative, SUPPORT project homepage, online available at 
http://www.leonardo-support.com, last visited 10.05.2004 
 
European Commission, Commission Recommendation concerning the definition of micro, 
small and medium-sized enterprises, 6 of May 2003, online available at  
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/enterprise_policy/sme_definition/index_en.htm, 
last visited 10.05.2004 
 
European Commission, The Observatory  Reports of European SMEs, online available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/enterprise_policy/analysis/observatory.htm, last visited 
10.05.2004   
 
Forum for the Future, Discover the lustre of sustainable clusters  - Regional Futures, 
http://www.forumforthefuture.org.uk/, last visited 10.05.2004 
 
Gerlach, A., Sustainable entrepreneurship and innovation, online available at  www.on-a-
mission.org/resources/files/Sustainable Entrepreneurship and Innovation.pdf, last visited 
10.05.2004    
 
Gross, R. Resource Productivity Innovation: Systematic Review, online available at 
http://www.sd-research.org.uk/documents/RPISystematicReview-Assessmentreport.doc, last 
visited 10.05.2004     
 
Harvard Business School, Institute for Strategy and Competitiveness, Cluster Mapping 
Project, online available at http://data.isc.hbs.edu/isc/cmp_overview.jsp, last visited 
10.05.2004  
 
Kiernan, M.J., Get innovative or get dead. Business Quarterly, Autumn, 51–58, 1996 
 
Lettice, F.; Thomond, P., Disruptive Innovation: The Challenges for Managing Knowledge,  
http://www.knowledgeboard.com/download/3095/Lettice_DI-and-Knowledge.pdf, last visited 
10.05.2004     
Val Samonis: Building knowledge economies in new EU countries: A study of the “Sunrise Valley” 
cluster, Lithuania 
 
 150
 
Lisbon European Council, LISBON STRATEGY Status 2003, online available at 
http://212.3.246.117/1/AJAOOCLCCHIOMGCAJDHOPBOMPDB69DB1CG9LI71KM/UNI
CE/docs/DLS/2003-00589-EN.pdf, last visited 10.05.2004  
 
Utterback, J.M., Mastering the Dynamics of Innovation: How Companies Can Seize 
Opportunities in the Face of Technological Change. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School 
Press, 1994 
 
Van de Ven, A., Polley, D.E., Garud, R. & Venkataraman, S., The Innovation Journey. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1999 
3rd International GET UP Workshop on University Based Start-Ups 
29 – 31 October 2004, Jena  
 151
 
Empirical test of the existence of dynamic changes in regional firm 
founding activities 
 
Dirk Fornahl 
 
Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems 
Evolutionary Economics Group 
Kahlaische Straße 10 
07745 Jena, Germany 
Phone: +49-(0)3641-686822 
Fax: +49-(0)3641-686868  
E-Mail: fornahl@mpiew-jena.mpg.de 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Firm foundings are an important factor for regional development. A lot of valuable 
empirical research was already conducted to figure out which factors influence regional 
founding activities. In this paper the focus is slightly different because changing patterns of 
firm founding activities are the units of investigation and will be identified. Thus, the aim of 
the analysis is to find out if short- to medium-term changes in the regional firm founding 
activity do exist and how they look like. Such an approach can serve as an input for future 
research in which the relevant factors that lead to theses changes shall be detected. 
 
Keywords. Entrepreneurship, Region, Case Study 
JEL. R1, D21, C2  
 
1. Introduction 
Firm foundings have a strong impact on regional development: they positively influence the 
regional employment situation, the innovation activities and via cooperation and buyer-
supplier-relations the whole regional innovation system (e.g. Klomp and Thurik 1999, 
Brenner 2001, Fornahl and Frenzel 2003, Hendry et al. 2000). This paper focuses on the 
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uneven regional distribution of start-up activities that can be observed in many empirical 
studies (e.g. Fritsch and Niese 1999, Bade and Nerlinger 2000, Berger and Nerlinger 1997). 
The central questions in this field of research are which factors influence the decision to start 
a firm and which resulting (local) founding dynamics can be observed? A lot of empirical 
studies already tried to answer the first question and identified relevant variables (e.g. 
Audretsch and Fritsch 1994, Reynolds 1994, Steil 1997, Nerlinger 1998) that can be grouped 
into main categories like ‘industrial’, ‘national’ and ‘regional’. Industrial factors include all 
the aspects that are linked to the industrial characteristics of the observed industry like the 
market environment or the used technologies. National factors represent all the general factors 
that influence the founding activities irrespective of the industry and the region. Regional 
factors could be the regional infrastructure, the educational system, etc. In the majority of 
studies a static environmental context is assumed and a possible change of the environmental 
circumstances is neglected. Furthermore, short-term changes in the firm founding activities as 
well as switches of the founding activity from one level of activity to another (higher or 
lower) one are not considered. To sum up, in most studies the independent factors are given to 
varying degrees or not given at all and the effect on the corresponding founding rate as the 
dependent variable is analysed. In this paper the focus is slightly different because especially 
changes of firm founding activities over time are the units of investigation and shall be 
examined. Thus, the aim of the analysis is to find out if short- to medium-term changes in the 
regional firm founding activity do exist and how they look like. With such an approach this 
paper is complementary to the already existing empirical studies. Since the paper is partly 
conceptual in nature and proposing a framework and method that can be used for further 
empirical research, already existing empirical studies and especially the empirical data of 
these studies can be applied to this method. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 the data source and the sample on which the 
empirical analysis is based is described. After that it is tested by using empirical data on firm 
3rd International GET UP Workshop on University Based Start-Ups 
29 – 31 October 2004, Jena  
 153
founding activity from 49 German regions in which regions, sectors and years these short-
term shifts or start-up bubbles appear or whether the regional activities can be explained by 
industrial and long-term regional factors alone and which characteristics these changes have 
(section 3). Section 4 concludes and gives an outlook for further research. 
 
2. Background of the Empirical Study 
The empirical analysis focuses on two main areas: First, do short- to medium-term changes in 
the regional firm founding activities occur? In order to explore this question a method is 
proposed in section 3.1 that eliminates developments caused by industrial, national or long-
term regional influences. Second, how do these developments in the firm founding activity 
look like? This question is answered exemplary by using empirical data on firm founding 
activity from 49 German regions (section 3.1). In this section the data source and the sample 
are described before. 
In Germany only few databases are available in which the number of foundings is collected in 
a differentiated and credible way. It is especially difficult to get disaggregated data on a 
regional and industrial level. Possible sources for such data are for example the Centre for 
European Research (ZEW), the National Office of Statistic or a recent project trying to build 
up a “Regional Founding Atlas” (Fritsch et al. 2002, Fritsch and Niese 2000 or anonymous 
2003). The sample, which is used in the following analysis, is based on the “Mannheim 
Founding Panels” of the ZEW.  
The basis for the ZEW Founding Panel is the firm data provided by “Creditreform”. 
Creditreform is the largest German commercial credit rating agency, thus, normally providing 
information regarding a firm’s financial situation but also selling addresses and additional 
information to customers.  
Although, there exist some shortcomings and disadvantages linked to the ZEW Founding 
Panel data, the data seems reasonable good to be used in this analysis. It is not possible to 
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give an accurate approximation of the absolute number of foundings in each industry, but 
there seems to be no systematic temporal and regional biases in the data. Fritsch et al. come to 
the conclusion that two data sources are most suitable in order to analyze founding activities 
(Fritsch et al. 2002). These are the ZEW Founding Panels and the employee statistics from the 
Federal Employment Office. Since the latter also includes branches in its database, one can 
conclude from analysis by Frisch et al. that only the ZEW Founding Panels can be used for 
the aim at hand. 
The ZEW offers data on founding intensities (absolute number of firm foundings per 
10.000 inhabitants between 18 and 65 years) for external users.5 This data is available on the 
local administrative unit of a “Kreis” for Germany and Austria or aggregates of this unit like 
counties. The industrial differentiation is on the WZ-93 classification 2-digit level. This 
availability of founding data on a disaggregated level makes it possible to analyze time 
patterns of founding activities for different kinds of regional and industrial aggregates.  
 
For the empirical analysis a sample is chosen that encompasses 49 regions, 15 sectors and 12 
years. In this section this sample will be described and motivated. 
The data used in the following ranges from 1990 to 2001. Especially for Eastern Germany 
only observations from 1990 onwards are possible because the data is not available for the 
time before and the comparability of the data before and after the re-unification would cause 
severe methodological problems. Additionally, on the one hand such a time span should be 
long enough to decrease the likelihood that singular short-term events bias the data. On the 
other hand, the time span is short enough that some regional factors can be regarded as fixed 
which is relevant for section 3.1.  
                                                 
5 Since the ZEW based its calculation for the relative founding intensities for the years 2000 and 2001 on data on 
inhabitants from the year 1999, the relative founding intensities for these years were calculated by the author 
based on the absolute number of firm foundings provided by the ZEW and on the data of inhabitants taken from 
“Statistik Regional”, a data source provided by the German Federal Office of Statistics. 
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As the geographic unit the level of so called "Kreise" is chosen. On this level 440 
administrative units exist in Germany, thus, the data is collected and the analysis is conducted 
on a disaggregated level. The advantage of this level is that small developments in the 
founding activities can be observed that could not be seen in larger aggregates because of the 
leveling out of these developments by a larger basis. A disadvantage is that developments in 
the neighboring local units and influences from these units are not taken into consideration. 
Since such a neighboring effect shall not be analyzed in this paper, it seems more suitable to 
rely on very detailed information on the ‘Kreis’ level. From the 440 local administrative units 
in Germany not all were included in the analysis. Instead 49 regions were selected which are 
shown in Table 5 in the Appendix. These 49 regions were selected because they all included 
at least one firm that was listed in the NEMAX 50 (‘New Market Stock-Index’ of the German 
stock exchange containing the 50 most liquid stock values of the German New Market) or its 
successor the TecDax (Technology index containing the top 30 technology stocks traded in 
the Prime Standard segment of the German stock exchange in terms of turnover and market 
capitalization).6 Thus, all NEMAX and TecDax firms were or are still concentrated in these 
49 local units. This criterion was used for two reasons: first, the existence of a NEMAX or 
TecDax firm is assumed to influence the regional founding activities (which is relevant for a 
research presented in a different paper). Second, although the number of regions is relatively 
high and they show a large variety in various factors (see Appendix 5), it was supposed that 
these regions have a high number of firm foundings which makes them more interesting for 
economic analysis in general and which makes it possible to better analyze the development 
of the firm founding activity in particular.  
 
                                                 
6 On the 1st of July 2003 a list of firms was compiled which had been or were still listed in one of these indices. 
As a next step the regions in which these firms were founded were collected. 
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15 industries were selected for the empirical analysis. A list of these industries can be 
found in Table 4 in the Appendix. The industries were selected according to the German 
classification of Economic Activities, Edition 1993 (WZ-937) on a 2-digit level that is 
equivalent to the European NACE (Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the 
European Community) 2 level. 12 of the industries belong to the manufacturing industry (No. 
22 to 33). This is around 50 percent of all the industries in the manufacturing sector. The other 
three (No. 72-74) belong to the business service sector that is probably the most important one 
for other firms and thus for the upcoming analysis.  
The 15 industries have a share of 28 percent of the total 2-digit industries. The WZ-93 level 
was chosen because a more aggregated one would just consist of a few industries that would 
make it impossible to analyze the individual processes in different industries. A more 
disaggregated level is not available at the moment but would be favorable in order to get more 
detailed information about the processes going on in the industries inside each 2-digit 
industry.  
The 15 sectors were selected for various reasons: first, in these industries a high number 
of firm foundings are expected (especially in comparison to the agricultural or mining sector). 
Second, these sectors are expected to have a strong impact on regional development and 
regional innovation systems. Since the two sub-categories "Asset management" and 
"Management activities of holding companies" in the industry "Other business activities" are 
not directly related to innovation activities and have only an indirect impact on the 
development of other firms, these were left out in the analysis. Thus, they are not included in 
sector 74 (“Other business activities”). 
 
 
                                                 
7 The WZ93 classification is the official German classification of industries. 
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3. Empirical Analysis of Changes in Regional Firm Founding Activities 
After the description above giving an overview of the sample and explaining why this sample 
is used, the following sections will concentrate on the empirical identification of short- to 
medium-term changes in regional firm founding activities (section 3.1) and on the 
characterisation of these changes and on a classification (section 3.2). 
 
3.1 Identification of changes in Founding Activities 
Up to now it was only assumed that short- to medium-term changes in the regional firm 
founding activities do occur. In this section the question of whether such changes can really 
be observed in reality is answered. In order to address this question first a definition of short- 
to medium-term changes in firm founding activity has to be made. Let us assume that there 
are only four broad categories of factors influencing the regional firm founding activities. 
Namely these are the national and temporal (1), industry (2), long-term regional (3) and short- 
to medium-term regional (4) influences. The category 1 includes all the factors that influence 
all regions and all industries like national legislation, taxes and firm founding support. A 
dynamic aspect is contained in this category since the factors in this category and the firm 
founding activities do not have to stay constant over time but can both change. The second 
category takes into account that the characteristics of the industries vary largely and that this 
has an influence on the number of firm foundings. Thus, in each point in time the firm 
founding activity is likely to differ according to the industry. A combination of category 1 and 
category 2 would lead, in the simplest version, not to one aggregated curve (like for category 
1 alone) but to disaggregated developments for each industry. Category 3 adds long-term 
regional influences to this picture. Not all regions will have the same regional environment 
and thus it is not likely that the firm founding activities in an industry are the same for all 
regions. Taken the first three categories together, the already disaggregated curves for each 
industry would shift up- or downward according to the regional advantages or disadvantages 
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of the regions under consideration. If only these three factors influence the regional founding 
activities, the founding intensity for one region in one sector for the period of time under 
consideration can be transferred into the aggregated curve of this sector by multiplying it with 
one fixed factor. If such a multiplier cannot be found it is likely that the fourth category has an 
impact on the firm founding intensities which leads to an corresponding shift in the founding 
activities and thus to short- to medium-term changes in these regional founding activities.  
Thus, the definition of short- to medium-term changes reads as follows: A short- to 
medium-term change in the founding activity in one region and a specific sector occurs, if the 
regional development cannot be transferred into the aggregated one by multiplying it with a 
fixed multiplying factor for the period of time under consideration. In the following we are 
searching for time series for which this definition holds. 
 
The regional firm founding activities are defined in terms of the likelihood that a person 
founds a firm in a specific sector, year and region. If this likelihood cannot be explained by 
the above describe procedure, a relevant time series is identified. Since only the observed firm 
founding activities can be derived from the data, the corresponding probabilities that can lead 
to this observation have to be calculated. 
Thus, in order to test the hypothesis whether such a change in the likelihood of firm 
foundings takes place first the probabilities leading to the observed firm foundings are 
calculated. The calculation of the corresponding probabilities and the testing procedure is 
described in the following. Let us denote the regions with { }49,...,1=∈ Rr with ordering the 
regions from 1 to 49 according to the code numbers in increasing order (see Table 5 in the 
Appendix). Let us denote the industries with { }19,...,1=∈ Ii . The industries are ordered from 
1 to 15 according to the industry codes in increasing order (see Table 4 in the Appendix). 
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(1)
(2)
Furthermore, aggregates are constructed: aggr15 ( i =16) corresponds to the firm founding 
activities of all 15 aggregated industries, aggr14 ( i =17) to the aggregated industries without 
industry 74 (‘Other business activities’), prod ( i =18) contains the industries 22 to 33 (all the 
manufacturing industries) and service ( i =19) holds the industries 72 to 74 (all the service 
industries). The time is denoted by { }12,...,1=∈Tt  from 1990 to 2001. The calculation of the 
probabilities is done by using a binomial distribution with the two alternative events: 
‘founder’ and ‘non-founder’. For each year t, region r and industry i the observed number of 
firm foundings (equivalent to the number of founders) is given by i,r,tf  and is directly taken 
from the data provided by the ZEW. The inhabitants of the region between 18 and 65 years of 
age are regarded as the population trn , . It is assumed here that all these inhabitants have the 
same probability of becoming a founder. The event ‘founder’ in a region r and industry i at 
time t occurs with the probability trip ,, . At each given confidence interval there exist two 
probabilities ( trip ,, and trip ,, ) that can lead to the observed number of observations ( i,r,tf ). 
Thus, we identify an interval in which the firm founding probabilities should be located in for 
a specific confidence interval. An example is given in (1) and (2) for a 95% interval (see e.g. 
Hartung, Elpelt and Klösener 1998). 
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trip ,, and trip ,,  are then calculated numerically by using 95% and 99% confidence intervals. 
The results are 11172 intervals (49 regions times 12 years times 19 industries) in which the 
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(3)
(4)
(5)
probabilities must be located and which would lead to the corresponding observed firm 
foundings ( i,r,tf ). The same is done for the aggregated level. Here the aggregated population 
of the regions at time t is defined as ∑=
r
trt nN , and the number of firm foundings as 
∑=
r
triti fF ,,, . The borders ( tiP ,  and tiP , ) of the interval are calculated by using (3) and (4): 
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The results are 228 intervals in which the probabilities must be located and which would lead 
to the corresponding observed firm foundings ( i,tF ). 
Based on these calculations it can be analysed whether the development over the whole 
time span in a region r in an industry i can be transformed into the aggregate development by 
multiplying the regional development with a fixed factor. Since both the regional probabilities 
( trip ,, and trip ,, ) and the aggregated probabilities ( tiP ,  and tiP , ) are given as intervals, also 
the factors for the multiplication can range from a lower border ( trim ,, ) to an upper one 
( trim ,, ). The borders of the intervals are calculated as follows ((5) and (6)):  
tri
ti
tri
p
Pm
,,
,
,, =  
 
3rd International GET UP Workshop on University Based Start-Ups 
29 – 31 October 2004, Jena  
 161
(6)
tri
ti
tri
p
Pm
,,
,
,, =  
For each of the 931 time series (49 regions times 19 industries) that have to be analysed, 12 
intervals result (one for each time t) by which the regional time series can be transformed into 
the aggregated one. Whether the whole regional time series can be transformed into the 
aggregated one depends on the existence of an overlap of all of the 12 intervals defined by 
trim ,,  and trim ,, . If such an overlap does not exist, such a transformation is not possible and 
thus, according to the definition above, a time series with a short- to medium-term change in 
regional firm founding activities is identified. 
In table 6 to 8 in the Appendix the results of this procedure are presented. On the 95/95% 
level (both calculations for the probabilities ( trip ,, and trip ,,  as well as tiP ,  and tiP , ) were 
done on the 95% level) we find that 461 of the 931 time series (or around 50%) cannot be 
transformed in the aggregate one. Thus, these time series show a development in which the 
regional firm founding activities change during the time period under consideration. On the 
99% level still 208 such time series can be found. Concerning differences between the 
industries one can conclude that there exist some industries in which these changes in firm 
founding activities occur more often than in others (Table 6). In general this phenomenon can 
be much more often observed in the service than in the manufacturing industry. A more 
detailed view shows that in some industry (all from the manufacturing industries) the 
phenomenon does not show up on the 99/99% level (industries no. 23, 25, 27, 31 and 32) or 
even on the 95/95% level (industry no. 23). Some industries in the manufacturing sector (like 
no. 22 ‘Publishing…’or 28 ‘Manufacture of fabricated metal products…’) and the service 
sector (like no. 74 ‘other business activities’ or no. 72 ‘Computer and related activities’) 
display a stronger tendency towards these changes in founding activities. The same holds for 
the differences between the observed regions (Table 7). While some regions have no 
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(Warendorf, Offenbach and Rendsburg-Eckernförde) or only few (like Schwäbisch Hall, 
Minden, Cuxhaven or Aschaffenburg) of these changes, others like München, Karlsruhe, 
Hamburg, Berlin or Dresden show these changes in over 37% of the observed industries. 
Table 8 illustrates by a cross-tabulation how the changes are distributed over regions and 
industries. In this table it shows up that for 4 regions (Aschaffenburg, Cuxhaven, Minden and 
Walldeck-Frankenberg) the changes can only be found in the aggregated industries. 
We can conclude from this such changes in regional firm founding activities can be found 
in the empirical data. Thus, the relative regional position in comparison to the aggregated firm 
foundings activities changes during the 12 years. These processes seem to be strongly 
influenced by regional circumstances (in 7 of the 49 regions no disaggregated changes or no 
changes at all could be found) and by the analysed industries with most of the findings in 
industry 74 and the aggregated industries.  
 
3.2 Characteristics of Changes in Founding Activities 
After the identification of the time series in which the changes took place, a deeper analysis is 
needed to get some additional insights. In the following some characteristics of these changes 
will be presented. In order to do this two different methods are used. The first one focuses 
only on the up and down development of the parameters trim ,,  and trim ,,  searching for the 
highest and lowest intervals. The second one assigns all 12 intervals of the parameters trim ,,  
and trim ,,  to a specific level. 
 
The first method takes one interval after the other and searches for significant differences 
between them. If trim ,,  of an interval t is higher than trim ,,  of an interval t – x (whereby x can 
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range from 1 to 11) then these two intervals are noted (as starting and ending point) and 
defined as an increase or positive change in the activities. If trim ,,  of an interval t is lower 
than trim ,,  of an interval t – x (whereby x can range from 1 to 11) these two intervals are 
defined as a decrease. If an increase was identified and trim ,,  of the interval t+1 is higher than 
trim ,,  of the interval t then the interval t+1 is the new ending point. The same holds if a 
decrease was identified and trim ,,  of the interval t+1 is lower than trim ,,  of the interval t. 
After such an increase or decrease was identified the reference point to which the following 
intervals are compared to is the ending point. The result of this method is a classification of 
the development over the observed 12 years in a succession of increases and decreases which 
are defined by the starting and ending points resulting from the highest and lowest values of 
the interval borders. 
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 1. Around 68% of the time series show 
one change in their relative position in founding activities on the 99/99%-level.  26.4% 
change and change back again and only 5.3% show even a stronger up and down movement. 
Hence, in most cases in which the changes took place this appeared only one during the 12 
years of observation or as can only be concluded from this kind of analysis the change in 68% 
of the cases only went in one direction (increase or decrease). A shortcoming of this kind of 
analysis is that the magnitude of increases and decreases cannot be identified. This problem 
can be solved with the second method described below. Before turning to the second method, 
the distribution of these findings according to the industries shall be briefly mentioned (Table 
9 in the Appendix). Most turbulence (measured in the increases and decreases in the relative 
position) can be found in the aggregated and the service industries. In the manufacturing 
industries only no. 22 (‘Publishing…’) and no. 30 (‘Manufacture of office machinery and 
computers’) show one change in the direction of change (once increase-decrease and twice 
decrease-increase). 
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Table 1: Characterization of the identified developments 
 Absolute Number Relative Number 
 Level8 Level 
Kind of development 99/99 95/95 99/99 95/95 
Increase 81 137 38.9% 29.7%
Decrease 61 110 29.3% 23.9%
Increase-Decrease 21 50 10.1% 10.8%
Decrease-Increase 34 106 16.3% 23.0%
Increase-Decrease-Increase 6 13 2.9% 2.8%
Decrease-Increase-Decrease 5 34 2.4% 7.4%
Increase-Decrease-Increase-Decrease  3  0.7%
Decrease-Increase-Decrease-Increase  6  1.3%
Increase-Decrease-Increase-Decrease-Increase  0  0.0%
Decrease-Increase-Decrease-Increase-Decrease   2   0.4%
Sum: 208 461   
 
The second method assigns each of the 12 intervals to specific levels. First it is identified how 
many levels do exist in each time series. In general a level is defined by the borders trim ,,  and 
trim ,,  of the 12 intervals. For each of the time series that are analysed at least two levels must 
exist because these time series were already selected in 4.1 based on the simplest criterion for 
a change of levels (the non-existence of an overlap). Here now more levels are defined. The 
first two levels are selected in the following way: Level 1 (the lowest level) is the interval 
with the lowest trim ,,  and the level 2 is the interval with the highest trim ,, . If all the other 10 
intervals show an overlap with either the level 1 or with level 2 (defined by trim ,,  and trim ,,  
of the corresponding interval) there exist only two levels. If not all the other intervals overlap, 
the intervals with the highest trim ,,  (but whose trim ,,  is lower than the trim ,,  of the interval 
defining level 2) and the interval with the lowest trim ,,  (but whose trim ,,  is higher than the 
trim ,,  of the interval defining level 1) are selected. If these two intervals overlap, level 2 
becomes level 3 and the borders of the new level 2 are defined as the average trim ,,  and 
                                                 
8 99/99 means that both the calculations of the probabilities on the regional ( trip ,, and trip ,, ) and the aggregated 
level ( tiP ,  and tiP , ) were done by using the 99% level. 95/95 represents the same for the 95% level. 
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trim ,, of all the intervals that overlap with these two intervals (but not with the intervals 
defining level 1 and level 3). If the two intervals do not overlap, the old level 2 becomes level 
4 and the new level 2 is defined by the average trim ,,  and trim ,, of all the intervals that overlap 
with the interval defined by the lowest trim ,,  (but not with the intervals defining level 1, 3 and 
4), whereas the new level 3 is defined by the average trim ,,  and trim ,, of all the intervals that 
overlap with the interval defined by the highest trim ,,  (but not with the intervals defining level 
1,  2 and 4). If there still exist intervals that do not overlap with the levels 1, 2, 3 and 4, the 
procedure starts again. After this definition of the levels, all the 12 intervals are assigned to 
the levels. If the interval overlaps with the borders of only one level, this level is assigned to 
the interval. If the interval overlaps with two levels, the average of the two levels is assigned 
to the interval. 
Table 2: Levels of changes 
  99/99 95/95 
Highest Level 
Number Share Number Share
2 180 86.5% 380 82.4%
3 20 9.6% 63 13.7%
4 5 2.4% 13 2.8%
5 3 1.4% 2 0.4%
6 0 0.0% 3 0.7%
  208   461  
 
After the assignment was done, we can observe that in 86.5% of the cases there exist only two 
levels between the changes occur. But still 28 time series can be found in which the 
development crosses more than 2 levels. Note that even with only two levels there might be a 
lot of turbulence as it was defined above. To probe deeper in this question, the development 
across the levels is analysed. 
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A classification of the development across the levels seems to be helpful to answer the 
question of how the changes in the regional firm founding activities really look like. For this 
purpose a 5-year window is used that runs across each time series. A 5-year window was used 
because a smaller one appeared to be too small in order to capture all possible developments. 
A larger window largely increased the number of possible cases that might occur (81 cases for 
the 5 year window and 243 for the 6 year one) and this seemed to be a strong disadvantage for 
classification purposes.9 The classification went as follows: in a 5-year window four changes 
of the level can take place. Possible changes might be staying on the same level, increasing or 
decreasing the level. For this case full as well as half steps up- and downward are regarded 
both as increases and decreases. Three alternatives times 4 possible possibilities for the 
change add up to 81 classes of development. It was counted how often each class appeared in 
the data. 
Table 10 in the Appendix shows the result of this analysis. These 81 classes can be further 
condensed. A first brief re-grouping of the first 25 classes leads to 5 aggregated classes that 
are presented in the following table 3. 
Table 3: Classes of changes according to the first 25 sub-classes 
Class  Observations 
No. Definition Sub-Class Number Share 
1 Staying the same 1 282 16.9% 
2 Phenomenon at the edge of the window that 
cannot be clearly classified 
2,3,4,8 328 19.7% 
                                                 
9 Other problems like the interpretation of findings at the beginning and the end of the 12 year period are not 
discussed here but the author is aware of them. 
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3 Successive change of the level (up-down, 
down-up) which can be a statistical artefact 
5,6,7,9,10,11 389 23.4% 
4 New level defined as a change of the level 
as a successive stay on this new level 
12,13,14,15 131 7.9% 
5 Bump defined as a change to a new level for 
at least one year with a change back to the 
old level 
18,20,22,23 77 4.6% 
* Sub-classes No. 16, 17, 19, 21, 24 and 25 not assigned 
 
The second and third class are of minor interest for the conducted research. From the other 
three classes some preliminary conclusions can be drawn. First, the high number of 
observations in which no changes occur, shows that there are many cases in which the level of 
firm founding activity stays the same for at least 5 years. Second, the founding activities 
change to a higher or lower level in many cases. The duration of this change differs and can 
last for 1 to 3 years at least (a longer period cannot be derived from the data) before falling 
back to the old level or even changing again. The other possible developments like a linear 
increase or decrease have to be further explored and new classes have to be built. Such a class 
formation will probably lead to 10 classes in which all the observations can be grouped. 
 
4. Conclusions and Outlook 
The aim of this paper was to develop a method by which changes in regional firm founding 
activity could be identified. Such identification seems to be possible with the proposed 
procedure. Furthermore, we were able to analysis the first characteristics of these changes and 
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in which sectors and industries they occurred. The last aspect that is preliminary in this paper 
it the classification of the founding development. Thus, in general the attempt seems fruitful 
for the analysis of firm foundings. After this brief description of the preliminary results, an 
outlook shall is given what will be the next steps: First, the already started classification 
procedure will be extended in order to include all the possible developments. Second, after the 
changes are identified the most it has to be figured out which factors let to this development. 
Two aspects are relevant in this respect: the general reasons for changes and the respective 
developments of the firm founding activities have to be collected from other empirical studies 
and theoretical considerations and afterwards this theoretical connection has to be tested by 
the empirically identified classes. Third, the derived theoretical link between factors and 
development has to be tested. Thus, the question is why the found changes have really 
occurred. This can be done by interviews or by a multivariate analysis taking the occurrence 
of a change (and the type of change) as the dependent and the possible underlying factors as 
the independent variable. Fourth, the tested method can be used to analyse other empirical 
data on firm foundings activities to which the results gained here can be compared. 
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Appendix 
Table 4: Selected characteristics of the industries included in the analysis 
WZ93-
Code 
Industry Average absolute 
number of firm 
foundings per year and 
region 
Average firm founding activity 
per 10,000 inhabitants 
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 19.79 0.58 
23 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 0.08 0.003 
24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 2.23 0.077 
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 1.76 0.079 
26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 2.89 0.12 
27 Manufacture of basic metals 1.60 0.062 
28 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and 
equipment 
10.07 0.43 
29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment 6.17 0.27 
30 Manufacture of office machinery and computers 2.54 0.10 
31 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus 2.14 0.084 
32 Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and 
apparatus 
1.52 0.054 
33 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches 
and clocks 
6.66 0.26 
72 Computer and related activities 68.00 2.08 
73 Research and development 5.28 0.18 
74 Other business activities / business services; without „Management 
activities of holding companies“ (74.15) and “Asset management” 
(74.847) 
270.03 7.77 
 
Source: ZEW Founding Panels; own calculations   
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Table 5: Selected characteristics of the sample regions 
No. Name Regional 
code 
Av. no. of firm 
foundings per 
year (1990 to 
2001) 
Av. firm 
founding 
intensity per 
10,000 
inhabitants 
Inhabitants 
(December 
2000) 
Inhabitants 
between 18 
and 65 
(December 
2000) 
No. of patents 
per inhabitant 
(patent averages 
1995-2000; 
inhabitants 
1998) 
Geographic
al area in 
square km 
Unemploy-
ment rate in 
2001 
Type of 
region in 
19991 
1 Lübeck 01003 538.2 38.37 213,399 135,958 152.65 214.14 13.8 2
2 Dithmarschen 01051 330.1 38.76 137,174 84,240 54.61 1,429.37 11.5 3
3 Rendsburg-
Eckernförde 
01058 734.3 42.88 270,119 172,280 133.67 2,185.49 8.6 2
4 Hamburg 02000 12107.8 105.24 1,715,392 1,149,508 154.97 755.33 9.6 1
5 Göttingen 03152 872 48.52 265,396 175,906 211.13 1,116.58 12.1 2
6 Cuxhaven 03352 268.1 20.96 204,843 126,935 45.77 2,072.50 10.6 2
7 Düsseldorf 05111 2971.6 76.04 569,364 380,779 299.57 217.00 10.4 1
8 Mühlheim/Ruhr 05117 541 47.16 172,862 108,597 299.14 91.29 9.4 1
9 Neuss 05162 1471.1 49.83 443,865 287,797 293.19 576.43 7.4 1
10 Aachen 05313 755.2 44.64 244,386 164,808 608.34 160.83 10.9 1
11 Köln 05315 3317.5 50.12 962,884 647,716 189.06 405.15 11.5 1
12 Heinsberg 05370 612.8 39.56 250,400 156,521 193.75 627.97 9.1 1
13 Warendorf 05570 574.8 32.74 280,443 175,133 233.28 1,317.05 7.5 2
14 Minden-Lübbecke 05770 726.8 36.70 322,789 196,548 200.05 1,152.06 8.7 1
15 Dortmund 05913 1521.7 38.77 588,994 377,617 118.40 280.29 14.7 1
16 Frankfurt am Main 06412 2911.1 64.38 646,550 446,402 244.99 248.31 7.7 1
17 Offenbach am Main 06413 448.8 56.87 117,535 78,199 217.71 44.90 10.3 1
18 Wiesbaden 06414 1212.5 67.92 270,109 177,575 232.90 203.90 8.4 1
19 Darmstadt-Dieburg 06432 859.3 45.49 286,780 189,661 637.45 658.51 5.9 1
20 Hochtaunuskreis 
(Bad Homburg) 
06434 945.7 63.87 225,638 146,784 552.38 482.05 4.8 1
21 Main-Taunus 
(Hofheim) 
06436 788.5 53.41 220,264 146,789 792.46 222.40 4.3 1
22 Wetterau-Kreis 
(Friedberg) 
06440 949.3 50.55 294,260 189,800 270.71 1,100.70 6.5 1
                                                  
* 1= agglomeration areas,  2 = urbanized areas, 3 = rural areas. 
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23 Lahn-Dill (Wetzlar) 06532 628.3 37.47 262,859 164,447 329.78 1,066.51 8.0 2
24 Marburg-Biedenkopf 06534 433.9 25.69 253,279 166,557 248.05 1,262.56 7.4 2
25 Waldeck-Frankenberg 
(Korbach) 
06635 331.8 31.30 170,568 104,699 130.25 1,848.58 7.8 2
26 Westerwald-Kreis 07143 594 47.74 201,840 125,493 143.43 988.75 6.6 2
27 Kaiserslautern 07312 328.1 49.12 99,825 64,953 235.37 139.72 12.4 2
28 Mainz 07315 660 51.86 182,870 124,086 310.81 97.77 7.5 2
29 Stuttgart 08111 1853.8 45.76 583,874 396,645 569.90 207.36 6.6 1
30 Esslingen 08116 1293.9 38.97 500,666 326,194 663.18 641.44 4.2 1
31 Karlsruhe, Stadt 08212 989.2 52.73 278,558 185,160 339.35 173.46 7.9 1
32 Karlsruhe, Landkreis 08215 1121.2 41.43 419,555 270,429 370.76 1,084.96 5.2 1
33 Heidelberg 08221 393.7 39.93 140,259 98,685 535.43 108.83 6.6 1
34 Rhein-Neckar-Kreis 
(Heidelberg) 
08226 1390.5 40.51 524,028 340,650 488.15 1,061.71 6.2 1
35 Breisgau-
Hochschwarzwald 
08315 613.3 40.44 240,545 152,735 266.01 1,378.34 5.3 2
36 Tübingen 08416 408.7 29.33 208,535 139,629 427.27 519.16 5.4 2
37 München 09162 5292.5 61.49 1,210,223 837,297 582.55 310.59 5.7 1
38 Freising 09178 573 58.53 152,307 102,230 524.74 799.61 3.5 1
39 München Land 09184 1709.5 86.46 295,247 200,921 989.54 667.27 4.0 1
40 Cham 09372 259.8 31.35 131,035 82,107 100.24 1,509.96 8.2 2
41 Nürnberg 09564 1553.5 46.84 488,400 321,926 287.88 186.37 11.0 1
42 Aschaffenburg, Stadt 09661 276.8 64.35 67,592 43,120 385.76 62.75 8.7 2
43 Augsburg 09761 718.3 42.33 254,982 163,884 259.46 146.72 8.2 2
44 Saarbrücken 10041 841.8 35.41 350,924 227,104 124.44 410.61 12.6 1
45 Schwäbisch Hall, 
Saarpfalz-Kreis 
10045 363.1 35.17 157,309 99,868 177.79 418.55 8.0 2
46 Berlin 11000 13806.5 58.92 3,382,169 2,327,406 191.23 891.69 18.2 1
47 Dresden 14262 2160.9 69.68 477,807 318,509 308.53 328.30 15.9 1
48 Jena 16053 442.8 63.83 99,893 69,254 670.49 114.23 12.5 2
49 Sömmerda 16068 348.1 63.18 81,204 54,115 36.80 804.29 18.3 2
Partly based on: ZEW Founding Panels; ‘Statistik Regional 2002’ of the German Federal Office of Statistics; ‘Patentatlas 2002’; INKAR 2000; own calculations 
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Table 4: Analysis of the industries in which short- to medium-term changes were identified 
  Absolute Number Relative Number11 
Industry  Level12 Level 
Name Code 99/99 95/95 99/99 95/95 
Publishing, printing and reproduction of recoded media 22 7 34 14% 69% 
Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 23 0 0 0% 0% 
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 24 1 8 2% 16% 
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 25 0 5 0% 10% 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 26 1 8 2% 16% 
Manufacture of basic metals 27 0 7 0% 14% 
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 28 6 29 12% 59% 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment 29 2 25 4% 51% 
Manufacture of office machinery and computers 30 4 12 8% 24% 
Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus 31 0 9 0% 18% 
Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 32 0 5 0% 10% 
Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 33 2 24 4% 49% 
Computer and related activities 72 24 42 49% 86% 
Research and development 73 6 33 12% 67% 
Other business activities 74 38 47 78% 96% 
 aggr14 24 44 49% 90% 
 aggr15 40 47 82% 96% 
 service 36 48 73% 98% 
  prod 17 34 35% 69% 
  208 461   
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Relative number is calculated on the basis of 49 potential regions that might show the relevant behavior in this industry. 
12 99/99 means that both the calculations of the probabilities on the regional ( trip ,, and trip ,, ) and the aggregated level ( tiP ,  and tiP , ) were done by using the 99% level. 95/95 
represents the same for the 95% level. 
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Table 5: Analysis of the regions in which short- to medium-term changes were identified  
  Absolute Number Relative number13 
Region  Level14 Level 
Name Code 99/99 95/95 99/99 95/95 
Aachen 5313 5 12 26% 63% 
Aschaffenburg 9661 1 7 5% 37% 
Augsburg 9761 6 10 32% 53% 
Berlin 11000 8 16 42% 84% 
Breisgau-Hochschwarzwald 8315 6 10 32% 53% 
Cham 9372 5 7 26% 37% 
Cuxhaven 3352 1 5 5% 26% 
Darmstadt-Dieburg 6432 3 9 16% 47% 
Ditmarchen 1051 4 7 21% 37% 
Dortmund 5913 4 9 21% 47% 
Dresden 14262 9 12 47% 63% 
Düsseldorf 5111 9 13 47% 68% 
Esslingen 8116 3 11 16% 58% 
Frankfurt 6412 6 13 32% 68% 
Freising 9178 6 11 32% 58% 
Göttingen 3152 6 8 32% 42% 
Hamburg 2000 7 13 37% 68% 
Heidelberg 8221 4 9 21% 47% 
Heinsberg 5370 3 10 16% 53% 
Hochtaunuskreis 6434 4 9 21% 47% 
Jena 16053 6 10 32% 53% 
Kaiserslautern 7312 5 8 26% 42% 
Karlsruhe (Stadt) 8212 8 10 42% 53% 
Karlsruhe 8215 2 8 11% 42% 
Köln 5315 5 14 26% 74% 
Lahn-Dill (Wetzlar) 6532 3 9 16% 47% 
Lübeck 1003 4 5 21% 26% 
Main-Taunus (Hofheim) 6436 6 7 32% 37% 
Mainz 7315 5 9 26% 47% 
Marburg 6534 3 9 16% 47% 
Minden 5770 1 9 5% 47% 
Mühlheim/Ruhr 5117 5 9 26% 47% 
München 9162 8 15 42% 79% 
München Land 9184 3 12 16% 63% 
Neuss 5162 5 10 26% 53% 
Nürnberg 9564 4 9 21% 47% 
Offenbach 6413 0 6 0% 32% 
Rendsburg-Eckernförde 1058 0 11 0% 58% 
Rhein-Neckar-Kreis (Heidelberg) 8226 5 11 26% 58% 
Saarkreis 10041 2 9 11% 47% 
Schwäbisch Hall 10045 1 7 5% 37% 
Sömmerda 16068 5 7 26% 37% 
Stuttgart 8111 4 7 21% 37% 
Tübingen 8416 5 10 26% 53% 
Warendorf 5570 0 6 0% 32% 
Walldeck-Frankenberg (Korbach) 6635 1 7 5% 37% 
Westerwald-Kreis 7143 3 7 16% 37% 
Wetterau-Kreis (Friedberg) 6440 4 10 21% 53% 
Wiesbaden 6414 5 9 26% 47% 
  208 461   
 
 
                                                 
13 Relative number is calculated on the basis of 19 potential industries that might show the relevant behavior in 
this region. 
14  99/99 means that both the calculations of the probabilities on the regional ( trip ,, and trip ,, ) and the 
aggregated level ( tiP ,  and tiP , ) were done by using the 99% level. 95/95 represents the same for the 95% level. 
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Table 6: Cross-tabulation of the regions and industries changes were identified in (99/99% 
confidence interval)  
 Industry                 Total
 Region 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 72 73 74 aggr14 aggr15 prod service   
Aachen         1      1 1 1 1  5 
Aschaffenburg                1   1 
Augsburg 1            1  1 1 1  1 6 
Berlin 1      1      1  1 1 1 1 1 8 
Breisgau-Hochschwarzwald         1  1 1 1 1 1 6 
Cham       1        1 1 1  1 5 
Cuxhaven                  1  1 
Darmstadt-Dieburg           1   1 1   3 
Dithmarschen            1  1  1  1 4 
Dortmund        1       1  1  1 4 
Dresden 1      1      1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 
Düsseldorf 1    1       1 1 1 1 1 1  1 9 
Esslingen               1  1  1 3 
Frankfurt       1  1      1  1 1 1 6 
Freising             1  1 1 1 1 1 6 
Göttingen 1            1  1 1 1  1 6 
Hamburg 1            1  1 1 1 1 1 7 
Heidelberg              1 1 1  1 4 
Heinsberg               1  1  1 3 
Hochtaunuskreis           1  1  1  1 4 
Jena             1  1 1 1 1 1 6 
Kaiserslautern              1 1 1 1 1 5 
Karlsruhe             1   1    2 
Karlsruhe (Stadt) 1        1    1  1 1 1 1 1 8 
Köln             1   1 1 1 1 5 
Lahn-Dill (Wetzlar)             1  1  1 3 
Lübeck       1        1  1  1 4 
Main-Taunus (Hofheim)          1 1 1 1 1  1 6 
Mainz              1 1 1 1  1 5 
Marburg               1  1  1 3 
Minden                   1 1 
Mühlheim/Ruhr     1      1  1  1  1 5 
München   1          1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 
München Land             1  1  1 3 
Neuss            1 1  1  1  1 5 
Nürnberg             1  1  1  1 4 
Offenbach                    0 
Rendsburg-Eckernförde                0 
Rhein-Neckar-Kreis (Heidelberg)        1  1 1 1 1  5 
Saarkreis               1 1    2 
Schwäbisch Hall           1       1 
Sömmerda                       1 1 1 1 1 5 
Stuttgart             1  1  1  1 4 
Tübingen        1      1 1  1 1  5 
Walldeck-Frankenberg (Korbach)           1    1 
Warendorf                    0 
Westerwald-Kreis             1  1  1 3 
Wetterau-Kreis (Friedberg)         1  1  1  1 4 
Wiesbaden        1      1  1 1 1 5 
Gesamt 7 0 1 0 1 0 6 2 4 0 0 2 24 6 38 24 40 17 36 208
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Table 7: Number of changes according to industries 
   99/99%-level15 95/95%-level 99/99%-level 95/95%-level 
   Absolute Absolute Relative16 Relative 
   Number of changes Number of changes Number of changes Number of changes 
    1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5 
Industry 22 5 2   19 13 2    4% 4%   8% 8% 4%   
 23                     
 24 1    4 3 1    1%    2% 2% 2%   
 25     5           2%     
 26 1    5 2 1    1%    2% 1% 2%   
 27     5 2          2% 1%    
 28 6    19 9 1    4%    8% 6% 2%   
 29 2    21 2 2    1%    9% 1% 4%   
 30 3 1   10 2     2% 2%   4% 1%    
 31     8 1          3% 1%    
 32     5           2%     
 33 2    19 4 1    1%    8% 3% 2%   
 72 15 9   20 15 6  1 11% 16%   8% 10% 13%  50%
 73 5 1   25 7  1   4% 2%   10% 4% 0% 11%  
 74 24 12 2 17 21 5 3 1 17% 22% 18% 7% 13% 11% 33% 50%
 aggr14 17 5 2 22 14 7 1   12% 9% 18% 9% 9% 15% 11%  
 aggr15 28 9 3 14 22 10 1   20% 16% 27% 6% 14% 21% 11%  
 prod 13 4   17 13 4    9% 7%   7% 8% 9%   
  service 20 12 4 12 26 7 3   14% 22% 36% 5% 17% 15% 33%   
Sum  142 55 11 247 156 47 9 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
                                                 
15  99/99 means that both the calculations of the probabilities on the regional ( trip ,, and trip ,, ) and the aggregated level ( tiP ,  and tiP , ) were done by using the 99% level. 95/95 
represents the same for the 95% level. 
16 Relative number is calculated on the basis of the sum of the observations in each of the categories (142, 55, 11, 247 etc.). 
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Table 8: Classification of level changes 
 99/99 Change no. 
Class Number Share 1 2 3 4 
1 282 16.9% same same same same 
2 93 5.6% same same same decrease
3 91 5.5% increase same same same 
4 79 4.7% same same same increase
5 78 4.7% same same decrease increase
6 78 4.7% decrease increase same same 
7 74 4.4% same decrease increase same 
8 65 3.9% decrease same same same 
9 58 3.5% same same increase decrease
10 56 3.4% increase decrease same same 
11 45 2.7% same increase decrease same 
12 44 2.6% same same increase same 
13 39 2.3% same increase same same 
14 24 1.4% same same decrease same 
15 24 1.4% same decrease same same 
16 22 1.3% increase same decrease increase
17 21 1.3% increase decrease increase same 
18 21 1.3% same increase same decrease
19 21 1.3% decrease increase same decrease
20 20 1.2% decrease same increase same 
21 19 1.1% increase same same increase
22 18 1.1% same decrease same increase
23 18 1.1% decrease same same increase
24 17 1.0% same increase decrease increase
25 16 1.0% same decrease increase increase
26 15 0.9% increase same increase decrease
27 15 0.9% same decrease increase decrease
28 15 0.9% decrease increase decrease increase
29 15 0.9% decrease increase decrease same 
30 14 0.8% decrease increase same increase
31 13 0.8% increase increase decrease same 
32 13 0.8% increase same decrease same 
33 12 0.7% decrease same increase decrease
34 12 0.7% decrease same same decrease
35 11 0.7% increase same same decrease
36 11 0.7% increase decrease increase decrease
37 11 0.7% increase decrease same increase
38 10 0.6% same increase same increase
39 10 0.6% decrease increase increase decrease
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
      
 99/99 Change no. 
Rank Number Share 1 2 3 4 
40 9 0.5% same increase decrease decrease
41 8 0.5% increase increase same same 
42 8 0.5% increase increase same decrease
43 8 0.5% decrease decrease increase same 
44 7 0.4% same same increase increase
45 6 0.4% increase same increase same 
46 6 0.4% increase decrease increase increase
47 6 0.4% increase decrease same decrease
48 6 0.4% increase decrease decrease increase
49 6 0.4% same increase increase decrease
50 6 0.4% decrease increase increase increase
51 6 0.4% decrease increase increase same 
52 5 0.3% increase increase increase same 
53 5 0.3% increase same decrease decrease
54 5 0.3% decrease same decrease increase
55 4 0.2% increase increase increase decrease
56 4 0.2% increase increase decrease increase
57 4 0.2% increase same increase increase
58 4 0.2% increase decrease decrease same 
59 4 0.2% same same decrease decrease
60 4 0.2% same decrease same decrease
61 4 0.2% same decrease decrease same 
62 4 0.2% same decrease decrease decrease
63 4 0.2% decrease decrease same increase
64 4 0.2% decrease decrease decrease increase
65 3 0.2% same increase increase increase
66 3 0.2% same increase increase same 
67 3 0.2% same decrease decrease increase
68 3 0.2% decrease same decrease same 
69 3 0.2% decrease decrease increase decrease
70 2 0.1% decrease increase decrease decrease
71 2 0.1% decrease same increase increase
72 2 0.1% decrease decrease decrease decrease
73 1 0.1% increase increase increase increase
74 1 0.1% increase decrease decrease decrease
75 1 0.1% decrease same decrease decrease
76 1 0.1% decrease decrease same same 
77 1 0.1% decrease decrease same decrease
78 1 0.1% decrease decrease decrease same 
79 0 0.0% increase increase same increase
80 0 0.0% increase increase decrease decrease
81 0 0.0% decrease decrease increase increase
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1. CHARACTERISTICS AND IMPORTANCE OF KNOWLEDGE-BASED FIRMS 
 
There is no single definition of knowledge-based firms. Although as the name implies, 
knowledge-based firms are those in which the development, possession and application of 
knowledge is central to the production of particular goods and services. They are 
characterized by a high dependence on the processing of knowledge for their competitive 
performance. Such dependence is often focused on individuals or small groups controlling 
specialist forms of expertise. It is manifested in distinctive forms of work organization – often 
project-oriented – and in idiosyncratic management practices. Scientist started ventures 
represent a special case of knowledge-based firms. 
 
The focus of this article is on start-ups derived from research institutions and universities. 
Higher-education institutions are no longer only a source of qualified manpower for the job 
markets but are now sowing seeds for new enterprises. Engagement of universities with 
industry began with the objective of creating fit between the education and training imparted 
to the graduates and knowledge and skills required by industry. Then this evolved to transfer 
of technology and know how. Now it has matured to creation of new enterprises itself on the 
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strength of intellectual resources of universities. Integration of higher-education institutions 
with business enterprises resulting in the establishment of Science Parks, Technology Parks 
and Research Parks was started in the USA in 1950s. Subsequently, these initiatives gained 
acceptance the world over as these helped in the promotion and growth of new industrial 
structures, in generation of additional avenues of gainful employment and also as an 
additional source of income for universities.  
Knowledge-based firms are increasingly common in the new economy. They play an 
important role for economic development and job creation in industrialized countries. As they 
possess high potential for sustainable growth they account for a disproportionately large part 
of gross jobs gained. Also, they provide a variety of innovations and technologies to cope 
with more turbulent global competition dynamics. According to a publication by the Advisory 
Council on Science and Technology in 1990, smaller firms with competitive advantages can 
grow very rapidly and diffuse their products into the economic structure, so raising the level 
of average practice economic performance in their sector. It is because of this connection 
between diffusion and average efficiency that barriers to growth for the individual firm 
become barriers to raising the national level of economic performance. (Acost, 1990)  
Especially the creation and “growing up” of companies started by university founders play a 
positive role in promoting rapid structural change in the national economy. (Kirchhoff, 1994; 
Etzkowitz, Webster and Healey, 1998)  
Because of their importance, knowledge-based firms have received increasingly 
attention from economists and policy makers within the last decades. Around the globe 
several programs had been designed to support entrepreneurs from universities and research 
institutes aiming in the creation of successful firms. 
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The article focuses on success factors of new knowledge-based firms. Hereby the emphasis is 
on internationalization activities and their impact on the development of the firm.  
Several studies indicate that knowledge-based corporations often act across national 
borders and perceive the world market as their relevant market. (Bürgel 2000; Oviatt and 
McDougall 1994) Many of them are exporters, often competing in the international 
marketplace from their earliest days. Thus, internationalization seems to have an enormous 
importance for young firms in knowledge intensive industries. However, investigations on 
how internationalization is influencing the performance of the firm are rarely. There is no 
comprehensive theory that explains why knowledge-based firms in favor are going abroad. 
The article is addressed to entrepreneurs and managers from companies originated by 
universities as well as policy makers and promoters of knowledge-based firms. The objective 
is to raise the awareness for the importance of international activities but also to discuss the 
conditions for success of internationalization.   
 
Section two of this article gives a definition of success. What does it mean for a knowledge-
based firm to be successful? This review is necessary as there might be different 
understandings of success: While politicians are interested in firms that contribute to 
economic development, innovative entrepreneurs might strive for realization of short-term 
profits or self-realization through implementation of their research results.  
 Innovative start-ups pose unique problems and challenges, and most of them fail and 
never grow. Success demands more than a good product; it requires the right combination of 
partners, employers and investors, and a suitable environment. Section three examines the 
factors that influence the success of knowledge-based firms. Entrepreneurship literature 
already provides different approaches and concepts for success factors of start-ups in general. 
The authors derive critical factors that affect the development of innovative start-ups.  
Gabriele Beibst and Arndt Lautenschläger: Internationalization – A critical factor of success for 
knowledge-based start-ups? 
 182
 In section four the authors concentrate on internationalization as one factor of success. 
It is discussed whether and why internationalization might play an important role for 
knowledge-based start-ups to overcome obstacles.  
Based on the insights discussed in the previous sections finally the conditions are 
illustrated for that case that internationalization represents a critical success factor.  
 
2. INDICATORS FOR SUCCESS OF KNOWLEDGE-BASED FIRMS 
 
The definition of business success is quite differently for each business and by each 
individual. Business success is subject to individual interpretation based on upbringing, past 
experiences, role models, competitive forces, personal motivations and goals. For some, 
merely staying in business can be considered success, while for others it could be achieving a 
certain level of sales or profit. Applying this to knowledge-based start-ups, firms are 
successful in the eyes of politicians and economists when they create jobs and economic 
wealth. The founders itself may strive for self-realization, the competition of their research 
and implementation, the realization of profits, and so on.  
Most people who achieve business success first defined it, then planned for it, and 
pursued it diligently; they set goals to achieve it. Figure 1 gives an overview of possible 
individual objectives for the success of a knowledge-based firm which is not complete yet.  
 
See FIGURE 1. 
 
The view of business success will change at various times throughout business cycles and the 
founder’s career. For example, what might be deemed successful early in start-ups stage 
might be viewed very different as the company has grown and become big.  
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As an innovative entrepreneur achieves success in business, it is sometimes 
measurable and sometimes not. Accumulating a certain volume in sales is certainly one way 
to measure success, but it is not the only way; earning a prestigious award, earning the respect 
of peers, or providing livelihood to employees may be far more meaningful to some founders. 
In figure 2 some measures of business success and their conjunction are presented.    
 
See FIGURE 2. 
 
Concluding, there are different understandings of business success as well as measures.  To 
answer the question what factors are important for knowledge based firms first one have to 
find a definition of business success for those kind of firms. Without taking into consideration 
different plans and goals of founders it is not possible to find out whether and under which 
conditions internationalization will lead to the success of the firm. 
As this article points out the importance of knowledge-based firms to regional 
development, the authors suggest the following definition for use in the paper:     
A knowledge-based firm can be regarded as successful if  
(1) the technology or knowledge it based on is fully developed and the product or service 
already have been bringing onto the market, and 
(2) the numbers of sales and employees had been growing over a certain period of time or 
if they are still growing. 
According this definition success is declared as growth resulting in the creation of jobs. 
Applying that to the initial problem, the central question is now: Does internationalization 
leads to growth? The following section comprises a review on literature to identify obstacles 
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that hamper growth and to specify factors that influence the success of knowledge based 
firms.  
 
3. SUCCESS FACTORS OF KNOWLEDGE-BASED FIRMS 
 
New knowledge-based firms pose high potential for sustainable development and growth. 
Their novel technological solutions promise competitive advantages and high profits. (Baier 
and Pleschak, 1996, p. 56) However, because of their special characteristics they face well 
above average business risks. The attainment, upgrade and sustainment of competitive 
advantages hardly depend on the abilities and efforts to overcome several restrictions and 
difficulties.  
 
Economic Exploitation of New Knowledge 
To succeed, a knowledge-based entrepreneur needs more than an innovative product. Success 
requires the right combination of partners, employees, and investors. Also, not the invention 
and development of a new technology is crucial but the protection of intellectual property and 
getting the product to market quickly. (Preston, 2003b, p. 24) 
Once a technology had been developed the ability to exploit this knowledge and to 
take economic use of it are determining the company’s success. Therefore it is important to 
consider intellectual property protection at the founding of a new company.  
Knowledge as unique resource of a company accounts for competitive advantages. 
Unfortunately, knowledge is at least partly a public good. As knowledge may not remain 
unique for a long time, the firms rent-earning opportunity decimates. Hence, efforts are 
necessary to prevent any imitation of the innovation. Patents and copyrights are the first 
choice, but knowledge that has potential commercial value is often also protected with 
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secrecy. Another way to limit the expropriation of venture knowledge is to use network 
governance structures. Network structures of alliances with complementary organizations 
tend to control the risk of expropriation. (Oviatt and McDougall, 1994, p. 57) 
Also the time at which the product reaches the marketplace may determine its 
success. However, there is a trade-off between speed and quality. When a company rushes a 
new product to the market that is defective it could be an expensive mistake.  
New knowledge-based firms in technology industries need sufficient demand for 
their products.  Because of high capital investments in the start-up stage, economies of scale 
could be favorable. However, the sales of large amounts of e.g. engine plants or specific 
technological solutions might be restricted because of small domestic markets and lacking 
local demand.  
Once a product had been developed and launched continued innovation activities 
ensure technological leadership and the sustainment of competitive advantages. Thereby it 
might also important to cooperate with universities and research institutions. (Steinle / 
Schumann, 2003, p. 59) 
 
Overcome Information Asymmetries 
Innovative start-ups and their respective market partners are faced with severe asymmetric 
information problems due to their lack of prior production history and reputation. (Backes-
Gellner / Werner, 2004)  
As innovative start-ups market new products and services they possess no customer 
base. Moreover, the novelty and complexity of their products and services requires a special 
customer orientation and service. Thus, marketing and distribution activities are essential. 
Special efforts are inevitable to make customers familiar with the benefits of the new 
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technical solution offered.  To a certain extent a special training, education or instruction is 
necessary, e.g. for technical plants.  
Innovative start-ups also have no labor market history. This makes it difficult for 
potential employees when deciding whether to accept a job or not. However, to find and to 
recruit qualified human resources is important to new firms when growing. A wide range 
of human competence is required to commercialize, produce the merchandise and develop the 
business organization. 
Knowledge-based firms are also complex and difficult for lenders and investors to 
understand and evaluate. Assets such as knowledge, process technologies, or patents tend to 
be characterized as “soft”. These firms often lack the hard assets – buildings, equipment, and 
inventory – that lenders have traditionally accepted as collateral. Such firms therefore tend to 
be confronted by higher costs when seeking financing, or they may be denied financing 
altogether.  
Moreover, many innovative growth companies, particularly those in emerging 
knowledge-based sectors, have difficulty finding venture investors with enough knowledge 
about their business to add value. Attracting financing will be a challenge to the 
entrepreneurial skills of small knowledge-based companies themselves. The technological and 
creative skills of entrepreneurs in knowledge-based businesses are frequently not matched by 
their management and general business skills. For lenders and investors, these managerial 
shortcomings increase the risk of deals that are already difficult to understand. 
To find investors is important, as significant amounts of financial assets are needed to 
turn the firm and its merchandise from ideas into viable business opportunities.  
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Entrepreneurial Management of the Company 
The development of a knowledge-based company is to a large extent influenced by the 
founder’s attitudes and qualifications. One should never underestimate the role of passion, the 
importance of management talent, and the significance of teaming.  
However, founders of firms derived from research institutions commonly lack 
previous business experiences, contacts and relations that must be seen as crucial for a 
potentially prospering young business. Qualification and background of the founder are 
crucial factors in turning a vision into business reality. The lack of knowledge in strategic 
management as well as and operative management are frequent causes for failing. (Pleschak, 
2002, p. 85)      
Teams of people with complementary skills perform better. “For example, if a 
technologist partner with someone who knows the capital markets and another person who 
knows how to market technology-based products, the team of three will have a much higher 
probability of success than the solitary technologist trying to start a company on his or her 
own.” (Preston, 2003a, p 16.) 
A survey among knowledge-based firms in three university regions of the Netherlands 
found that the effective combination of craftsmanship and entrepreneurship, knowledge of the 
market, and networking are seen by entrepreneurs as the determinants of their success. 
Moreover, the more innovative entrepreneurs rank networking higher than other 
entrepreneurs. (Poutsma, 1997) 
 
Resuming, the success of new knowledge-based firms depends on several factors that can be 
described as  
(1) the ability to capitalize the innovative product or service,  
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(2) the ability to overcome information asymmetries in order to obtain financial and 
human resources and to convince potential costumers from the benefits of the product 
offered, and  
(3) the behavior and background of the founders.  
Figure 3 gives an overview on these factors.  
 
See FIGURE 3. 
 
Besides, some authors also argue that external support activities provided by public 
or corporate business supporters can be of great help for the creation and development of new 
business ventures. (e.g. Tötterman, 2004) 
For a much more deeper investigation of success factors for start-ups it should be 
taken into consideration that the role of certain factors differs according to the stage of the 
firms development and therefore a dynamic view is necessary. 
 
 
4. INTERNATIONALISATION, PERFORMANCE AND SUCCESS FACTORS 
 
The term internationalization is used to describe the process by which the firm increases their 
international activities. Transnational activities of firms range from exports through licensing, 
contracts, franchising to foreign direct investment.  They represent alternative strategies to 
enter and serve foreign markets or to provide a firm with resources.  They vary in respect to 
resource commitment, level of perceived business control and involved risks 
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Internationalization can be measured by numerous parameters like the number of 
employees working abroad, the number of foreign subsidiaries, the percentage of the firms 
employees working abroad, the profit or the percentage of profit gained abroad, etc. 
 
Several studies state that internationalization of start-ups is particularly pertinent in 
high technology / knowledge-based industries, indicating that international business activities 
may have an enormous importance for that kind of firms. (Bürgel, 2000, p. 18) This view is 
also facilitated by the results of a diploma thesis at the University of Applied Sciences in 
Jena. Out of 71 interviewed German new technology-based firms 67,6% specified the 
international character of their business. (Reisberg, 2000, p. 118) Another more recent study 
of Thuringian high-technology start-ups found that out of 30 interviewed firms 15 start-ups 
already had served international markets, and 12 start-ups had plans to do so. (Beibst / 
Lautenschläger, 2002) 
International activities are of critical strategic concern for firms in knowledge-based 
industries and, therefore, they should be a key area of attention when investors and 
entrepreneurs putting together a business plan. (Bürgel, 1998, p. 18) 
 
On the one hand, the causes of international commitments can be found in the nature of the 
business itself. Several authors argue that the internationalization behavior of the firm is 
largely influenced by industry-specific factors. (McDougall, 1989; Bell, 1995; Boter and 
Holquist, 1998) Factors are for example: the need for special resources and inputs, limited 
domestic demand for a special technological solution, the intensity of domestic competition 
and so on.  Certainly the most important reason is that small domestic markets do not offer 
enough opportunities for growth. Young firms increase their international presence because of 
the domestic pressure, because of the international pull, or because of distinct competitive 
advantages.  
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On the other hand, there are factors that are situated in the entrepreneur’s person itself, 
such as knowledge and experiences, intentions, characteristics.  The entrepreneur’s 
background and his intra-personal skills are important when explaining international 
entrepreneurship. Several studies indicate that the founders’ international experience 
facilitates internationalization processes and leads to a higher degree of internationalization of 
a firm. (Lindqvist, 1991; Bloodgood, Almeida and Sapienza, 1996; Reuber and Fischer, 1996) 
A case study on four high-technology start-up companies that grew extremely rapidly and 
built up international presence in several countries within few years reports that all founders 
had international backgrounds from education and previous work experience and a “vision” to 
turn their business into globally operating firms. (Jolly, Alahuhta and Jeannet, 1992) 
A study of US and UK small international high-technology start-ups found four 
important factors to be particularly influential: (1) the international vision of the founder, (2) 
the recognition that a large proportion of the firm’s prospective customers were foreign along 
with (3) the identification of specific international opportunities, and (4) the desire of the 
founder to be international market leaders. (Johnson, 2002) 
 
Past research on the internationalization of small innovative start-ups has resulted in 
discovering and consolidating important knowledge about the role of internationalization for 
improved performance. Now scholars know a lot about the antecedents of the 
internationalization of the small firm. However, “…evidence on the effect of 
internationalization on small company’s long term performance and survival is particularly 
fragmentary and contradictory.”(Manolova / Manev, 2001) Several studies indicate that early-
internationalized companies are not more successful than others per se. (Schmidt-Buchholz, 
2001, p. 272) 
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5. CONCLUSION 
In section 1 the question had been raised whether internationalization is a necessary action for 
knowledge-based firms to become successful or not. After defining success as the 
achievement of growth in sales and employment, it had been asked for the factors that are 
essential to overcome obstacles in the firm’s development. A review of literature and research 
had shown that young knowledge-based firms could gain great advantages when they 
internationalize. However, the positive correlation between international activities and 
performance of the firm is not clear and empirical not confirmed. 
Internationalization can help a knowledge-based start-up to overcome several 
obstacles. The table in figure 4 shows different goals of knowledge-based firms and 
constraints that must have overcome. In each case internationalization could be a possible 
step, that helps to succeed. 
 
See FIGURE 4. 
 
Concluding, internationalization is not a necessary condition for a young knowledge-
based firm to survive and to grow. It is rather a strategy which 
(1) depends to some extend on the founders abilities and objectives, and which 
(2) serves to achieve growth or to supply the firm with resources that are not available 
in the domestic markets.  
Further research in that field should be targeted to the development of a comprehensive model 
that explains under which conditions a young innovative firm will be more successful if it 
internationalizes than others that does not. This investigation also should include an empirical 
component.    
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FIGURES 
 
Fig. 1: Possible visions of success for knowledge-based ventures 
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Fig. 2: Additive assignment of success factors for technology-based start-ups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Steinle / Schumann, 
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Fig. 3: Success factors of new knowledge-based firms 
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4: Internationalization as success factor 
CONSTRAINT ACTION 
absence of local research 
partners 
cooperation in R&D with 
foreign partners 
local availability of suitable 
capital 
attracting investors from 
abroad 
ion 
global enforcement of 
property rights and lax 
property protection in some 
countries 
governance network 
structures and alliances 
with foreign partners  
local availability of suitable 
capital 
attracting investors from 
abroad s 
attracting qualified human 
capital 
attracting foreign 
workforce, relocate 
production abroad  
 limited domestic demand for a special technological 
product 
export of products, 
establishments of foreign 
subsidiaries 
qualification of the founders, personal
characteristics, experiences and
background, market knowledge, risk
awareness, visions and aims, business
planning, strategic orientation, … 
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Abstract 
The objective of this paper is to discuss the role of the university in the regional economic 
development process. First, we seek for the changes that the university must embrace in order 
to be the key element in the economic development process. From there we learn the 
undergoing changes that are moving universities from producing ideas into producing goods, 
services and firms. Second, we look to the social advantage of using university infrastructure 
as a targeted policy for R&D investment. The result shows that the social rate of return to 
R&D investment through universities far exceeds the private one. Third, the outcomes of 
economic policies towards entrepreneurship behavior and R&D investment are used to 
explain high-tech exporting success. In general, our results support the idea that university 
infrastructure may be used in a targeted policy for R&D investment to achieve economic 
development through exporting high-tech goods.  
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In economic development the most important aspect is to know precisely the sources 
of the innovations.  This is equivalent of learning the engines of economic growth and 
development. In this paper we focus in one of the source of knowledge production, the 
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university. More precisely we are concerned with the appropriation of ideas developed in the 
universities into economic goods. So, ideas are “non-rival” goods, however their products are 
“rival” as in Romer (1996)’s words.  In our view the undergoing revolution in the universities 
where goods and firms are becoming a very important output and not just ideas may be 
fostered by a R&D targeted policy.  
This view is linked to the new endogenous growth theory that has demonstrated how 
important the development of new technologies in the long run growth process is.17 For 
instance Romer (1990) has shown that the size of human capital force allocated to the R&D -
research and development - sector of the economy is vital for economic growth. The size of 
of the human capital in the R&D sector depends upon policies and incentives for the 
development of endogenous technological products or services. There is also the need for 
adequate infrastructure. In this paper, we plan to discuss the importance of the university as 
the centerpiece for an economic regional development based on new technologies. 
The major characteristics of a regional economic development model are the 
requirement of basic infrastructure and human capital. Both characteristics seem to be present 
in the universities.  For basic infrastructure we mean laboratories and equipments that are 
used in the innovation process. By human capital we mean the scientists and researchers.   
The most recent focus of economic research is the new role of the universities in the 
economy’s innovation process. The universities are undergoing into a transformation process 
to become a new source of high-tech firms. In this new role, the university besides producing 
human capital, products, services, it will be also in charge of spinning-off new firms. This 
new product demands entrepreneurial knowledge, besides the scientific one. The 
commercialization process of new products, patents, services and firms by the universities has 
demanded changes in behavior and required new laws. We will look at the literature to learn 
                                                 
17 See Aghion and Howitt (1998). 
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about the important elements that must be present in this new activity to be pursuit by the 
universities and its new role on economic development. 
The success of this role by the university is very much linked to the rate of return to 
R&D investment. The discussions on the importance of the social rate of return lead us also 
to estimate it worldwide. In this new cross-country estimative we place high importance for 
the tertiary education and its human capital, scientists and engineers. As we shall see our 
results seems to corroborate with a targeted policy that use more intensively the university’s 
knowledge as the base for economic development, especially through government incentives.  
In our next step our focus changes to exporting high-tech products. The degree of 
development is linked to a certain level of international competitiveness. Thus, we look to the 
role of the university infrastructure as way of catching up high-tech export leaders worldwide.  
This innovative view has as objective to show the importance of having a strong university 
based on research processes as mean of reaching international level in economic 
development.  
 The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. We begin in Section II with a 
discussion about the most important aspects regarding the university’s new role on 
developing R&D products, services and firms. Section III reviews the issue on social rate of 
return to R&D investment and estimate a new model that shows the importance of the tertiary 
education infrastructure. Section IV discusses the importance of R&D investment and 
entrepreneurial behavior as important elements for reaching new levels of exporting high-tech 
products.  
 
II. The University Based Economic Development Process 
 Moving from producing ideas into producing “goods” requires some adjustment in the 
university itself. In our view this change in focus demands to learn about the overall 
environment for which the innovation will be made.  Here, we will look into the literature for 
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more details on this new economic aspect of the universities. In our view there are three 
important aspects to be looked at. The macroeconomic aspects or the policies regarding the 
university as mean of economic development. The role played by institutional factors at the 
university, also known as the local policies conditions. Lastly, there are the entrepreneurship 
aspects of exploiting the innovation process - private enterprise and individual initiative.  
The economics of intellectual property at universities became a field of economic 
research under the proposition of Audretsch (1995) and more recently by Link, Scott and 
Siegel (2003). By bringing this issue into evidence they have shown the importance of the 
research and development undergoing in the universities as economic mean and not just ideas 
that could be generated without economic return.  According to Link, Scott and Siegel (2003) 
this transformation came by the Bay-Dole Act of 1980 that removed existing restrictions and 
made the commercialization process easier for the university. The importance of this Act was 
confirmed by Shane (2004) study. According to the author the Act led universities to 
concentrate their patenting in lines where business commercialization is more effective.18  
Thus, a macro policy is quite important in order to stimulate the innovation process at 
university level. 
The commercialization barriers could be local, for instance at the university level. In 
this case it may discourage the process of transforming ideas into economic goods. Goldfarb 
and Henrekson (2003) evaluated the policy pursued in Sweden and US regarding the 
commercialization process of university-generated knowledge. Even though Sweden has the 
highest R&D spending relative GDP – Gross Domestic Product in the World during the past 
decade, the incentives for commercialization of intellectual property right is weak, according 
to the authors. This turns out  in weak academic-based start-ups. The Swedish policies aimed 
at directing government funds to more entrepreneurial research ideas had lacked of direct 
                                                 
18 A similar act the Small Business Innovation Development Act had similar effect in award recipients at NASA 
Langley Research Center. The researches there shift to more commercial potential projects; the projects 
experienced higher rates of commercial success; and there was a trade-off between basic research and 
commercial projects [Archibald and Finifter, 2003]. 
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incentives to academic researches to get involved in the commercialization process of their 
ideas.  This lack of entrepreneurial support and incentive for disclosure of their inventions 
gained importance in the study done by Jensen et al (2003). The existence of TTOs-
Technology Transfer Offices not only solves the problem of commercialization of the idea, 
product or service, but also generates an economic incentive for scientists to disclosure their 
inventions at earlier stage. The same need for academic commitment to the entrepreneurial 
team engaged in the commercialization process was found to be fundamental by Vohora et. 
al. (2004). 
One of the results of the commercialization process of an idea or patent is the 
potential for generating new firms, the so called start-ups. Besides the entrepreneurial 
commitment Gregorio and Shane (2003) observed three other important aspects for university 
success in start-ups. First, they posit to be the intellectual eminence of the university. The 
second aspect is a university policy that claims low inventors’ share of royalties for the 
inventor.19 And lastly, the university willingness to make equity investments in start-up 
companies – partnership.   
We know that intellectual eminence is very hard to discuss at least economically. So, 
we focus on their expected result that is the capacity to produce radical technologies. Nerkar 
and Shane (2003) using a radical technology index studied the university start-ups survivals. 
They found that radical technologies by itself do not help to survive in every industry. It fails 
to provide an advantage to the new firm in concentrated industries and only works in more 
fragmented industries. Even though this study was based on MIT – Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology spin-offs, it can be used as warning for a strategy to be followed by researchers.  
The rate of success of their innovation depends upon their intellectual eminence in generating 
innovations for sectors of the economy that are less concentrated. Moreover, if industry 
                                                 
19 Finding an optimal tax or royalty fees can be very important. In a model simulation Beath et all (2003) found 
that charging a optimal tax on academics performing research/consulting the university is able to increase its 
quantity of basic research. 
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environment does influence the research commercialization process then economic market 
studies might be required prior engaging in a research project.   
This economic aspect of knowing the market for which the innovation will be 
addressed can be lessening in importance with the university-industry partnership. Link and 
Scott (2003) found that when the university has a formal relationship with a science park the 
following my happen: i) the university generates more patents; ii) hire prominent scholars; iii) 
and shift from basic toward applied research.  This is quite important because science parks 
help to enhance the university research productivity and act as a spillover mechanism. As we 
can see the local environment for entrepreneurial activities is quite important for overall 
production and exploitation of innovations made.20 Building tangible entrepreneurial 
infrastructure attached to a university based applied research as way of transforming regions 
would be a wise policy to be followed.  
The importance of this tangible infrastructure is also supported in the view of Shane 
and Venkataram (2003) that analyzed several other studies. They found that the technology, 
the technical systems, and institutions are important mechanisms in the founding process of 
firms.  The key element in their view is that science park attached to university is able to 
influence the propensity to emerge innovative entrepreneurs in a specific local or region. To 
influence the propensity of having more innovative entrepreneurs is the most important aspect 
of any economic regional development plan that is based on new technology. Moreover, this 
closes the circle by fostering the university to transform more ideas into “things” – tangible 
goods - that can be exploited economically which is the bases of any endogenous 
technological development. 
 
                                                 
20 Local conditions that favor entrepreneurship activities may be due to a broader macro condition. Spencer and 
Gomez (2002) have studied these matters and provided interesting results. 
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III. The Social Return to R&D – Research and Development 
 As we shall see the fast growing literature on social rate of return to R&D has 
measured it within countries’ industries, as a spillover effect between countries’ industries 
and under overall cross-country effect. In this section we want to open a new venue in this 
literature by looking at the cross-country social rate of return to the university infrastructure. 
In this way our study follows Adams (1990) research that linked the academic science to 
productivity growth in US manufacturing industries. In his view the university’s output in the 
form of papers, scientists and engineers are major contributor to that productivity growth. We 
want to use the core of his idea to measure the social rate of return due to university 
infrastructure and the number of scientists and engineers in a cross-country model.  
  The social rate of return to R&D became a very important mechanism of measuring 
the investment being made. Thus, the attention is not just on the direct return from the 
investment itself rather on the social or spillover effect of this investment. If the social rate is 
above the private one then public investment may be justified under a social premise.21  This 
view is shared by Jones and Williams (1998) that found the optimal level of R&D investment 
to be at least two to four times below the actual level of investment in US.  
 The estimated rates of return to R&D at the industry level in US ranges from 17% to 
as much as 30% [ Sveikauskas, 1981; Griliches, 1994]. However, when considered the social 
rate of return it goes to as much as 100% as in Scherer (1982) and Jones and Williams (1998). 
The other example of high social rate of return was found in Canadian equipment 
communication industry. Bernstein (1996) estimated it to be around 55% which is 225% 
higher compared to the private one.  
 The cross-country studies have also found a quite large social rate of return to R&D 
investment. The impact of 1% increase in business R&D investment is around 0.13% in 16 
OECD productivity growth; however, the same amount of foreign R&D investment generates 
                                                 
21 The social rate of return measures the benefit to the users from the R&D investment while the private rate of 
return to R&D measures the benefit accruing to the investors. 
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0,46% in the productivity growth [Guellec and Potterie, 2001]. This intra-country spillover 
was measured by Coe et al. (1997) through the social rate of return to R&D for 15 OECD 
countries. It was found to be 85%.  Using a more complete panel dataset Lederman and 
Maloney (2003) found this rate to be between 20%-40% for OECD countries,  an average 
60% for medium income countries (Mexico and Chile), and 100% in poor countries 
(Nicaragua and Nigeria). The overall social rate of return is in the range 102% - 133% 
depending upon the sample size used. 
The source of this international spillover effect is due basically to two sources. The 
first one is the international trade. According Cameron, Proudman and Redding (2004) trade 
helps enhance the speed of technology transfer. The second one is the foreign direct 
investment (FDI). The FDI has important implication for intra-industry spillover effects, 
especially for domestic firms [Damijan et all, 2003].  
As we saw above, the social rate of return seems to more than justify government 
policies that subsidies R&D investment, foster trade open-up and stimulate foreign 
investment as mean of economic development based on R&D. Moreover, it also may justify a 
more intensive investment in existing or in the build-up of university based R&D projects as 
we saw in the previous section. The reason for this government intervention accrues from 
comparing it to the private rate of return proposed by Jones and Williams (1999) of 7%. 
There is a huge gain to be made by a R&D targeted policy towards a more intensive use of 
university infrastructure in our view. The social rate of return of a university based R&D 
investment is our main focus hereafter in this section. 
 
III.1 – The Model 
The support for an increase in university based R&D process as a mean of economic 
development can be obtained through an econometric model. We use Griffth (2000) simple 
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methodology in measuring that.  Consider the following aggregate production function across 
country. 
Yi = AiF(KiLi)       (1) 
Where Yi is the output obtained from combining the physical capital (Ki) and labor (Li) in 
each country, and Ai is the total factor productivity (TFP). The TFP may be affected by 
several factors other them the stock of knowledge, Hi, which is our main focus here. Thus, the 
overall effect can be written in the log form as 
Log (Ai) = αi + ξLog(Hi) + βLog(Xi)     (2) 
Where αi represent country specific effects and Xi denotes all the other factors. The elasticity 
of output with respect to knowledge is ξ = ri*(Hi/Yi) and ri=(∂Yi/∂ Hi) is the rate of the 
accumulation of knowledge. The knowledge is proxy by R&D investment, the flow of 
investment in knowledge.  
 Our objective is to estimate equation (2) by considering the role of tertiary education 
as potential proxy for stock of knowledge. The size of the social rate of return to this 
education infrastructure will enable us to see if there is room for R&D targeted policy.
 When estimating equation (2), we will add an error term and other variables to control 
for omitted bias problem. 
 
III.2 – The Variables  
 The variables to be used are the 1990’s average R&D investment as a proportion of 
GNI-Gross National Income (RD90s) available in World Bank (2001); The 1990s log of TFP 
computed by Hall and Jones (1999); The Log of predicted share of an economy (LogFR) 
based on a gravitational model that uses only population and international trade, Frankel and 
Romer (1996); the fraction of population speaking one of five European languages (Eurfrac): 
Portuguese, French, Italian, Spanish and English from Hunter (1992); the 1990’s average 
number of scientists and engineers per million in each country (Scieng90s), World Bank 
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(2001); the average human capital per worker (HL), Hall and Jones (1999); the average 
1980’s enrollment in tertiary education as percentage of gross enrollment (Tertiary80s), 
World Bank (2001); the average 1990’s enrollment in tertiary education as percentage of 
gross enrollment (Tertiary90s), World Bank(2001). 
 The variables LogFR and Eurfrac were used by Hall and Jones (1999) to represent the 
exogenous social infrastructure of a country and therefore capture all the omitted variables. 
By social infrastructure the authors mean the institutions and government policies that 
determine the economic environment in which economic agents accumulate physical and 
human capital necessary to produce output. Taken together these two variables supposedly 
represent all the social-economic differences among countries or their fixed effects. Thus, our 
R&D investment variable would measure more precise the social rate of return because it 
would not be influenced by countries differences. 
 
III.3 – The Social Rate of Return Econometric Results  
 Table 1 shows the econometric results os estimating equation (2). The models were 
estimated using OLS with robust standard errors. The econometric result in column 1 
represents our baseline model. The social infrastructure represented by both variables LogFR 
and Eurfrac are determinants of the changes in TFP-Total Factor Productivity of the 
countries. The coefficient on the Log of RD90s (LogRD90s) is the elasticity of output with 
respect to knowledge ξ=0.18. In order to compute the social rate of return to R&D investment 
we use the sample ratio Hi/Yi = 0.23. Using these two values we have that the ri = 0.78 which 
give us an average social rate of return to R&D investment of 78% for our sample of 
countries. This result is within the range obtained by the previously mentioned authors. 
 In column 2, we have added the human capital per worker proposed by Hall and Jones 
(1999). They computed the human capital through a piecewise decreasing function having 
average years of education as the main variable. This variable was not significant. Moreover, 
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the coefficient on LogRD90s remained the same, thus giving us the same social rate of return 
as the one in Column 1. This result is interesting because tell us that the overall stock of 
knowledge of the economy is not the main element, so we have to find a more specific one.  
 The use of scientists and engineers did change the previous results, Column 3 in Table 
1. Now the coefficient on the LogRD90s is no longer significant. This is a clear indication 
that the number of scientist and engineers are the determinant factor of R&D investment. 
Using its coefficient as the output elasticity of knowledge we find a social rate of return to 
R&D of 61%. This is lower than the previous one, but it is more than eight times (8.71) 
higher compared to the standard 7% proposed by Hall and Jones (1999).  
 Columns 4 e 5 estimates the importance of the university infrastructure through the 
proxies Tertiary80s and Tertiary90s. Using their coefficients as the output elasticity to 
knowledge stock we find a social rate of return of 100% and 161%, respectively. This can be 
interpreted with some caution as an increase in the social rate of return to R&D investment 
caused by university infrastructure growth in the 1990s. The caution is regarding the potential 
for contemporaneous endogenous problem in the latter coefficient, Tertiary90s. There is 
chance for a feedback effect going from R&D investment to university infrastructure build up 
in the 1990s. Recall that this infrastructure has risen from 2.47% in 1980s to 2.97% in the 
1990s of the total gross enrollment in our sample.  Measuring the impact of this infrastructure 
overtime would be an extremely important aspect to be looked at in future research. 
 Our estimates lie within the range of studies that did take into consideration a broad 
sample of countries in a panel dataset and also considered all the potential endogenous 
problems, e.g. Lederman and Maloney (2003). The social rates of return to R&D investment 
estimated by us do show a room for a targeted R&D policy. This targeted policy may be 
aimed at building or improving university related infrastructure as in Section II like science 
parks, labs, multipurpose plants as mean of generating new high-tech products and firms. In 
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the next section we look for the importance of this infrastructure for producing and catching-
up leader countries in high-tech product exporters.  
 
IV. The Determinant Factors of High-Tech Exports 
 The export of high-tech products is a very good way of measuring countries 
international level of productivity. In this section we look for factors that influence the 
production and export of high-tech products as percentage of its manufacturing exports. 
Taking US as the leading country we make export of high-tech goods as percentage of 
manufacturing export of all countries relative to US. This relative measure enables to see 
which country is improving relatively to US regarding its international productivity. 
  As we saw in Section II there is clear need for entrepreneurship commitment in the 
process of producing innovation. Therefore, we look for the entrepreneurial class size as a 
proxy for this commitment. We do believe that the entrepreneurial class size is endogenous 
and depend upon very much on the social infrastructure [Baumol, 1990; Murphy, Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1991; Dias and McDermott, 2004]. 
Our average entrepreneur class size in the 1990s’ variable (Ent90s) comes from ILO-
International Labor Organization.22  The social infrastructure is again an important factor in 
determining the entrepreneurial class size. Here, we proxy this variable through the following 
combinations: i) the log of Frank and Romer (1996) index; ii) the fraction speaking English 
as a mother tongue (Engfrac) from Hunter (1992); and iii) the control variable average output 
per worker in 1980s from World Bank (2001). Again this set of variables was used to 
represent social infrastructure as in Hall and Jones (1999). We add to these variables the 
government cost for entrepreneurs to set up a business (Costgov) from Djankov et all (2002). 
The latter variable represents the prevailing economic policy towards entrepreneurship in the 
                                                 
22 We use the dataset in www.ilo.org to compute the percentage of entrepreneurs as percentage of the workforce 
in the economy by using the ISCO-International Standard Classification. The ISCO-1968 codes used are 2.0 and 
2.1 and the ISCO-1988 codes 11, 12 and 13.  
3rd International GET UP Workshop on University Based Start-Ups 
29 – 31 October 2004, Jena 
 209
economy.  Together we believe these variables captures the most important aspects of the 
entrepreneurial behavior of the economy. 
 The other important aspect in the economy is related to the determining factors of 
R&D investment. By considering this variable to be endogenous we follow the cross-country 
studies done by Varsakelis (2001), Bebczzuk (2002) and Lederman and Maloney (2003). Our 
approach differs from them by positing it to be a key element in determining high-tech 
export. Under this view, R&D investment is a function of existing stock of knowledge, 
international trade, market competitiveness, and the rate of return to assets.  
Here we describe the variables that determine R&D investment and their sources. The 
stock of knowledge used is the 1990s’ average number of scientists and engineers per million 
people (Scieng90s) from World Bank (2001). The international trade is proxy by the variable 
years open index (Yrsopen) build by Sachs and Warner (1995). The international trade index 
variable enters in explaining R&D because it helps transfer and speed-up R&D investments. 
The product market competitiveness index (Markcom) proposed by Djankov et all (2002) is 
used as a proxy for the prevailing competition in the economy. We believe that a more 
competitive market requires innovation, thus influencing the level of product competitiveness 
through R&D investment. The rate of return on assets (Roa) also comes from Djankov et all 
(2002). This variable captures the average return on assets in the economy leaving out any 
marginal return due to R&D investment. And lastly, we add a control variable to capture pre-
existing conditions through the average physical capital stock per worker in 1980s (Kpw80s) 
from World Bank (2001). 
 
IV.1 – The High-Tech Export Econometric Model  
Once we have determined the level of entrepreneurship and the R&D investment we 
use them to explain the high-tech export as percentage of manufacturing export relatively to 
US. This three stage process gives us the opportunity to better understand the role of the 
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policies regarding entrepreneurial activities and university infrastructure related to R&D 
investment as a mean to achieve international market competition. Thus, our econometric 
model is as follow: 
Y1i = α1i  + β1iX1i + ε1i       (3) 
Y2i = α2i  + β2iX2i + ε2i       (4) 
Y3i = α3i  + β31Y1i + β32Y2i + ε3i      (5) 
Where equation (3) determines the entrepreneurial behavior prevailing in the economy; 
equation (4) is the key for determining the R&D investment; and equation (5) represents the 
high-tech export goods as function of the two previous equations. The error terms are 
assumed to have the following behavior E(X1i ,ε1i)=0, E(X2i,ε2i)=0 and E(Yji ,ε3i)=0 where 
j=1,2. In order to comply with these conditions we use the SURE-Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression Method. All the results are reported in Table 2. This table is divided into three set 
of equations. The first set of equations explains the entrepreneurship behavior. The second 
explains the R&D investment. The third one shows the specification for the high-tech export 
relative to US.  
 In explaining entrepreneurship behavior, we have kept the same specification across 
columns (1)-(5). The objective was to capture the combination of social infrastructure and 
government behavior. The entrepreneurship class is marginally affected by the size of the 
economy – average output per worker in 1980s - (Yw80s). The social capital or infrastructure 
represented by the variables Logfr and Engfrac do explain in a positive way most of the 
entrepreneurship behavior of the economy. The Logfr index is the predicted share of an 
economy, based on a gravity model of international trade that only uses population and 
geographical features of a country; the Engfrac is the English speaking fraction of population. 
Both variables are key elements in explaining social infrastructure in Hall and Jones (1999).  
This means that countries influenced by Europeans tend to have social infrastructure that is 
more conducive to entrepreneurship behavior. However, as one may notice, there is still room 
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for government policy. Especially policies regarding the bureaucracy cost of setting up a 
business. As matter of fact the variable Costgov showed to be negative and quite significant. 
 
IV.2 – The High-Tech Export Econometric Results 
 The R&D investment (RD90s) regression in Column (1) of Table 2 is our baseline 
model. There we can see that the stock of knowledge represented by the amount of scientists 
and engineers per million people allocated to the R&D sector (Sciengrd90s) is the key 
element in determining the level of R&D investment. The rate of return to assets (Roa) 
showed to be positive indicating that economies with high rate of returns tend to invest more 
on R&D. The years open variable (Yrsopen) did confirm the importance of openness as way 
to boost R&D investment. The market competitiveness index (Markcom) showed to be 
negative. We are expecting that more competitive economy would invest more in R&D. It 
requires more investigation on the causes. 
 Still on the R&D specification, Column (2) adds the amount of credit to private sector 
(Dcbanking90s) to see its influence. The result is positive in every specification showing the 
importance of available credit to companies and its indirect influence on R&D investment. In 
Column (3) we replace the Sciengrd90s for Tertiary80s to see the importance of the tertiary 
education infrastructure on R&D investment. The existence of tertiary education 
infrastructure previously is quite important for R&D investment. Thus, it corroborates with 
our thesis on the importance of taking advantage of universities infrastructure as way to 
enhance R&D investments. Columns (4) and (5) replicate the previous specification, but 
adding domestic credit to companies by the banking sector (Dcbanking90s). In both cases the 
tertiary education showed to be significant as well as the availability of credit to companies in 
explaining R&D investments. 
 The last set of regressions explains the high-tech exports relative to US. Looking at 
the variables along the rows, we see that the stock of capital per worker (kpw80s) is 
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negatively related to exporting high-tech products. This means that physical capital 
investment is not a key element for a country to catch-up US in the high-tech export business. 
As a matter fact our hypothesis that high-tech export depends upon R&D investment (Rd90s) 
and Entrepreneurship policies (Ent90s) proved to be right. Both variables show to be 
significant and positively related to high-tech export goods relative to US.  Economies where 
competitiveness is present tend to export more easily high-tech products as showed in 
Columns (1)-(3) by the variable Markcom.  Column (4) tests the importance of ISO-
International Standard Organization certification. The Isoqual variables helps companies to 
meet international standards and by extension countries to export more high-tech products. 
We use this variable as a proxy for entrepreneurship quality of the country. Therefore, both 
variables when combined state that quantity and quality of entrepreneurship matters for 
exporting high-tech products. As a last specification in Column (5) we use the private cost of 
setting up a business as a proxy potential intermediation cost of exporting goods in each 
country. It showed not to be significant.  
 
V. Conclusion 
This research supports a regional economic model that has the university as the centerpiece 
for producing ideas, goods and firms. The social rate of return to R&D investment proved to 
be quite high, especially when we considered the university infrastructure in our model. 
Moreover, it may require changes in laws and existing universities behavior to make it a more 
entrepreneurial activity, especially regarding the commercialization of its products. By 
linking the university to a science park may solve the entrepreneurial problems of the 
economy and by extension the university itself.  The good news is that the above combination 
of entrepreneurial and R&D investment policies seem to help the economy to export high-
tech products. Hence, our main conclusion is that any successful economic development plan 
must combine a university infrastructure that is conducive to entrepreneurial behavior and 
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exploits the R&D investment as mean of producing high-tech products and companies. In 
sum, we found that 
i) there is a high unexploited social rate of return due to university infrastructure, 
above 100%; 
ii) it is not the size of the economy that matters for entrepreneurship, but the social 
infrastructure and government policy that incentives entrepreneurial activities like 
less bureaucracy; 
iii) an economy where the university infrastructure produces scientists and engineers 
also have more R&D investments; 
iv) economic policies that that lead the economy to be more open and to have an asset 
market more developed also generate more R&D investments; 
v) entrepreneurship behavior and R&D investments are key elements for a country to 
export high-tech products and not the physical capital as one may think it is.   
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Annex. 
 
Table 1: The Social Rate of Return to R&D Investment 
Dependent Variable Log of TFP (LogA). 
Variables Coefficients 
(1) 
Coefficients 
(2) 
Coefficients 
(3) 
Coefficients 
(4) 
Coefficients 
(5) 
LogFR 0.23 
(0.08)* 
0.23 
(0.09)* 
0.20 
(0.09)* 
0.22 
(0.06)* 
0.018 
(0.06)* 
Eurfrac 0.71 
(0.14)* 
0.71 
(0.14)* 
0.66 
(0.16)* 
0.56 
(0.13)* 
0.50 
(0.14)* 
LogRD90s 0.18 
(0.05)* 
0.18 
(0.06) 
0.02 
(0.07) 
0.09 
(0.05)*** 
 
LogHL  0.03 
(0.31) 
   
LogScieng90s   0.14 
(0.05)** 
  
LogTertiary80s    0.23 
(0.07)* 
 
LogTertiary90s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.37 
(0.08)* 
Constant 7.44 
(0.27)* 
7.42 
(0.34)* 
6.58 
(0.43) 
6.89 
(0.28)* 
6.43 
(0.33)* 
N 50 50 47 47 47 
R2 0.48 0.48 0.51 0.55 0.63 
Notes: * significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 10%. Variables with Log in front of its name 
are in logarithms. The values underneath the coefficients are their robust standard errors. 
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Table 2: Explaining High-Tech Export  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ent90s 
Yw80s 9.38e-07 
(5.38e-07)*** 
9.65e-07 
(5.5e-07)*** 
8.80e-07 
(5.67e-07) 
7.22e-07 
(5.48e-07) 
7.02e-07 
(5.46e-07) 
Logfr 0.007 
(0.002)* 
0.007 
(0.002)* 
0.008 
(0.003)* 
0.009 
(0.002)* 
0.009 
(0.002)* 
Engfrac 0.055 
(0.013)* 
0.055 
(0.013)* 
0.056 
(0.014)* 
0.052 
(0.014)* 
0.053 
(0.013)* 
Costgov -0.008 
(0.003)* 
-0.009 
(0.003)* 
-0.007 
(0.003)* 
-0.009 
(0.003)* 
-0.008 
(0.003)* 
Rd90s 
Sciengrd90s 0.481 
(0.079)* 
0.408 
(0.077)* 
   
Roa 2.908 
(1.107)** 
2.898 
(1.006)* 
2.510 
(1.483)*** 
2.208 
(1.147)** 
2.165 
(1.154)** 
Yrsopen 1.295 
(0.275)* 
1.050 
(0.261)* 
1.058 
(0.363)* 
0.772 
(0.292)* 
0.772 
(0.293)* 
Markcom -0.676 
(0.122)* 
-0.634 
(0.111)* 
-0.104 
(0.085) 
-0.169 
(0.070)* 
-0.170 
(0.070)* 
Tertiary80s   0.032 
(0.010)* 
0.027 
(0.008)* 
0.028 
(0.008)* 
DcBanking90s  0.005 
(0.001)* 
 0.007 
(0.002)* 
0.007 
(0.001)* 
Htex90us 
Kpw80s -1.05e-05 
(4.84e-06)** 
-9.72e-06 
(4.86e-06)** 
-9.38e-06 
(4.85e-06)** 
-8.55e-06 
(4.68e-06) 
-9.45e-06 
(4.83e-06)** 
Rd90s 0.246 
(0.124)** 
0.211 
(0.125)*** 
0.227 
(0.121)** 
0.240 
(0.124)** 
0.248 
(0.125)** 
Ent90s 3.949 
(2.282)*** 
4.028 
(2.293)*** 
3.894 
(2.329)*** 
4.775 
(2.301)** 
4.957 
(2.295)** 
Markcom 0.077 
(0.035)** 
0.078 
(0.035)** 
0.072 
(0.035)** 
  
Isoqual    0.623 
(0.288)** 
0.584 
(0.291)** 
Costpriv     4.1e-05 
(6.4e-05) 
N 33 33 33 33 33 
R2-Ent90s 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 
R2-Rd90s 0.90 0.92 0.84 0.89 0.89 
R2-Htex90us 0.62 0.56 0.62 0.56 0.56 
Source: Authors Calculation. Notes: * significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 10%. The values 
underneath the coefficients are their robust standard errors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Slovenia is a small economy with the per capita GDP below the EU average. Its 
development strategy is to “catch-up” with the EU. To strengthen its competitiveness, the 
innovation and entrepreneurship should become the key drivers of its economic growth that 
has to surpass the EU performance. However, there exist neither a strong tradition of 
entrepreneurship culture in Slovenia nor are the key institutions of a “knowledge-driven” 
economy ready for the new development paradigm. 
 As a small country, Slovenia only has three universities, with the largest one, 
University of Ljubljana, still traditional and conservative in its concept of university-industry 
collaboration. Since the technology transfer from universities to industry is one of main 
weaknesses of the economy, government recently conceived a more aggressive approach to 
the change by supporting entrepreneurship infrastructure at universities and at some leading 
R&D institutions and companies. 
 The paper will analyze the development of LUI, the Ljubljana University Incubator 
during 2002-2004 as the case of an institution geared towards supporting university spin-offs 
within an academic environment that represent more a barrier than a support.  
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THE BACKGROUND 
 By its economic parameters, Slovenia is the most developed transition economy. 
However, its index of economic liberties and the entrepreneurship culture lag behind its 
economic performance. Further liberalization of Slovenian economy is necessary where a 
strong SME sector and corporate venturing are the keys to structural changes. 
 
State of entrepreneurship culture in Slovenia 
 While the first half of 1990s created a strong SME sector by the number of new 
businesses, jobs created and market niches covered (Glas and Drnovsek, 2000), this wave of 
entrepreneurship still shows some deficiencies: 
- the process of new venture creation has been virtually stalled after 1995 and the number 
of businesses even declined lately, 
- new ventures are mostly micro-businesses of the “life-style” character and few enjoyed 
dynamic growth, 
- few SMEs really created new products and services, they prevailed in traditional sectors 
and the level of technology has not supported high value added activities. 
 
Slovenia joined the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) research since 2002. Two 
annual reports show quite a disappointing picture of entrepreneurship: the TEA (Total 
Entrepreneurship Activity) Index placed Slovenia with 4.63 (GEM average: 6.88) at the 25th 
place among 37 countries in 2002, while the performance worsened in the year 2003: with 
4.05 Slovenia was placed 24th among 31 countries. In a consolidated picture for the period of 
2000-2003, Slovenia would earn the 36th place among 41 countries. Further weakness is 
highlighted by the fact that Slovenia ranks worse on opportunity-based vs. necessity-based 
entrepreneurship: there is the lack of searching for new opportunities. The research on 
motivation for start-ups revealed the autonomy and not opportunity as the most important 
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factor (Glas and Drnovsek, 2000) what leads to “life-style” not growth attitude. Only among 
dynamic enterprises a profitable opportunity and challenge seemed to be the main motive 
(Zizek and Liechtenstein, 1994; PHARE report, 2002). 
 In both GEM Annual reports Slovenian experts consistently ranked the conditions for 
entrepreneurship related to government policies and structural support to SME development 
as weakest. Experts use to be fierce critics of government’s actions, sometimes understating 
the efforts of the Ministry of Economy to introduce a modern competition policy, but this 
picture sends a serious warning to Slovenian politics. 
 By the stereotype Slovenians are risk averse people. The national culture does not 
support individual success, acquired through own efforts and hard work. The egalitarian 
values inherited from the socialism are very strong and they resent individualism, 
independence and personal initiative. Government is expected to take care of individual’s 
well-being. GEM Report 2002 sees the problems with cultural and social norms in some anti-
entrepreneurship concepts: 
- low tolerance for increased income and wealth differentials, 
- highly negative attitude and stygmatisation of business failures, 
- controversial attitude towards commercial approach within some social activities e.g. 
education, health, culture, opposing personal financial inputs into these activities, 
- expecting government to provide assistance in case of social problems, 
- harsh, unforgiving attitude towards unemployed persons, 
- low level of public confidence in government institutions etc. 
GEM Report 2003 stated that becoming rich in Slovenia is not always socially 
acceptable, even if resulting from the honest and productive business and entrepreneurship 
activity. The report called for an adequate reward system for creativity, innovation and 
entrepreneurship if scarce talents were to push their own projects. This social setting could be 
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traced back to the historical tradition of Slovenians as farmers, traders and artisans, not really 
people from industrial and financial community (Glas, 1998). 
 
The academic sphere and entrepreneurship 
 The academic sphere in Slovenia represents a weak link in the process of technology 
transfer and creation of applied technology research as proven by the research on the 
competitiveness of Slovenian economy. Slovenia is lagging behind some less developed 
former socialist countries not only behind the EU countries. 
 
  Figure 1. The assessment of the university - business technology transfer 
 
 This ranking is further supported by the findings of the PHARE Report (2002) that 
discussed the university spin-off incubators in Slovenia: 
- the global R&D spending as a percentage of GDP as well as the number of full-time 
equivalent researchers per 1000 active population in Slovenia are only slightly below the 
EU average, but less R&D is done in companies and there are only few innovative firms 
among SMEs; 
- the level of business/entrepreneurship education in Slovenia is moderate, lower in the 
science and technology areas; academic and research circles have limited business 
experience and scarce business contacts that hinder faster research commercialization; 
- public RD spending is supporting the survival of large research institutes and it is not 
geared towards technology needs of the private sector; 
- no true seed funds are available for NTBFs, either by formal venture capital funds or 
“business angels” and the access to seed and expansion capital is a major concern for 
founders of new technology companies; 
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- R&D spending in companies is low, especially at SMEs; firms are oriented more towards 
real estate investments than towards investments in R&D, new knowledge and intellectual 
property. 
The role, universities play in Slovenia, is far from the intentions of the European 
Commission as put in its communication (2003). Some academic staff and departments with 
international experience nurture a different culture, but as the whole, universities have a 
tough agenda to change. However, to be fair to the academic community, this picture resulted 
from some trends in the development of higher education, where universities had no direct 
influence: 
- the number of students increased enormously during 1990’s, and the academic staff, 
financial resources, premises and research equipment felt short of this increase, 
- the system of higher education financing stimulated the number of programmes and not 
the efficiency and quality of teaching and research, 
- the average financial means per student are much lower than in EU countries, 
- level of professional and financial autonomy of universities was rather low and the 
procedures to change curricula and introduce new courses and programmes were quite 
cumbersome, discouraging dynamic changes according to new demands, 
- former barriers for international mobility of staff and students are still taking a toll on the 
research excellence and publishing of teaching / research staff, 
- Slovenian companies are too weak to present a serious research and financial partners to 
universities e.g. as a source of additional revenues, etc. 
 
Entrepreneurship infrastructure in Slovenia 
 The movement towards SMEs in Slovenia resulted in late 1980s from the strong 
private crafts sector and from a group of academic people attracted by the entrepreneurial 
“silent revolution” in the United States and later development in Europe. They also promoted 
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the concept of incubators but early promising developments failed due to the lack of own 
premises and real financial support and few developed during 1990s. Two technology parks, 
one in Ljubljana by the Jozef Stefan Institute and the Styria TP in Maribor by its 
municipality, were founded. 
 In the same time, the SME Support Network at the local and regional level gradually 
evolved, with the Small Business Development Center (SBDC) as the strategic leader and 
three Euro-Info centres. However, universities newer got really involved as strong partners to 
this network, although vast intellectual resources were available. 
 The entrepreneurship education and training developed quite successfully at all levels, 
mostly as part of private initiative and individual efforts. However, it only developed  at 
economic faculties, while science and technology departments never embraced the business 
initiative among their students and staff (Glas and Menzies (2001), Glas, Petrin and Vahcic 
(2001) and GEM Report 2002). Still, education and training got high score with experts in 
GEM: best ranking on the 9th place in 2002, a little more critical 13th and 17th place in 2003. 
The Centre for Entrepreneurship Development was established at the Faculty of Economics in 
Ljubljana (Glas and Drnovsek, 2001) and the Institute for Entrepreneurship and SME 
Management at the Faculty of Economics and Business in Maribor. Recently both centres 
initiated the creation of university incubators in 2002 with initial funding provided by the 
government.  
 
 Within such an environment, there were some stimuli to push for more 
entrepreneurship initiatives, but also some barriers. 
 
Table 1. A tentative list of stimuli and barriers for entrepreneurship at the 
  University of Ljubljana 
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UNIVERSITY INCUBATOR IN LJUBLJANA 
The academic group at the Chair for Entrepreneurship Studies for almost a decade advocated 
an university incubator. However, the government (Ministry of Education and Science), the 
City Municipality of Ljubljana or the university as key possible stakeholders never thought of 
providing necessary resources. The concept of incubator was inconceivable with the 
traditional academic community and other institutions did not consider university as a serious 
player in the entrepreneurship development: 
- the rector of University, Professor Joze Mencinger, although a macroeconomist by his 
profession, a strong opinion-maker, explicitly stated his doubts about the necessity and 
the effectiveness of incubators and technology parks; 
- academic community failed to embrace the idea of an incubator as a vehicle for the 
commercialization of research or an option for alternative career path for younger 
teaching and research staff, 
- mayors of Ljubljana never attempted strong efforts to spark technology oriented firms,  
- national government did not push for university incubators since entrepreneurship and 
SME development only recently got the status of key generators of growth and welfare; 
- SME owner-managers, quite a number of them former craftsmen, did not expect strong 
impact from an university incubator so their associations never pushed the idea.  
 
After a PHARE study confirmed the viability of two university spin-off incubators in 
Ljubljana and Maribor, with the third at Nova Gorica (Politehnika) government decided to 
sponsor the pre-start research and preparatory activities through a tendering process. While in 
Maribor, through a cross-border programme, the incubator was already provided with some 
premises, the activity in Ljubljana started from scratch.  
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The pre-start period of LUI 
 In Ljubljana two stakeholders promoted the initiative to create a project group to 
participate in the tender: 
- the teaching staff at the entrepreneurship department at the Faculty of Economics, with its 
Centre for Entrepreneurship Development, 
- manager of the Ljubljana Technology Park (TPL). 
TPL, established in the mid-1990’s by some institutes and leading firms, has already 
proposed to the University of Ljubljana the co-operation in promoting and supporting new 
business ideas of students and staff, however with little success. The manager of TPL 
provided the technical support to a group of teachers from five departments: Faculty of 
Biotechnology, Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Faculty of Pharmacy, Faculty of Chemistry 
and Chemical Technology and Faculty of Economics. After few meetings, where the concept 
of incubator has been thoroughly explained, the group applied for the project at the Ministry 
of Economy. With five deans and the initial group in consent, the university leadership 
accepted the initiative. The project got the budget of €45.000 for the Phase one, and the group 
performed several activities: 
- the Initial Project Group was created with representative of all five departments and the 
Technology Park as partner,  
- the initial group visited selected European university incubators and science parks: in the 
UK, they visited universities at Cambridge and Oxford and participated at the annual 
conference of university incubators in Manchester, in Austria, technology parks in Graz 
and Leoben were visited, as well as the lead institution, TIG in Vienna, in Italy BIC 
Trieste and the Area Science Park close to Trieste were visited, 
- a broad marketing research among students, academic staff and high-growth SMEs in 
Ljubljana region has been undertaken: 850 undergraduate and 83 graduate students filled 
a questionnaire at all five participating departments, 90 members of teaching and research 
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staff responded and 47 dynamic SMEs in the region were asked about their intentions 
about corporate venturing, 
- a standard business plan for the establishment of the incubator has been developed and 
proposed for the Phase two to the Ministry of Economy. 
 
From the very beginning, the project group started to build a network: financial 
institutions e.g. Horizonte Venture Fund and Kmecka Druzba Investments, the only venture 
capital investors with some deals in Slovenia participated, as well as the Small Business 
Development Centre as a national institution and the Centre for Small Business Development 
from the City of Ljubljana were also in touch. The motivation of academic stakeholders were 
mostly: 
- to create an institution important for the future development of the university offering 
students practical experience in working with spin-off firms, 
- to offer new opportunities for business activity to target groups at the University of 
Ljubljana, to students and staff: improving the image and the competitive position of the 
University of Ljubljana, it should help to curb “brain drain” from Slovenia by offering 
opportunities to develop new projects at home and it should be used to establish better 
relationships with Alumnis from the university, 
- it should provide a tangible impact of University of Ljubljana on the local/regional 
economic development by nurturing technology oriented ventures, 
- it could become a new source of revenues for the University of Ljubljana through the 
commercialization of its intellectual property. 
The project group assumed three target groups for potential tenants of LUI, with 
different objectives, experience and career options: 
- undergraduate and particularly graduate students due to their working experience and 
stronger financial status, 
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- academic staff: teaching, research and other technical staff, 
- external founders, mostly from the Alumnis, with technology oriented projects. 
 
Figure 2. The role of LUI as assumed in its business plan (2003) 
 
According to the world experience, the project group expected a smaller share of 
high-tech projects, mainly from the academic staff that could bring to the market their 
expertise through a number of service and consulting businesses, and graduate students, while 
undergraduate students are expected to create all kinds of “campus businesses”, focused on 
the needs of the student population and other customers. LUI could be used by several 
research groups that enjoyed 3-5 years of public funding (at least part of their budgets) to 
provide additional 3-5 years of the development of products and services resulting from the 
applied research.  
While the project has been mostly “tolerated” and never really encouraged by the 
university leadership, the marketing research revealed a more promising picture of the 
potential for new venture creation: 
- 5.5% of students want immediately after finishing their studies establish own firms, while 
44% intend to find corporate jobs, 
-  99% of students want to develop their entrepreneurship skills, 32% would like to have an 
obligatory course on entrepreneurship, 
- even 60% of students would establish a firm if properly assisted, 
- in 5 years after finishing studies 18% undergraduate an d even 32% of graduate students 
plan to found own businesses (14% of graduate students, mostly at the Faculty of 
Economics, already possess own business), 
- from LUI they mostly expect: financial assistance, information and advice as well as 
premises with subsidized rents, 
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- among teaching staff 12 % expect to have own firm in 5 years while 7% already have one. 
 
With more than 55.000 full- and part-time students at the University of Ljubljana, 
these figures reveal an important potential for new venture creation. 
 
Establishment of Ljubljana University Incubator 
 The incubator was a new concept at the University of Ljubljana, and the formal 
procedure of approving the decision to found such a unit has been respected and a number of 
decision-making bodies notified or asked for approval: the deans of all five participating 
departments, the Senate, and ad hoc commission set up by the Senate, dean’s assembly, the 
Management Board, and the rector’s collegiate board. An important step in championing the 
incubator was the election of the new chairman of the Management Board after the previous 
one left for the post of the Minister of Finance in the national government. A member of the 
Entrepreneurship Chair was elected to this second highest post in the university hierarchy, so 
the support for LUI project has been ensured. 
A positive consensus has been built at the level of all these bodies, with the only 
demand that LUI be open also for the staff and students of other departments and the financial 
situation be closely monitored to avoid financial risks. It was not a real enthusiasm among 
stakeholders, but the tacit agreement that University of Ljubljana needs such an institution 
has been created.  
As a public institution, university  needs governments  approval to establish the 
incubator. The process of getting this approval revealed why the “Anti-Bureaucracy 
Program” is important in Slovenia: 
- the documentation was delivered to the Ministry of Education, Sport and Science, 
covering the higher education; 
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- an inter-ministerial procedure among the Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Education 
and Ministry of Finance lasted for months due to incomplete legislation, 
- Ministry of Finance found out that university as public institution is not allowed to fund 
LUI as a limited liability company from its own financial resources – project group had to 
find a private organization to sponsor the founding capital of € 8.000: an investment 
company with a manager very much in support of entrepreneurship provided the 
resources (the option was that project group would contribute the money), 
- the notary studied the founding contract – University being the founder with the initial 
departments having representatives in the governance bodies of LUI – and after a long 
discussion and some interventions from the University proposed the documentation to the 
Registration Court which respond immediately on a personal request). 
It took eight months to pass the whole procedure although the project was in fact a 
government sponsored project. During the initial discussion on the organizational and 
financial structure of LUI, the collaboration between University of Ljubljana and the 
Technology Park (TPL) crashed since TPL demanded LUI  to keep only the pre-incubation 
stage and to direct all mature projects immediately to TPL. This demand would deny LUI the 
real incubator activity and the chance to develop appropriate intellectual property structure to 
cash in on university knowhow. LUI decided to establish the incubator with University of 
Ljubljana as the sole owner but to keep future co-operation with TPL open.  
 During the whole period of administrative procedures, LUI already started some 
activities: 
- promotional events at the departments collaborating in the project (another Faculty of 
Mechanical Engineering, very strong at university – industry collaboration, joined the 
project), 
- identifying entrepreneurial teams with viable projects, 
- initial training and the business basics and business plan preparation, 
3rd International GET UP Workshop on University Based Start-Ups 
29 – 31 October 2004, Jena 
 231
- establishing Information Points as pre-incubation units at all the departments, with a room 
and some computer equipment to establish the first stage of the promotion and idea 
identification, 
- searching for sponsorships at financial organizations, 
- developing the network of supporting institutions, 
- finding the premises for the central incubation unit where entrepreneurial groups with 
mature and approved business plans would enter the real incubation process. 
In June 2004 LUI was formally established, its governance structure appointed and the 
manager, a graduate from the Faculty of Mechanical Engineering, took over executive 
functions from the project group. 
 
LUI: VISION AND REALITY 
 The concept of LUI, although conceived as a “simple” university incubator at the 
stage one, is much more ambitious: it has to become the focal point in the development of 
entrepreneurship curriculum at University of Ljubljana, a vehicle for an intense university-
business collaboration and an option to career development of some academic staff and 
students. 
 
  Figure 3. The vision of LUI as the focus of entrepreneurship development 
 
 Since it is the weakness in entrepreneurship education not to be appropriately 
introduced at science and technology departments, LUI would be used as the focal point to 
bring entrepreneurship training and experience to these students and staff and later to enter 
the new Bologna-based curricula. LUI would link different existing or newly created 
knowledge generating institutions at University of Ljubljana. 
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  Figure 4. Organisation and network structure at LUI 
 
 How far this vision of LUI will really materialize depends on a number of issues 
discussed currently within the project group, formal governance bodies and the expert groups. 
LUI is just a link in the whole organizational structure that is itself still weak while other 
links have yet to develop. The problem is with the dispersion of the departments over the 
whole area of Ljubljana which makes it difficult to establish the co-operation among staff and 
students from different departments, with important issues of logistics and coordination. It is 
highly important to prove that LUI could really provide good assistance to entrepreneurial 
teams and that viable projects exist and could be implemented. The most important issues are: 
1. Establishing a capable management team (up to 3 persons) and expert pool (5-8 
members) at the main incubator that will start to work with would-be entrepreneurs 
early in their idea development stage – the info-points at all departments do not provide 
well this function due to unequal knowhow and lower level of efforts than expected. 
2. Enhancing promotion at all departments – initial members and others, raising awareness
 on entrepreneurship and LUI existence, to be able to direct all initiatives to LUI to 
prove the venture creation potential among target groups of LUI. 
3. To provide appropriate premises for LUI, located close to science and technology 
departments – a PHARE project is still under consideration to provide the bulk of 
resources. LUI as a “virtual incubator” could hardly provide the focal point assumed. 
This issue could be best solved through the co-operation with TPL and the future 
Technology Zone. 
4. Creating a nucleus of first entrants to LUI to prove the concept and start developing the 
image of a viable and effective institution. 
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Although the activity of the project group and the LUI manager have focused on the 
procedure of formal establishment, they identified 12 entrepreneurial groups already working 
on their business ideas and the process of the evaluation and the disbursement of initial 
financial support is underway. 
 
 Table 2. Entrepreneurial teams at their initial stage 
 
 Table 2 reveals a variety of projects, a combination of services and production 
(usually more assembly of existing parts). The most distinct feature of the list is the fact that 
10 out of 12 projects are teamworks which is quite unusual for local environment where only 
few successful partnerships exist and entrepreneurs are not highly enthusiastic about working 
with partners unless from the same family. While the PHARE research assumed that spin-off 
incubator should analyze and support 30-50 projects annually to get to 3-5 spin-offs per year, 
the current result show that more efforts should be put to reach such a number of projects and 
that the success rate of one in ten “ideas” coming from research is quite realistic, with the 
projects of academic staff and graduate students being able to provide even better output. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The idea of an university spin-off incubator at the University of Ljubljana was for 
years “a dream” of the academic group at the Entrepreneurship Chair at the Faculty of 
Economics. Only recently, through the financial support of the government, the project was 
initiated. The two years since the inception phase in 2002 show that within an environment 
with low entrepreneurship culture it takes enormously strong energy and a lot of time to 
establish a new institution. Even with some “guerilla” actions to create the support of the 
university, a number of unexpected details hindering the project have to be expected and a lot 
of patience is recommended to make the progress.  
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 The project group with members from different departments proved the existence of 
highly divergent understanding of entrepreneurship, a lot of reservations and low level of 
flexibility among the people from the science and technology departments not used to the 
quantity of barriers. Also, separate individual “by-pass” projects of some academic people 
created lots of reservations since those people were not supporting transparent dealings within 
the incubator setting that might limit their own earnings.  
 LUI has still to prove its viability and efficiency and more time is needed to get to an 
established institution. It is certainly the question how far the whole project might reach in 3-
5 years, but the existence of the potential is beyond any doubt and the diversity of ideas is 
encouraging. While students created a surprise with their prevalence of teamwork, academic 
staff has still not joined the process as much as expected. However, it is not the absence of 
business ideas behind their reluctance, but rather the practice of own “by-pass” businesses 
that evade the university control that makes them uncertain about the benefits of doing 
business through LUI: they would have access to a lot more of resources, the conflict of 
interest issue would be avoided and professional services offered. LUI has to prove its 
usefulness to this target group as well if it is to develop the whole vision of a focal point for 
entrepreneurship education and new venture creation processes at the University of Ljubljana. 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Commission of the European Communities (2003): The Role of the Universities in the Europe 
of Knowledge. Brussels, COM(2003) 58 final. 
Glas, M. and Menzies T. (2001): Entrepreneurship Centres at Universities: Comparison of 
Canada and Slovenia. In: Klandt, H., ed., Proceedings of the IntEnt’98 Conference. 
Lohmar-Koeln: Josef Eul Verlag GmbH, pp. 197-221. 
Glas, M., Petrin T., and Vahcic, A. (2001): Experiences with the Entrepreneurship Education 
in Slovenia. In: Klandt, H., ed., Proceedings of the IntEnt’98 Conference. Lohmar-
Koeln: Josef Eul Verlag GmbH, pp. 242-265 
3rd International GET UP Workshop on University Based Start-Ups 
29 – 31 October 2004, Jena 
 235
Glas, M. (1998): Eastern Europe: Slovenia. In: Morrsion, A., ed., Entrepreneurship: An 
International Perspective. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, pp. 108-124. 
Glas, M. and Drnovsek, M. (2000): Small Business in Slovenia: Expectations and 
Accomplishments. Working Paper No. 102. Ljubljana: Faculty of Economics. 
Glas, M. and Drnovsek, M. (2001): Support for Graduate Students with Entrepreneurial 
Intentions: The Case of Slovenia. 31st ESBS Seminar, Dublin, September 12-14, 
Glas, M. and Drnovsek, M. (2003): Does the Entrepreneurship Programme Matter? Working 
Paper No. 145. Ljubljana:  Faculty of Economics. 
LUI (2002): Poslovni nacrt. Ljubljana: Projektna skupina. 
PHARE (2002): Strategic Possibilities for the Development of Science/Technology and 
University Spin-off Incubators in Slovenia – Final Report. Ljubljana. 
Rebernik, M. et al. (2004a): GEM 2002 – The Slovenian Report: The Winding Road to 
Entrepreneurial Society. Maribor: Faculty of Economics and Business – IESBM 
Rebernik, M. et al. (2004b): GEM Slovenija 2003 – Spodbujati in ohraniti razvojne ambicije. 
Maribor: Ekonomsko-poslovna fakulteta - IPMMP 
Zizek, J. and Liechtenstein, H. (1994), ‘750 Central and East European Dynamic 
Entrepreneurs Database Survey – Final Report’. Schiphol: EFER  
Miroslav Glas: Supporting university based start-ups within an environment with a low culture of 
entrepreneurship 
 236
Table 1. A tentative list of stimuli and barriers for entrepreneurship at the University of 
Ljubljana in the period 2001-2004 
Stimuli for entrepreneurship development 
• Financial support of the Ministry of Economy 
• Parallel projects of this ministry (applied R&D support measures, clustering) 
• Strong group of academic staff on entrepreneurship at the Faculty of Economics 
• Changes in the system of financing towards performance-based criteria 
• Good relationships with some leading world and European universities 
• Encouraging experiences with some student entrepreneurial teams 
• Support of Ljubljana Technology Park 
• Strong entrepreneurship programme at the Faculty of Economics 
• Strong interests of students at some departments, partly staff and dynamic SMEs 
• Available research equipment and knowhow 
• Administrative barriers for effective founding of LUI and tenant companies 
Barriers for entrepreneurship initiatives 
• Tendency to slowdown in the world economy and Slovenian economy 
• Low level of entrepreneurship culture in Slovenia and among the university staff 
• Lack of entrepreneurship courses and experience at science and technology 
• Lack of support at the level of university management (rector) 
• Lack of start-up (seed and expansion) capital 
• Divergent interests of some academic staff to retain commercial activities through their 
own businesses (conflict of interests) 
• Unregulated issue of intellectual property rights at the University of Ljubljana 
• Criteria of academic performance denying practical contribution through the transfer of 
technology to business 
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igure 2. The role of LUI as assumed in its business plan (2003) 
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Figure 3. The vision of LUI as the focus of entrepreneurship development 
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  Figure 4. Organisation and network structure at LUI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
PRE-INCUBA- 
TION PHASE
Info Points 
2 
UNIVERSITY 
INCUBATOR 
Main premises 
Entry 
Business plans 
approved by LUI 
entry commission 
Manage-
ment 
Expert 
group 
Services to tenants 
Ljubljana Technology 
Park / Zone 
Business Zones 
Other locations 
Acquisitions by firms 
Exit 
3 
FOUNDATION 
OF START-UP 
CAPITAL 
4   
CENTRE FOR 
TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER
5 – SPECIALIZED EXCELLENCE CENTERS
Centre for Entrepreneurship Development 
Specialized institutes and laboratories 
Venture capital 
funds 
Business angels 
Other investors 
Miroslav Glas: Supporting university based start-ups within an environment with a low culture of 
entrepreneurship 
 240
 Table 2. Entrepreneurial teams at their initial stage 
Project Short description Evaluation 
SLO-IGC d.o.o. 
3 members 
Services: measurement of the surface energy of 
hard particles, measurement systems and 
equipment validation (pharmacy, food 
processing industry) 
Mature 
business plan 
KAT Systems d.o.o. 
3 members 
Design and production of low-budget sailboat of 
the catamaran type 
Question: 
market 
WIPEE – Marketing  
4 members 
Production of sanitary equipment and marketing 
of products for men restrooms 
Tested, 
question: 
market 
AirPRO d.o.o. 
2 members 
Marketing of professional process software and 
consultancy on energy and material-saving 
redesign of processes 
Question: 
market 
Surgical body implants 
3 members 
Production of low-budget medical implants for 
surgery  
Question: 
quality 
CST d.o.o. 
1 member 
Design and production of massive rubber parts 
for oil industry and bridge construction 
Hardly viable 
Video-control system 
3 members 
Design and marketing of multi-purpose video 
controlling systems (safety, process 
improvements) 
Question: 
technology, 
market 
VVE Consulting 
3 members 
Consulting to SMEs on the overall redesign of 
business processes based on up-to-date computer 
and internet technology 
Viable 
Skylab d.o.o. 
5 members 
Institute for multimedia and convergence – 
design and implementation of web applications 
and portals 
Need further 
investigation 
ECO-tire 
4 members 
Recycling of used tires and sales of material 
components 
Question: 
market and 
technology 
E-services 
2 members 
A web portal to provide exchange of various 
information on services available to households 
Question: 
market 
PAP Engineering 
1 member 
Full automation of modules of production 
process 
Firm already 
founded 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper compares entrepreneurship and innovation policies in New Zealand and Sinaloa, 
Mexico. New Zealand has a robust and well-funded innovation policy yet places little 
emphasis on the needs of actual individual entrepreneurs and their decision to choose self-
employment. In Sinaloa the emphasis is on creating more and better entrepreneurs, but there 
is no innovation policy. Both sides have something to learn from the other. 
Using population survey data from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) and from in-
depth interviews (Frederick et al., 2004), the paper discusses what each can learn from the 
other in order to create a “three-legged” foundation for prosperity, namely three 
interconnected policies: small business policy, innovation policy and entrepreneurship policy. 
Entrepreneurship and innovation are seen as complementary phenomena that go hand in 
hand. An innovation uncommercialised is an innovation wasted, and entrepreneurship is thus 
considered to be the commercialisation of innovation. A prosperous economy must get the 
three-legged chair of small business policy together with both innovation policy AND 
entrepreneurship policy. 
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Mexico, New Zealand, entrepreneurship, innovation, policy 
Howard Frederick: Entrepreneurship OR Innovation Policy: Comparative Practices in New 
Zealand and Sinaloa, Mexico 
 242
INTRODUCTION  
This paper compares entrepreneurship and innovation policies in two very different 
and, for many readers, quite unfamiliar economies, New Zealand and Sinaloa, Mexico.  A 
prejudiced comparison, one might say, to contrast a national with a state (provincial) 
economy.  Yet as part of an OECD study group of entrepreneurship experts and scholars who 
spent one week intensively studying Sinaloa, Mexico, I as a New Zealander was asked to 
evaluate the entrepreneurship and innovation policies of Sinaloa in the light of best practice in 
New Zealand.  Our report A Review of Entrepreneurship in Sinaloa appeared in October 2004 
and is available from the OECD Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs, 
Local Economic and Employment Development Programme (OECD 2004).    
Although these “neighbours” are separated by 6,000 km of Pacific Ocean, Mexico is 
New Zealand’s largest trading partner in Latin America.  New Zealand’s attention has 
focussed heavily on Mexico for economic reasons.  Not only is Mexico’s population of 100 
million a huge potential economic partner in its own right, through its network of free trade 
agreements, Mexico has preferential access to 860 million consumers in 32 countries 
covering sixty percent of the world’s GDP.  
Like New Zealand, Mexico (and Sinaloa as part of it) is a “New World” country open 
to new ideas and innovation.  Also like New Zealand, Mexico is known internationally for 
economic reforms that have created two outward-looking, world-trading, and competitive 
economies.  With this shift, a new class of entrepreneurs arose with the support of the 
government.  One of those regional centres of entrepreneurship, and (with New Zealand) the 
subject of this study, is the State of Sinaloa, with its capital city, Culiacán.   
Mexico and New Zealand are near the top in the global entrepreneurial rankings.  
Beyond this, however, and more germane to this study, both countries are filled with low-
aspiration entrepreneurs who generate low levels of wealth and have low potential for growth.  
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Both are dominated by micro-businesses that do not have high-value-added components and 
are not investment-ready and pre-qualified for risk capita.  
 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH  
The idea that entrepreneurship, innovation and economic growth are closely and 
positively associated comes to us from the work of Josef Schumpeter originally written in 
1911 (Schumpeter & Opie, 1936).  In essence, Schumpeter separated himself from two 
hundred years of neo-classical economics, which had recognised only three factors of 
production: labour, naturalresources and capital. Knowledge, productivity, education, and 
intellectual capital were all regarded as externalitiesor exogenous factors– that is, falling 
outside the neo-classical system.  Neo-classical economics with their corollaries of perfect 
competition had no way to explain either quantum technological change or entrepreneurial 
activity (Solow, 1956).  The entrepreneur simply does not exist in Solow’s model.  
In Schumpeter’s growth theory, entrepreneurs create and exploit disequilibrium and 
disturbances through innovation.  Schumpeter calls this “creative destruction” and Aghion 
and Howitt have formulated a theoretical model that includes this process (Aghion & Hewitt, 
1992).  “New growth theory” developed in earnest in the mid 1980’s through the work of 
Stanford economist Paul Romer and others, who have attempted to deal with the causes of 
long-term growth, something with which traditional economic models have had difficulty.  
Following Schumpeter, Romer saw knowledge and technology as an intrinsic part of the 
economic system (they endogenise knowledge and technology).  In addition to natural 
resources, capital and labour, knowledge thus became a fourth production factor, a 
phenomenon that had become especially evident in leading economies (Romer, 1994, 1986, 
1990).    
Romer’s theory differs from neo-classical economic theory in several important ways.  
Knowledge is a basic form of capital.  Economic growth is driven by the accumulation of 
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knowledge.  While traditional economics predicts that there are diminishing returns on 
investment, Romer sees that knowledge-driven innovation can raise the return on investment.  
According to Romer, the virtuous circle that results can raise an economy’s growth rate 
permanently. Ethier (1982), Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) and Grossman and Helpman 
(1991, 1993), amongst others, have helped place this general subject in the forefront of 
international economic research with their path-breaking work that brought innovation-driven 
growth and trade into the economic model. New firms contribute to economic dynamism and 
growth in two ways.  First, they introduce new innovations into the marketplace, contribute to 
a more efficient allocation and use of productive resources, and thus create greater potential 
for national economic growth.   
Gradually governments are finding their way along the path from small business 
policy, through innovation policy, to entrepreneurship policy. Regardless of their diverse 
structures, diverse philosophical underpinnings, diverse ideologies and social goals, 
“governments realize the significant implications of business entry and exit and ‘churn rates’ 
and the dynamism of the small business sector for innovation and growth. . . . It will be hard 
for them to ignore the need for enhanced entrepreneurship support” (Lundström & Stevenson, 
2001).  From the literature it is clear that innovation policy and entrepreneurship policy go 
hand in hand.  An innovation uncommercialised or unexploited is an innovation wasted.  
Entrepreneurship might be seen as the commercialisation of innovation. Thus a prudent 
government would focus on both.  As we shall see, New Zealand and Sinaloa are markedly 
different in their respective emphasis on one or the other.  
 
WHY ENTREPRENEURSHIP OR INNOVATION?  
In both Sinaloa and New Zealand, there is a high level of government awareness of 
the need for economic growth.  Yet, from the outside one of the biggest differences between 
the two is the stress put on innovation OR entrepreneurship.  
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New Zealand is still quite caught in “innovation-speak”.  From the Prime Minister 
down through the business chambers and the media, government policy is making the greatest 
effort to drive up innovation.  Policy and media discourse focus on it.  A huge amount of 
resource and expertise is going into increasing the stock of innovative ideas, products and 
services.  In actual fact, New Zealand places little emphasis increasing the supply of 
entrepreneurs. Government policy does not explicit focus on the needs of actual individual 
entrepreneurs and their decision to choose selfemployment.  Entrepreneurship has only just 
entered the public discourse and governmental leaders do not place great stock in it.  For the 
left-leaning government with a strong basis in trade unionism, entrepreneurship and self-
employment do not fit easily into the dominant ideology.  There is no entrepreneurship policy 
per se, on small business policy and innovation policy.  
In Sinaloa, in contrast, the word innovation is hardly mentioned.  There, from the 
minister on down, the emphasis is on creating more andbetter entrepreneurs. In Sinaloa, there 
is little evidence of an “innovation system”.  The bottom line is that in New Zealand 
government policy emphasises innovation above all else while in Sinaloa entrepreneurship is 
the driving policy to raise the level of economic performance and to raise the standard of 
living for everyone.    
 
TWO ENTREPRENEURIAL ECONOMIES CONTRASTED  
New Zealand with 3.9 million and Mexico with 104.9 million are vastly different in 
size.  About 2.4 million and 58 million, respectively, are in their working years.  In New 
Zealand, 13.8% of working age adults is trying to launch new firms.  In Mexico, 12.4% are 
trying to get their start-up firms off the ground.  
Mexico and New Zealand are also very high in the Firm Entrepreneurial Activity 
(FEA) index, which measures whether existing businesses are considered entrepreneurial.  In 
New Zealand, 16.82% of existing firms are entrepreneurial firms while in Mexico 18.8% of 
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existing firms are entrepreneurial firms.  Table 1 provides the total population as well as 
estimates of the total number of individuals and business entities considered entrepreneurially 
active, established operating businesses, and entrepreneurial firms (those by our definition 
providing market innovation and hoping for growth).  Table 2 shows that Mexico and New 
Zealand are within a 3% of one another in overall TEA and thus are amongst the most 
entrepreneurially ranked countries in the world.  They both have high proportions of 
opportunity entrepreneurs.  Where they differ is in the rate of necessity entrepreneurship, 
where the Mexican rate is high while New Zealand’s is moderate-to-low.  
In 2002, 40 New Zealand experts and 40 Mexican experts in the field of 
entrepreneurship completed extensive questionnaires.  The limitation of this section is that 
these comments were made on Mexico in general and not on Sinaloa specifically.  Yet it is 
clear from the in-depth interviews that we can generalise from the country to the specific 
State.  Six significant differences are revealing:   
Regulation:  Mexicans suffer more regulation.  Compared to New Zealand, it is 
harder for new firms to get most of their required permits and licenses; taxes are a burden for 
new and growing firms; and government regulations are not applied to new and growing 
firms in a predictable and consistent way.  
Market openness: Mexicans suffer from a lack of openness.  For Mexican 
entrepreneurs, new and growing firms cannot afford the cost of market entry or enter markets 
without being unfairly blocked by established firms.  Anti-trust legislation is not effective and 
well enforced.   
Physical infrastructure: Entrepreneurs in Mexico has less access to available 
physical resources – communication, utilities, transportation, land, or space.    
Intellectual property: Compared to New Zealand, Mexican experts complain that 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) are not enforced; that illegal sales of ’pirated’ software, 
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videos, CDs, and other copyrighted or trademarked products is extensive; and that inventors’ 
rights are not respected.  
Female entrepreneurs: Mexican experts believe there are insufficient social services 
available for women to continue to work even after they start a family.  More than in New 
Zealand, starting a new business is not a socially acceptable career option for women.    
 
WHAT IS AN INNOVATION SYSTEM?  
Having provided a snapshot of these two countries from an entrepreneurial 
perspective, we now examine what is meant by innovation policy and by entrepreneurship 
policy.  
A commonly accepted definition has it that an innovation is the result of new or recent 
developments or applications inscience, technology or other knowledge areas, or the result of 
new combinations of existing technology. An innovation does not have to be new to the 
market, but rather new to a firm.  There are two forms of innovation: (1) Product innovation 
defined as new or significantly improved products (goods or services) offered by businesses 
to their customers; and (2) Process innovation identified as new or significantly improved 
production processes introduced by businesses, including new ways to supply services or 
deliver products (Statistics New Zealand, 2002).  
How might one characterise the New Zealand innovation system? New Zealand’s 
Minister of Research, Science and Technology has defined New Zealand’s innovation system 
as the “aggregation of those things that contribute to a nation’s ability to create or discover 
valuable knowledge and to deploy it widely, accurately and quickly” (Hodgson, 2002).  The 
components of New Zealand’s innovation system would include:    
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• Research, science and technology   • Fluid capital markets   
• The education system     • A robust Internet infrastructure  
• Protection of intellectual property, and  • Creative arts, design, and engineering 
  to see it as a new form of capital.   
• Linkages between science and society   
.• The immigration system    • A Futurewatch capacity  
• The ability to form international   • Basic research and public good  
   strategic alliances       research  
 
• A responsive Government led by 
   visionary politicians and state servants  
 
An innovation system exists to drive up the supply of commercialisable innovation, 
inventions and ideas. It requires an excellent basic infrastructure and responds to stimuli such 
as grants and incentives. Governments can and should invest in innovation.  New Zealand has 
studied innovation systems around the world and has designed one that fits its particularly 
circumstances.    
 
WHAT IS ENTREPRENEURSHIP POLICY?   
An entrepreneurship policy, in contrast, focuses on the human individual, not research 
institutes or small firms.  Some factors associated with generating more entrepreneurship are 
not easy for the Government to control.  Government cannot simply increase the percentage 
of young adults in the population, or raise the level of joblessness, income disparity, or 
unemployment (factors positively associated with the level of necessity entrepreneurship).  
One area where Government can assist in is increasing the supply of entrepreneurs willing, 
motivated, and with theproperskills to choose self-employmentand venture creation.  
This is quite different from Small Business Policy, which aims to create favourable 
economic conditions and to level the playing field, and Innovation Policy, which aims to 
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increase the supply of commercialisable products and services.  Small Business Policy means 
trying to adjust the R&D environment, the price signals, the finance and venture capital 
infrastructure and so forth.  Innovation Policy funds research and development of new 
innovative products and services.  Entrepreneurship Policy is an oft-overlooked leg of a three-
legged foundation of economic development.  
An economy needs an entrepreneurship policy focused on increasing the willingness 
and opportunity of real enterprising individuals to choose to become an entrepreneur.  The 
focus has to be on real people—their willingness, opportunities, and skills—as much as on 
getting the economic conditions right.  
Motivation to become an entrepreneur is largely affected by education and training, 
the availability of start-up capital, ease of entry into the market, whether a person is an 
immigrant, but also age, gender, education, regional location, employment, income level, 
wealth, prevalence of small firms, infrastructure endowment and history.  
Skills to become an entrepreneur become available to a person through 
entrepreneurship education in the schools, start-up training, mentoring, and networking 
initiatives.    
Opportunity to become an entrepreneur is based upon an individual decision as to 
whether self-employment is the best available career option.  It is affected by incentives such 
as profit and economic benefits; cultural support or sanctions; whether one comes from an 
entrepreneurial family; the social recognition of the entrepreneur; the relative security of the 
social safety net; and the security of being a “manager” instead of an “employer”.  (Adapted 
from Burnett (nd), van Praag & Van Ophem (1995), and Lundström & Stevenson (2000))   
As one Swedish study encapsulates it, “people must be motivated to explore 
entrepreneurship as an option, be able to acquire the knowledge, skills and ability to be able 
to pursue it, and be surrounded by the appropriate opportunity structure” (Lundström & 
Stevenson (2000, p. 12))  Policy intervention must take an integrated approach.  That’s why 
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the circles in Figure 1 overlap, because of the spill-over effects.  We have to take into account 
both the environmental conditions and the individual characteristics.  
 
EVOLUTION OF THE NEW ZEALAND INNOVATION SYSTEM  
New Zealand is a good country to do business in.  It has a competitive economic and 
business environment, a simple tax structure, low unemployment, robust growth, low 
inflation and no capital gains tax.  New Zealand public servants have been confirmed as 
amongst the most honest in the world (Transparency International, 2003).  Official 
information is largely free and accessible.  Public policy debates largely take place in the 
open and the governmental framework is flexible enough to adjust to shocks and periodic 
electoral re-direction.    
With population of 3.9 million and a land area about the size of the United Kingdom, 
New Zealand has a free trade association with Australia and a Closer Economic Partnership 
with Singapore. Exports total about US$ 10 billion and account for about 30% of the GDP.  
Exports come from dairy, meat, wood and wool as well as tourism, software and consultancy. 
Its four main markets are Australia, USA, UK, and Japan.  Mexico is its largest Latin 
American trade partner.  
New Zealand’s economy continues to be one of the best performers in the OECD.  
While growth has come off its 4.4% peak of early 2003, over the past four years, economic 
growth has averaged over 3.5% annually.  Unemployment has fallen to 4.3 percent, fourth 
lowest in the OECD.   
Despite this rosy news, New Zealand faces an historical economic dilemma that 
economists sometimes call the “Argentine disease” 1, or the decline of a once prosperous 
economy because the country’s per capita income has declined from among the highest in the 
world in the 1950s to just under the OECD average in 1970, to 26th in the OECD by 2004.  
As a result, New Zealand’s leaders have long articulated a goal of returning to the top half of 
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the OECD.  The objective of the Growth and Innovation Framework (GIF) is to return New 
Zealand to the top half of the OECD rankings.  
Innovation is constantly cited as a key factor in sustaining economic growth capable 
of competing successfully on the international stage.  The dominant thinking in Wellington is 
that driving up innovation will also drive up the economic growth rate.  Government policy 
has put great emphasis on innovation as the key to reversing the “Argentine disease” in New 
Zealand.  In fact, it is doing respectably albeit from a low base.   
The Lord of the Rings film trilogy may have boosted New Zealand’s reputation for 
innovation, but it reinforced what Kiwis—both indigenous Mäori as well as European New 
Zealanders—already knew about themselves as being “bloody innovative”.  Values such as 
resourcefulness, inventiveness, hard work and respect have always been part of what defines 
Kiwis—from the cow-cocky (dairy farmer) to the modern Waikato biotechnologist.  It is no 
accident that New Zealanders were the first to climb Mt Everest and to split the atom. Sir 
Edmund Hillary’s “We knocked the bastard off” and Sir Ernest Rutherford’s “We haven’t the 
money so we must think” are part of Kiwi innovation lore.    
European settlers developed a culture of innovation that stemmed from their 
remoteness to sources of tools and manufactured goods.  In the nineteenth century they had 
only a few of the tools necessary to carry on their trades as farmers and foresters. They had to 
be innovative or starve. They took up the challenge by modifying and adapting what little 
equipment could be imported from their remote homelands.  The conversion of New Zealand 
bush into farms created the need for a lot of fences. The preferred wire was known as 
“Number 8 gauge”, but it was also put to so many other uses that the “Number 8 wire 
mentality” now represents “Kiwi ingenuity,” a quality that was born out of isolation and lack 
of infrastructure in New Zealand’s early history.  
Mäori, New Zealand’s indigenous Polynesian inhabitants, also have a history of 
entrepreneurship and enterprise upon which to draw.  The Mäori Wars of 1860-1866 were 
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fuelled not only by the settler’s hunger for land but also because Mäori had become such 
successful entrepreneurs that they controlled a large share of the commerce throughout the 
country.  Mäori exported to Australia and various other countries, and to some degree Mäori 
entrepreneurial abilities were the subject of envy by Päkeha.  Mäori were also fervent 
adopters of technology.  Best known is the Mäori use of the muskets to the great cost of the 
settler forces. Less well known is the history of Mäori adaptation of European agriculture and 
shipping methods as well as their rapid adoption of books and use of publishing.   
New Zealand innovation policy has been well informed by developments in the 
OECD, the European Union and APEC in the fields of research and policy.2  Important 
policy initiatives of the present Labour-Progressive coalition government and the previous 
liberal National government have contributed greatly to today’s Innovation Policy.3  
The present government, elected in late 1999, saw that a more interventionist attitude 
was needed to ramp up innovation.  This manifested itself in the creation in 2000 of the 
Science and Innovation Advisory Council to raise public esteem for science; promote a long 
term strategic direction for research science and technology; build private sector 
commitment; and co-ordinate Government policies with business and the community.  
Innovation thus became (with social, environmental and economic policies) one of the four 
major government goals.    
One of the first problems was that, aside from the science and technology sectors, 
innovation was not a top priority. Innovation champions were few in number.  SIAC also 
realised that what was required was culture change that takes time, effort and a lot of money.  
Government priorities had previously not focussed on innovation and R&D per se.  Public 
and media attitudes were unhelpful.  The public tended to prefer an expose on medical 
malpractice over news of a medical breakthrough.  The business community was more 
focused on reducing compliance costs than on innovation, and the whole economy was more 
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focussed on tangible products such as wood and sheep than on intangible products such as 
software and film as the real future business drivers.    
In part stimulated by the work of the Science and Innovation Advisory Council, the 
Government set out to design an innovation policy that was relevant to New Zealanders and 
capable of accelerating economic growth.  Prime Minister Helen Clark articulated the 
government’s approach to economic development in the February 2002 document Growing 
an Innovative New Zealand and the policy is usually referred to as the Growth and Innovation 
Framework, or GIF (Prime Minister Helen Clark 2002).  GIF built on interventionist 
economic development policies that the government had put in place between 2000 and 2002, 
and on other public and private sector thinking about how best to lift New Zealanders’ living 
standards.   
 
Strengthening the innovation system  
New Zealanders look at innovation as a system of interconnected organisations and 
institutionsthat influence the development, diffusion and use of innovations.  Quite in contrast 
to the previous liberal National government, the Labour-Progressive coalition government 
recognised that it had a key role to play in supporting New Zealand’s innovation system.  
Science and research spending is now up by 45% over the past five years, with a good 
proportion of it going out to the private sector.    
 
Developing skills and talents  
As many as 40% of adults do not have all of the foundation competencies needed to 
fully participate in a knowledge society. Driving up educational participation is essential and 
New Zealanders have a high rate of tertiary participation by international standards. As a 
remote country with a small population, New Zealand must also strike a skills balance 
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between education and immigration.  Immigration can contribute to economic growth if 
migrants are able to bring skills that are not readily available.   
 
Increasing international connection  
For a country as isolated as New Zealand, international connection is essential to drive 
innovation, improved productivity, and economic growth.  These linkages include the 
international flows of goods and services, people, investment, information, ideas, knowledge, 
technology and culture.  They help the country’s entrepreneurs exploit commercial 
opportunities, access new markets, and exploit economies of scale.  They help build 
management expertise and give access to larger pools of skilled labour and capital.    
 
Engaging with sectors  
Groups of firms (known as clusters or industry sectors) often have issues in common 
that affect their opportunities for growth.  Engaging with sectors enables the government to 
identify and tackle sector-specific problems.  In May 2002, the government established four 
taskforces for biotechnology; information and communications technology (ICT); design; and 
screen production. These sectors were singled out because of their high growth potential.   
 
If New Zealand has no entrepreneurship policy, whence do we take hope?   
New Zealand has its small business policy and its innovation policy in place. But we 
argue for the need to pay more attention to the needs of enterprising individuals. This is the 
difference (or the complementarity) of innovation and entrepreneurship.  Small business 
policy gets the economic conditions right.  Innovation policy drives up the rate of 
commercialisable innovations.  But entrepreneurship policy focuses on individual behaviour, 
motivation, skills and opportunity.    
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ENTREPRENEURSHIP POLICIES IN SINALOA, MEXICO  
The author participated in an extensive qualitative, case study data collection exercise 
with a team of five OECD experts to examine entrepreneurship policies and achievements in 
the Mexican State of Sinaloa.  The report A Review of Entrepreneurship in Sinaloaappeared 
in October 2004 and is available from the OECD (2004).    
Sinaloa is one of the smaller states in Mexico occupying 58,000 km2 along the Pacific 
Coast.  Nonetheless, it contains fully 40% of the country’s entire fresh water and is lush in 
valleys, dams, agriculture, rivers, and diverse microclimates.  Due to its immigration history, 
the 2.5 million inhabitants have a risk-taking spirit. Beginning with capital-intensive and 
perilous mining industries in the 1800s, its mixture of predominantly Spanish and other 
European peoples are individualistic and compete strongly with their neighbours.  The 
turbulent weather and markets have helped them to be risk-tolerant.  Being a failed 
entrepreneur in Sinaloa is no stigma as recessions, depressions and banking failures have 
delivered the levelling blow of bankruptcy to virtually everyone at one time or another.    
Unlike in New Zealand, where they are the dominant discourse, the words 
“innovation” and “innovation policy” are rarely heard in Sinaloa. “Entrepreneurship policy” 
is the name of the game in Sinaloa.  The state government, through the Secretariat of the 
Economic Development, has made a commitment to nurture and support an entrepreneurial 
culture and economy in the state.  
Sinaloan entrepreneurship policy arose out of the crisis of the mid-nineties.  For 
Sinaloa, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) meant considerable economic 
collapse, since its industries were no longer protected.  Sinaloa realised early on that neither 
the economic reforms of the eighties and nor the commercial opening to the United States in 
the nineties could were going to help it.  Open to competition from more competitive firms in 
places such as Florida, agriculture production lost yield; food imports led to bankruptcy of 
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many agribusinesses.  It became quickly apparent that Sinaloa had to “de-commodify” itself 
and to change its heavy dependence on commodity exports.    
Sinaloan economic policy of present period can be summarised in four points:  
 • More and better jobs.   • More and better entrepreneurs.    
 • More and better firms.   • Add value to commodity production.    
 
As the State Secretary of Economic Development, Heriberto Felix Guerra says:  
We had to drive up the entrepreneurial spirit and convert Sinaloa into a land of 
entrepreneurs.  We had to changepeople’s mentalities from ‘Make themgive me a 
job’ to‘Let them help me create a job’. Paternalism was the cause of our poverty.  If 
yougive them hand-outs, they lose their dignity, theirspiritof entrepreneurship.  
 
In Sinaloa, a driving-sector company (empresas tractoras) is one that that drives or 
pushes economic activity by creating jobs, attracting investment (see Figure 2).  It is also a 
vehicle for other companies to commercialise their own products and/or services, thereby 
developing themselves as local suppliers to strengthen the internal market.   
The Sinaloan model goes like this:  The Top 100 Sinaloan companies provide 20% of 
the jobs in the state while the top 500 provide 42%.  Beneath them are the small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) and the micro-businesses.  At the base are the young entrepreneurs 
(Jovenes Emprendedores) who are the source of micro-enterprises.  So there is a critical 
relationship between the Driving-sector Companies, those companies underlying them that 
supply goods and services, and young entrepreneurs.    
Young entrepreneurs are at the base of the Sinaloan model of economic development, 
so education is a critical element in growth. This Jóvenes Emprendedores (Young 
Entrepreneurs) programme is now a requirement for 90% of undergraduate students in 
Sinaloa.  Sinaloan officials travelled as far away as Australia and Canada searching for a 
system to train young entrepreneurs.  They found it in their own backyard, at the Tec de 
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Monterrey (Instituto Technologico de Estudio Superiores de Monterrey or ITESM).  Tec may 
have the largest undergraduate entrepreneurship programme in the world.  Every 
undergraduate (19,000) must have “Development of Entrepreneurs” in 7th semester.  There 
are 120 lecturers who teach this single course and there is a highly developed pedagogy to 
train these lecturers.  Students may also choose a “Specialisation in Entrepreneurship”, which 
means that they have to have their business up and running in order to graduate.  There are 
the requisite incubators, business plan competitions, and capital funds to make this possible. 
The Jóvenes Emprendedores initiative is unprecedented at the tertiary level in Sinaloa, but at 
the global level as well.  It underlies a strong commitment towards creation of an 
entrepreneurial culture in the State of Sinaloa.    
Here we described some of the important entrepreneurship policy initiatives that are 
described in greater detail elsewhere (see OECD, 2004).    
 
Regulatory Reform  
Through its Law on Enterprise Management and the Regulatory Reform (Ley de 
Gestión Empresarial y Reforma Regulatoria), the State of Sinaloa is one of the leaders 
amongst the states in streamlining regulations and formalities from multiple regulators and 
layers of government, which all acknowledged have greatly slowed down business 
responsiveness, hampered market entry, reduced innovation and job creation, promoted the 
informal economy and corruption, and generally discouraged entrepreneurship.  The 
importance to entrepreneurs of this simplification in administrative proceedings cannot be 
overemphasised.  It used to take months to start a new company.  Now the processes typically 
takes less than eight hours, making Sinaloa one of the leading States legislating on enterprise 
management, speedy firm creation, use of the Internet, and the recognition of electronic 
signatures.   
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Finance mechanisms  
Fondo Sinaloa de Fomento Empresarial (Red FOSIN), the Sinaloan Fund for 
Enterprise Development Network, is a network of “one-stop shops” for financial services.  
The network provides micro- and SMEs with needs assessment, training, assistance with 
business planning, access to financing, linkages with business partners and opportunities, and 
continued followup with the entrepreneur.  FOSIN Advances (FOSIN Avanza) works at a 
higher level, with loan sizes ranging from $500,000 - $4,500,000 pesos.  FOSIN Woman 
(FOSIN Mujer) is a new micro- and SME financing project with capital of 2 million pesos 
and loans ranging from $20,000 - $50,000 pesos.  FOSIN Emprende, with $2 million pesos in 
capital, is connected with the university entrepreneurship program and targets 
microenterprises in the start-up phase with loans between $20,000-$50,000 pesos.    
 
Mi Tienda  
Mi Tienda is a program of the government of Sinaloa that provides business 
development services and small loans to owners of so-called “abarrotes.”  Abarrotes are very 
small grocery stores found in just about every neighbourhood or village in Mexico (“dairies” 
in New Zealand).  Abarrotes are family-owned and operated.  Mi Tienda is a component of a 
larger economic development plan by the government of Sinaloa to promote 
entrepreneurship.  Although a single abarrote by itself not significant, in the aggregate they 
form an important sector of the Sinaloan (and Mexican) economy.  Abarrotes moreover, 
purchase a high percentage of inventory from local producers, such that in the aggregate they 
comprise a large and vital component of demand for locally produced goods.    
 
The Prosper Foundation  
Fundación Prospera (Prosper Foundation) is a group of socially conscious 
entrepreneurs motivated by the desire to use private sector principles to solve social problems 
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in the state.  The mission of the Prosper Foundation is to “raise the quality of personal and 
community lives of foundation participants, create an entrepreneurial culture, and promote 
investment in high-quality projects through (a) micro-credit and savings schemes and (b) 
capacity building and technical assistance to small business owners.”  All clients of the 
Prosper Foundation are micro-entrepreneurs.  The typical client lives in a larger city; is self-
employed; is a woman (70% of clients); runs a family-based business in the industry, service, 
or commerce sectors; and does not keep written accounts.  Foundation officials estimate that 
60% of clients are poor.  
 
DISCUSSION  
One of the biggest differences between the two economies is the stress put on 
innovation OR entrepreneurship.  New Zealand is still quite caught in “innovation-speak”.  
From the Prime Minister down through the business chambers, the greatest effort is made to 
drive up innovation.  Policy and media discourse focus on it.  In contrast, the word innovation 
is hardly mentioned in Sinaloa.  There from the minister on down the emphasis in on creating 
more and better entrepreneurs.  Every campaign, every slogan, every government programme 
focuses on entrepreneurship and takes innovation as a given.  
This is perhaps the bottom line that differentiates the two countries.  In New Zealand, 
government policy emphasise innovation above all else.  In Sinaloa, entrepreneurship is the 
driving policy to raise the level of economic performance and to raise the standard of living 
for everyone.  
 
NEW ZEALAND LESSONS FOR SINALOA  
A Google search for “innovacion en Sinaloa” turns up just one document while a 
search for “emprendedores AND sinaloa” reveals more than six hundred.  While both New 
Zealand and Sinaloa need to drive up their respective living standards, it is clear that they 
Howard Frederick: Entrepreneurship OR Innovation Policy: Comparative Practices in New 
Zealand and Sinaloa, Mexico 
 260
have chosen two differing ways of doing so.  New Zealand has focused its efforts on 
innovation while Sinaloa emphasises entrepreneurship.  While the OECD study panel was 
impressed at the size and scope of the entrepreneurship policies in the State of Sinaloa, it 
expressed its concern that these policies were not interconnected with a clearly stated policy 
on how to accelerate the rate of innovation in the State.  In addition to robust 
entrepreneurshipand small business policies, Sinaloa needs an innovation policyfocused on 
ramping up the number of commercialisable products and services.    
New Zealand has an ever-increasing supply of new services and products that could 
be attract to the global marketplace, yet its supply of entrepreneurs cannot keep the pace.  
Meanwhile, research & development is very low in Sinaloa due to barriers to innovation.  
These barriers include protectionism, barriers to trade, low levels of education and so forth.  
Sinaloa cannot rely on business to fund innovation since the market has several defects in 
relation to innovation.  The free market system in Sinaloa simply does not produce sufficient 
innovation. That is why the entrepreneurs in Sinaloa need extra-market institutions to reduce 
the inherent flaws in private sector innovation development.  This of course includes the 
education system which generates Human Capital.  It also includes government programmes 
to fund private innovation and to protect intellectual property rights.  It embraces as well the 
development of high-quality ICT networks, universities and research institutes.  Coordination 
amongst the key partners is essential.  A Sinaloan Innovation System is an essential element 
in the economic growth strategy.  Not only does the State need more and better entrepreneurs; 
these entrepreneurs need more and better innovative products and services to take to the 
market.   
We could say that Sinaloa suffers from a dysfunctional innovation system. 
Universities absorb huge quantities of resources and do not produce the kinds of products and 
services that are relevant to entrepreneurs.  Nor do universities have a strong connection with 
business such that entrepreneurs can quickly take innovations to the marketplace.  
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Universities do not have a pricing motivation that ensures cooperation with the private sector.  
There are information asymmetries and it is difficult to monitor contract fulfillment.  
Coordination between research institutes and the private sector is lacking.  
Drawing upon the New Zealand experience, Sinaloa must cross the tipping point from 
entrepreneurship to innovation.  Key initiatives to increase the speed of innovation 
development should include:  
• Strategic research to improve the    • Support for networks with leading 
competitiveness of Sinaloan industries    global businesses  
• Research projects co-ordinated by    • Acceleration of clusters to tackle state-
funded research institutes with    sector-specific problems. Private 
sector participation      • An inventory of transport, energy,  
• Support for students and researchers to   telecommunications and water  
carry out R&D within companies     infrastructure  
• Long-term funding for research    • R&D projects to enable firms to  
institutes  develop high-value, technology-based and 
• An Innovation Policy Advisory Board  export-oriented products, processes  
to engage with business and    or services 
community partners   • Subsidies to support the placement of  
• Trade promotional activities to help  researchers or technologists in firms to  
Sinaloans bring their products to    build linkages and enhance 
international markets      understanding of technological 
• Funding to boost efforts to attract    innovation in a commercial  
high quality investment to Sinaloa    environment 
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It is clear that the Sinaloan government is committed to transforming its economy and 
society into one that is prosperous, sustainable, socially inclusive, knowledge-based, and 
innovative.   
The State has developed an entrepreneurship policy of which it can be proud and 
which can serve as a strategic beacon for other countries.  Yet it is clear that Sinaloa has a 
great need to raise the importance of other aspects of its economy and society to complement 
its excellent entrepreneurship policy.  These are the “New Zealand lessons for Sinaloa”:  that 
innovation policy can help gear the economy for growth.  Unless a Sinaloan Innovation 
System is stimulated, it will have major problems.  Turning the corner from entrepreneurship 
policy to include a strong innovation policy seems to be the logical next step for a prudent 
and progressive government.  
 
MEXICAN LESSONS FOR NEW ZEALAND  
Compared to Sinaloa, in New Zealand there has been little movement on promoting a 
government policy to increase the supply of entrepreneurs.  The political parties have no 
policy directly addressing entrepreneurs. Neither the private nor public sector supports 
entrepreneurship benchmarking research.  Even entrepreneurs themselves are too busy to 
advocate for a lobbying group.  
Based on the Sinaloan experience, it is clear that New Zealand needs to stimulate the 
economic and social environment so that enterprising New Zealanders can raise their game, 
develop and add value to their innovations for the benefit of the country as a whole.  Sinaloan 
entrepreneurship policy shows that it is possible to foster favourable conditions in which 
working people can create prosperity through sustainable growth-oriented businesses.  New 
Zealand needs to create supportive and opportunistic environments for potential entrepreneurs 
to acquire resources and to assist these resourceful people gain those essential skills through 
the school system, via start-up training, mentoring, and other initiatives.  It needs to create 
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incentives, provide cultural support and social recognition for people who want, and can, 
create workplace settings for others.  
True entrepreneurs are people who habitually create and innovate to build something 
of recognised value around perceived opportunities (Bolton & Thompson, 2000).  Yet New 
Zealand’s entrepreneurs are not creating enough new wealth.  Joe and Jill Entrepreneur 
typically operate a 6-person lifestyle firm in the Auckland area servicing the internal market. 
They are not the kind of export-oriented, dynamic firm that can exploit innovative venture 
opportunities and increase the size of the cake. They would rather exploit existing equilibrium 
opportunities and optimise supply and demand in established markets rather than exploit 
innovative venture opportunities and create new markets at home and abroad.  
From this comparative analysis, it is clear that current New Zealand government 
policy represents two legs of a three-legged chair:  Get the macro-economic conditions right 
and then introduce new resources and technologies for innovation.  Yet it pays no heed to real 
people who would like to choose self-employment, create wealth on behalf of all, and 
commercialise innovations.  The problem is that an innovation uncommercialised is an 
innovation wasted, and entrepreneurs are the people who exploit innovation.  But true 
entrepreneurs are a very scarce resource.    
How to increase the supply of true entrepreneurs? Based on the Sinaloan experience 
of entrepreneurship policy together with other international best practices, there are three 
areas which, in enacted, would show that entrepreneurship policy is being taken seriously in 
New Zealand.    
A National Commission on Entrepreneurship provides policy makers and leaders with 
roadmap of how to sustain and expand a flourishing entrepreneurial economy, focuses public 
policy on the role of entrepreneurship in the national economy and articulates policies that 
will foster its continued growth.  The Speech from the Throne (annual “state of the nation”) 
makes statements about entrepreneurship.  Acts of Parliament provide specific authorities for 
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entrepreneurship policy focus.  The Government might wish to issue a White Paper on 
Entrepreneurship Policy. The annual budget establishes Entrepreneurship policy with stated 
objectives and designates budget for policy measures.  
GEM research shows that New Zealand ranks poorly (with most of the rest of the 
world) in primary and secondary schools providing adequate attention to entrepreneurship 
and new venture creation.  Only the USA and Canada stand out in teaching entrepreneurship 
to young students.  Nor are New Zealand universities and polytechnics giving adequate 
attention to entrepreneurship courses and programmes.  They are mostly focused on creating 
good managers rather than employers (Frederick et al., 2002).    
Universities need to come together in the areas of entrepreneurship and 
commercialisation.  The goal is to identify ways to work together and attract government 
funding to build the capabilities of each of the universities in these areas.  Entrepreneurship 
education in Sinaloa has experienced tremendous growth, yet in New Zealand only one 
tertiary offers a postgraduate entrepreneurship programme.  Entrepreneurship education is 
different from management education just as business entry is different than business 
management.  Entrepreneurship education includes training in negotiating, leading high-
growth companies, new product development, opportunity analysis, and commercialisation of 
technologies, creative thinking and the challenges associated with venture development.  We 
must train employers not employees.  New Zealand’s public and private sectors need to 
recognise entrepreneurs through award programs, through young entrepreneurs organizations 
and through a campaign to persuade more young people to consider starting a business.  
Just as Sinaloa targets corner store owners, students, women, and micro-businesses, it 
would be strategic for New Zealand to target youth and ethnicities in order to stimulate higher 
levels of entrepreneurial activity within them.  In particular, women must be encouraged to 
pursue the dream of running a business.  Evidence of targeting would be resource centres, 
award programs, and entrepreneurial networks by demographic category.  
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CONCLUSION  
This paper compares two very different economies, New Zealand and the State of 
Sinaloa in Mexico.  Although they are separated by 6,000 km of Pacific Ocean and have 
vastly different populations, both are known for liberal economic reforms and competitive 
orientations.  Both have a high level of entrepreneurial activity, but both are also filled with 
low-aspiration entrepreneurs and low wealth-creating micro-businesses.    
From a comparative policy perspective, New Zealand emphasises innovation to the 
exclusion of entrepreneurship, while Sinaloa does just the reverse.  Both sides have 
something to learn from the other.   
The size and scope of entrepreneurship policies in the State of Sinaloa is impressive.  
But it also needs an innovation policyfocused on ramping up the number of commercialisable 
products and services.  It must turn the corner on entrepreneurship policy and greatly 
accelerate its innovation policy.  
In contrast, New Zealand has no policy to increase the supply of entrepreneurs.  It is 
clear that New Zealand must change the economic and social environment so that 
enterprising New Zealanders can raise their game, develop and add value to their innovations 
for the benefit of the country as a whole.   
If one considers a sound foundation for economic development might be represented 
by the humble three-legged chair, then there are three policies that make up that foundation:  
Small business policy, innovation policy, and entrepreneurship policy.  From this 
comparative analysis, Sinaloa and New Zealand operate with a wobbly two-legged 
foundation.  Both have a robust small business policy in place to even the playing field and to 
get the factor conditions right for business.  While New Zealand the macro-economic 
conditions right and then introduce new resources and technologies for innovation, it does not 
focus on real people who would like to choose self-employment. Similarly, while Sinaloa has 
made huge strides in getting the conditions right for business and in promoting 
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entrepreneurship, without a concerted effort to increase the level of innovation, its 
entrepreneurs are going to have an even playing field but no innovations to take to the 
market.  
Entrepreneurship and innovation are seen as complementary phenomena that must go 
hand in hand. An innovation uncommercialised is an innovation wasted, and entrepreneurship 
is thus considered to be the commercialisation of innovation.  A prosperous economy must 
get the three-legged chair of small business policy together with both innovation policy AND 
entrepreneurship policy.  Only then will the foundation for growth be sound.    
 
 
REFERENCES  
 
Aghion, P., & Howitt, P. (1992). A Model of Growth through Creative Destruction. 
Econometrica,60(2), 323-351.  
APEC Economic Committee (1999), Building the Future ofAPEC Economies, Move Forward 
on the New Economy and Entrepreneurship 
http://www.apecsec.org.sg/pubs/freepubs.html#1999  
Bolton, B & Thompson, J. (2000). Entrepreneurs: Talent, Temperament, Technique. 
Butterworth-Heinemann.   ISBN: 0750661283  
Burnett, D (nd), Hunting for Heffalumps -- The Supply of Entrepreneurship and Economic 
Development [Web Page]. Available at: 
http://www.technopreneurial.com/articles/heffalump.asp   
DeBondt, R. (1997). Spillovers and innovative activities. Journal of Industrial Organization, 
15, 1-29.  
Ethier, W. J. (1982). National and International Returns to Scale in the Modern Theory of 
International Trade. American Economic Review,72 , 389-405.  
European Commission (1998), Fostering Entrepreneurship in Europe:  Priorities for the 
Future. Communication fromthe Commission to theCouncil, Brussels, 07.04;   
European Commission (2000), Report on the Implementation of the Action Plan to Promote 
Entrepreneurship and Competitiveness. Brussels, 27.10.2000, SEC (2000). 1925-
Vol.1;   
Frederick, H., Carswell, P., Henry, E., Chaston, I., Thompson, J., Campbell, J., & Pivac, A. 
(2002). Bartercard New Zealand Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 2002.  Auckland: 
UNITEC Institute of Technology.  
3rd International GET UP Workshop on University Based Start-Ups 
29 – 31 October 2004, Jena 
 267
Frederick, H. (Ed.). (2004). Global Entrepreneurship Monitor New Zealand 2003: a Study of 
New Zealand Entrepreneurs. UNITEC School of Management & Entrepreneurship 
Research Report Series,Vol. 3, No. 1. Auckland: UNITEC Institute of Technology.  
Grossman, G. M., & Helpman, E. (1991). Innovation and growthin the globaleconomy. 
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.  
Grossman, G. M., & Helpman, E. (1993). Endogenous innovation in the theory of growth 
(NBER working paper series ; no. 4527. National Bureau of Economic Research.  
Hon Pete Hodgson, “Exploring Innovation”, Fifth Richard Dean Batt Memorial Lecture, 
Massey University, Palmerston North 12 September 2002 
http://imbs.massey.ac.nz/HTML/dean_batt5.html  
Information Technology Advisory Committee (1999).  NewZealand's Knowledge Economy. 
Authored by Howard H. Frederick and Donald J. McIlroy. Wellington: Ministry of 
Commerce, 1999. ISBN 0-478-23435-X 
http://www.med.govt.nz/pbt/infotech/knowledge_economy/  
Knuckey, S, Johnston, H. with Campbell-Hunt, C., Carlaw, K., Corbett, L., & Massey, C. 
(2002).Firm Foundations– AStudyof New Zealand BusinessPractices and 
Performance. Wellington: Ministry of Economic Development. Retrieved from 
www.med.govt.nz/irdev/ind_dev/firm-foundations/  
Lois Stevenson (1996), The Implementation ofan EntrepreneurshipDevelopment Strategyin 
Canada: The Caseof the AtlanticRegion. OECD in cooperation with Atlantic Canada 
Opportunities Agency, Paris, 1996. http://collection.nlc-bnc.ca/100/200/301/acoa-
apeca/implementation_eds-e/oecd.pdf  
Lundström, A., & Stevenson, L. (2001). Pa  erns and TrendsinEntrepreneurship/SME Policy 
and Practice in TenEconomies(Volume 3 of the Entrepreneurship Policy for the 
Future Series). Stockholm: Swedish Foundation for Small Business Research.  
Ministry of Research, Science and Technology (1999), Blueprint for Change: Government's 
PoliciesandProcedures for ItsResearch, Science and TechnologyInvestments. 
Wellington: Ministry of Research, Science and Technology 
http://www.govt.nz/urn.php?id=3223; OECD (1995), ThematicOverview 
ofEntrepreneurship and Job CreationPolicies. Paris.  
OECD (2001), Drivers ofGrowth: Information Technology, InnovationandEntrepreneurship. 
Paris.  
OECD (2004). AReviewof EntrepreneurshipinSinaloa, Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (OECD), Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social 
Affairs, Local Economic and Employment Development Programme (LEED), 
October 2004 (in press)  
Prime Minister Helen Clark (2002), Growingan InnovativeNewZealand 
http://www.executive.govt.nz/minister/clark/innovate/  
Ministry of Economic Development. (2003). Growthand Innovation Framework:Benchmark 
Indicators Report 2003. Wellington: Ministry of Economic Development. Retrieved 
from www.med.govt.nz/irdev/econ_dev/growth-innovation/ benchmark-
indicators.pdf.  
Rivera-Batiz, L. A., & Romer, P. M. (1991). Economic Integration and Endogenous Growth. 
QuarterlyJournal of Economics,CVI(425), 531-555.  
Howard Frederick: Entrepreneurship OR Innovation Policy: Comparative Practices in New 
Zealand and Sinaloa, Mexico 
 268
Romer, P. M. (1986). Increasing Returns and Long-run Growth. Journalof Political 
Economy,94(5), 1002-37.  
Romer, P. M. (1990). Endogenous Technological Change. Journal of PoliticalEconomy, 
98(5), 71-102.  
Romer, P. M. (1994). The Origins of Endogenous Growth. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
8(1), 3-22.  
Schumpeter, J. A., & Opie, R. (1936). The theoryof economic development:an inquiryinto 
profits, capital,credit, interest, andthe businesscycle(Harvard economic studies ; v. 
XLVI . Cambridge: Harvard University Press.  
Science and Innovation Advisory Council (2001), New Zealanders: Innovators To The 
World. Turning Great Ideas Into Great Ventures. A Proposed Innovation Framework 
for New Zealand. Wellington: Science and Innovation Advisory Council 
http://www.siac.govt.nz/innovation.html  
Solow, R. M. (1956). A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth. Quarterly Journal 
of Economics,70(1), 65-94.  
Statistics New Zealand (2002). Innovation in New Zealand 2001, Wellington, New Zealand 
ISBN 0-478-26905-6  
Stevenson, L & A. Lundström (2001). Entrepreneurship Policy For The Future:  Best Practice 
Components.  Keynote Presentation at the 46th World Conference of the International 
Council for Small Business, Taipei, ROC.  Swedish Foundation for Small Business 
Research (FSF)  
The Knowledge Wave Trust. http://www.knowledgewave.org.nz/  
Transparency International (2003).  Corruption Perceptions Index.  Retrieved from 
http://www.transparency.org/  
van Praag, C. Mirijam & Hans Van Ophem, "Determinants of Willingness and Opportunity to 
Start as an Entrepreneur," Kyklos, 1995, 48:4, 513-40   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3rd International GET UP Workshop on University Based Start-Ups 
29 – 31 October 2004, Jena 
 269
FIGURES 
 
 
Table 1 New Zealand and Mexico Comparison  
NAME NEW ZEALAND MEXICO  
Data 2002-2003  2002  
Total Population: 2003 3,951,307  104,907,991  
Total Population 18-64 Years Old: 2003 2,464,399  58,634,254  
TEA Rate [2002-2003] 13.8  12.4  
Number of Persons Involved in Start-ups 340,110  7,270,079  
Number of Startup Firms 179,159  3,905,636  
Number of ownermanagers of Existing Firms 521,796  8,697,117  
Number of Existing Firms 273,665  4,694,624  
Number Owner-Managers of Entrepreneurial Firms 90,378  1,450,761  
Number of Entrepreneurial Firms 46,036  880,485  
Entrepreneurial firms per 18-64 Years Old 1.87%  1.50%  
Entrepreneurial Firms per Total Firms 16.82%  18.76%  
 
 
 
 
Table 2 New Zealand and Mexico, 2001-2003, Total Entrepreneurial Activity, % of the adult 
population  
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Figure 1: Entrepreneurship policy creation model  
 
 
Figure 2: Driving Sector Companies in Sinaloa 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________ 
1
 Although these days Argentina is considered to be a developing country, in 1929 it was as rich as any 
large country in Europe.  
2 See especially APEC Economic Committee (1999); European Commission (1998); European 
Commission (2000); Stevenson (1996);  
Lundström & Stevenson (2001); OECD (1995); and OECD (2001). 
3 See for example Ministry of Research, Science and Technology (1999); Information Technology 
Advisory Committee (1999); Science and Innovation Advisory Council (2001); Prime Minister Helen 
Clark (2002); Knuckey et al. (2002).  
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Summary 
This paper describes the lifespan of a start-up e-fulfillment service provider for market 
leading retailers and manufacturers that adopted a first to market strategy based on a high 
technology business model.  The company was founded by an international group of 
investors with substantial technology experience and networks in Silicon Valley, other 
“technology hot spots”, and academia.  It was built to provide comprehensive information 
technology, distribution, and customer response services for market leading retailers and 
manufacturers.  It was capitalized with over $320 million in seed capital; chaired by one of 
the major contributors to the Fisher College of Business Entrepreneurship Center at the 
nearby Ohio State University; employed “best in class” hardware and software; and was hired 
by international high-end, brand sensitive clients.  Despite operational successes, the 
company was dissolved at the end of 2003.  The paper will review the lessons learned during 
the company’s 5-year life and the potential relevance of these experiences to other 
technology/knowledge-based start-up ventures. 
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Business Strategy 
 
In the late 1990s existing low technology fulfillment and customer service solutions were 
considered inadequate to meet the high velocity and rapidly growing business volumes of 
online retailers for the service levels, quality, and speed of delivery demanded by online 
customers.  Existing capabilities had been built either to support catalogue sales or to 
replenish traditional brick and mortar retailer inventories.  These capabilities were labor 
intense and relatively unsophisticated operations and the industry was fragmented. 
 
Sales and revenue projections for online retailers were increasing at an exponential rate and, 
with the exception of fulfillment and customer service functions, barriers to entry were 
relatively low.  By providing a high technology, comprehensive infrastructure for online 
retailers that provided a quick, adaptable, inexpensive solution for fulfillment and customer 
service, this last barrier could be removed and online retailers could focus on core functions 
such as merchandising, marketing, and sales.  Such a capability would also stimulate 
additional growth from new online entrants that had a way to address the last barriers to 
entry. 
 
SODC was built to fill this growing industry niche.  The strategy was straightforward:  
1) Build out a high tech infrastructure as fast as possible using state of the art 
hardware and software that would be expensive and disruptive for existing 
business models and new entrants to replicate. 
2)  Rapidly attract a critical mass of high brand sensitive clients to cover costs and 
provide a cash flow to support additional infrastructure growth.  High brand 
sensitive clients were targeted because the price points of their products increased 
the value of each order and increased contribution margins.  Additionally, market 
research evidenced that highly brand sensitive clients had an affluent customer 
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base short on discretionary time, intolerant of delays, and willing to use online 
retailers to bypass traditional channels. 
3) Reinvest in further rapid build out to capture an increasing market share in a 
growing industry.  The underlying philosophy was:  
a. High technology would foster high productivity. 
b. High productivity would lead to lower unit costs. 
c. Lower unit costs would attract increased volumes of business. 
d. Higher volumes of business would produce higher gross profits. 
 
Company Overview 
Founded in May of 1999, SODC was the first company of its kind to offer a comprehensive, 
integrated platform for businesses that included IT, technology integration, customer response 
management, brand management, fulfillment, and logistics management.  Designed from the 
ground up to meet the needs of businesses moving products through multiple channels, 
SODC  provided its clients with a major competitive advantage by ensuring total integration 
of all business-critical operations.  While other companies adapted legacy systems to offer 
fulfillment services, only SODC delivered a complete system that encompassed all points of 
customer contact. 
The company was built on innovation, vision and a commitment to excellence.  In fact, it was 
a pioneer in the design, development and implementation of state-of-the-art technology, 
facilities automation and best practices that supported the customer services and distribution 
needs of a variety of retailers and cataloguers.  
Its ultimate mission was to be the leading provider of outsourced and consulting solutions for 
multi-channel retailers, manufacturers, and distributors.  It accomplished this by leveraging 
state of the art infrastructure and business practices that were developed and refined based on 
experience with leading global brand named companies. 
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The Business Model 
Key Processes 
SODC was able to handle all inbound customer transactions in one of its two customer 
response centers (Melbourne, FL and Columbus, OH).  In these two centers, it handled 
phone, web, catalog, email and fax orders in the manner that our clients outlined.  Each client 
could tailor its protocols to meet the client’s unique customer requirements. The company 
became an extension of each client’s organization through a combination of training and 
systems support.  To the end user, the client’s customer, this interaction was entirely seamless 
and it was their belief that they were dealing directly with a client representative – not an 
outsource service provider. 
 
Once an order was received, it was transmitted to one of two distribution centers located in 
Memphis, TN and Columbus, OH for processing.  The company consistently beat customer 
and client expectations for the timely processing of orders.  For instance, all ground orders 
received in the company’s system by 6 AM would be shipped the same day – something very 
few of the company’s competitors can achieve to this day.  And, more impressively, SODC 
was able to ship all expedited orders received in its system by 2 PM on the same day as well. 
 
Brand Management 
The one thing that allowed SODC to create loyal and committed partnerships with clients was 
the level of service and support clients received across the organization. While competitors all 
offered some level of account management, SODC took it to a higher level and provided a 
true business consultant relationship with internal advocates for every client. 
Each client was assigned a primary point of contact from the Brand Management team.  This 
team member ensured that all client needs and concerns were addressed.  To accomplish this 
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seamless focus on each client’s brand, the Brand team worked with the other functional areas 
of SODC to ensure that there were always open lines of communication and proper focus was 
provided on key issues. 
 
Information Technology 
The company developed a patent pending integrated “middleware” solution that brought 
together, in a creative hub and spoke architecture, a host of “best of breed” solutions.  The 
architecture of the system allowed for most processes, including inventory updates, to be 
handled in real time.  Orders could literally be ready to pick in the distribution center within 
one hour of placement on the website.   
The SODC Electronic Commerce Outsourcing System 
• Integrated all distribution channels 
• Web, catalog, call center (phone), brick and mortar 
• $50 million technology investment 
• Software, hardware platform, client integration, catalog / web / distribution / data 
warehouse capabilities. 
• Flexibility to link to disparate client systems 
• Integrated to customer environments 
• Scalable to 500,000 transactions daily 
• Unrestricted order sizes, products, inventory or special processes. 
• Ability to manage the customer relationship  
• Real-time throughout the shopping experience: item selection, order / payment 
processing, and product delivery. 
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Customer Relationship Management 
SODC Customer Response: State of the art systems and people converging to create an 
exceptional Customer Experience.   Over 800-seat capacity in two states provide the 
environment to differentiate SODC client’s brands from the rest. 
Information at the touch of a button:  Siebel CRM provided full visibility of customer 
history (orders, inquiries, contacts) across all channels from one source.  
Increased Sales:  Cross-sell and up-sell functionality provided key information to help 
SODC analyze business trends and develop programs to help increase client sales. 
Customers for Life:  Captured customer specific information: how often they shopped, what 
they purchased, how many children they had, etc.  This enabled SODC to develop more 
personal relationships with the client’s customers that increased their BRAND LOYALTY 
and ultimately raised their LIFETIME VALUE to each client. 
Brand Ownership: was demonstrated by SODC associates and reinforced through brand 
specific training and a sophisticated automated desktop coaching system. 
Quality Management: the SODC quality-monitoring program was flexible and provided 
proactive improvement and development of associates as well as brand specific coaching. 
 
Distribution Centers 
“Best in Class” Warehouse Management System, automated material handling systems, and 
over 1.2 million square feet of highly automated distribution capability located at two centers 
in two states facilitated the expeditious receipt of client products, highly accurate inventory 
management, and the precise and efficient shipment of multiple items per order.  
 
Distribution Centers were located to service more than 76% of the US population within 3 
business days via ground transportation.  SODC distribution centers were fully integrated, 
high velocity pick, pack and ship facilities that allowed individual products to be pulled from 
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inventory in real time, consolidated into orders, packed and sent on their way.  More than 99 
percent of orders were shipped within 24 hours from the time they were received.  The 
company’s warehouse management system was totally and seamlessly integrated with its 
customer response, order management, and data base software.  The company utilized 
individual unit wave picking and automated conveyor and sorting technology.  It was 
proficient at combining automated material-handling equipment with appropriate manual 
operations; this combination provided flexible, product-specific functionality that exceeded 
service levels specified by SODC clients. 
 
As a result, client Capital Expenditure investments were minimized, labor costs were 
amortized across clients, rapid and accurate inventory and material management practices 
increased the velocity of product flow, increased inventory turns, reduced client inventory 
investments, improved client ROI, and increased client cash flows.  Additionally, value added 
services such as gift-wrap, promotional samples and hazardous goods helped clients increase 
revenues and lower costs.   
Near-real-time inventory updates – Each client had the ability to check inventory levels in 
a 15-minute snapshot.  This allowed clients to more accurately manage their supply chains 
and merchandising programs. 
Real-time data transfers – Client’s were able to receive customer information as soon as it 
was created, instead of waiting for in batch mode processing.  This feature enabled clients 
and their customers to process orders more frequently and with greater accuracy. 
 
Distribution Center Services:  
 
• Receiving 
• Inventory Management 
• Pick, Pack, and Ship 
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• Value-added Services  
• Gift wrap, gift cards 
• Promotional inserts 
• Kitting 
• Returns Management 
 
Accomplishments 
During its lifespan, SODC integrated a large, multi-state workforce with process 
improvements and best-in-class technology/infrastructure to provide scalable distribution, 
inventory, returns, and customer relationship services.  It attained annual client sales of $400 
million by leveraging its operations to minimize client capital investments and operational 
expenses, increase client cash flows, and improve customer satisfaction throughout the on-
line buying experience (from order entry to product delivery).  Company wide productivity 
increased 400%, same day shipping rates to were raised to 100%, inventory accuracy reached 
99%, costs decreased 62%,and  revenues per associate increased 400%. 
 
What Went Wrong? 
Why did a company with an entrepreneurial drive, hundreds of millions of dollars in funding, 
such powerful technology, thousands of highly talented and motivated colleagues, receptive 
business environments and huge economic incentives in every taxing jurisdiction in which it 
worked, and a huge pool of potential “deep pocket” customers not succeed? 
 
Unlike the majority of its dot-com clients, SODC had a viable business model and business 
plan.  However, it was dependent on the success of dot-coms and that success was ultimately 
dependent upon the sophistication and discipline of dot-com businesses, particularly as it 
related to their supply chain and financial viability.  Furthermore, the build out and 
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management hubris regarding the complexity of operational integration of systems within 
SODC and with client systems and supply chains resulted in the consumption of initial cash 
resources at a rate that could not support an ongoing business without the infusion of new 
capital and/or a significant growth in client revenues. 
 
Consequently the melt down of dot-coms had a major impact on SODC’s business.  Existing 
clients and potential clients went out of business and new entrants to the online marketplace 
disappeared.  The company’s capacity grossly exceeded demand, almost overnight. 
Exacerbating this situation was increased client dissatisfaction with SODC performance not 
meeting commitments and expectations.  To retain clients, pricing concessions were granted 
and increased costs were incurred. The company was consuming its cash at an accelerated 
rate and financing for any business even remotely associated with dot-coms virtually 
disappeared. 
 
Since projected revenue streams diminished radically and the additional financing needed to 
sustain the business was unavailable, the company initiated a “sale lease back” of key 
technology assts, began rightsizing the business, reduced capital expenditures to maintenance 
vice growth levels.  It was at this point that the company entered the second stage of its 
lifecycle with a refocused strategy and new leadership. 
 
The potential client pool was expanded to include multi-channel retailers, manufacturers, 
traditional with high velocity, high unit price products.  The pipeline was filled with high-end 
shoe, auto accessory, sporting equipment, cosmetics, clothing, pet supply, and cooking ware 
retailers.  The strategy was particularly successful with traditional “brick and mortar” retailers 
because they had become cautious about the potential of online sales opportunities but didn’t 
want to reject it entirely.  So, the SODC solution that enabled them to maintain an online 
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presence with minimum capital expenditure and shared operating expenses provided an ideal 
solution.  Winning new business led to further price concessions.  Basic services were offered 
at commodity prices and put additional pressure on revenues and profitability.  Cash flows 
were still negative. However, a sustained and successful turnaround efforts improved 
operational proficiency and reduced costs. Together with concurrent marketing successes, 
profitability and positive cash flows were imminent. 
 
All that changed on 11 September 2001 and SODC entered the third stage of its lifecycle as 
the entire retailing industry in the United States came to an unexpected and abrupt standstill – 
literally overnight.  Faced with the immediate decline in client sales and the immediate 
cessation of all “outsourcing” initiatives by potential clients, the company implemented a 
survival strategy.  Since it needed a critical mass of clients within six months to remain a 
viable business, it began a vigorous pursuit of merger and/or acquisition opportunities.  It was 
an approach supported by the investors who committed to additional funding for the company 
if the initiative was successful. 
 
Several merger and acquisition were pursued.  Three were nearly successful but none were 
consummated. 
 
Ironically, the operational proficiency, productivity, and cost reduction efforts of the 
company reached the highest levels ever achieved by SODC.  Clients lauded the proficiency 
and capabilities of the company.  Clients benchmarked SODC service offerings and service 
levels against competitors and determined SODC to be “best in class”. 
 
However, cash was being depleted at the rate of $3 million per month and the board agreed 
with management’s recommendation that it was time to cease operations and sell the 
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business, unless a “white knight” could be found before operations were irrevocably 
terminated. 
 
At this point, the company entered the fourth and final stage of its lifecycle.  The investors 
agreed to a threefold strategy that: 
1) Provided remaining clients a “soft landing” by continuing to support three 
months of operations while they identified and transitioned to new service 
providers. 
2) Provided a “soft landing” for employees – ensuring they had both financial 
and outplacement assistance finding new jobs. 
3) Return as much cash and value to the investors as possible, without filing 
for bankruptcy. 
Concurrent with the first three months of  implementing this strategy, management was to 
continue pursuing all viable merger opportunities. 
 
In the summer of 2002, operations came to a close without the prospect of a merger.  All 
clients had been successfully supported at the highest service levels.  All employees were 
placed in new positions.  Return of leased assets, sale of owned assets, and negotiations with 
creditors began in earnest. 
 
It was during this last phase of the company’s life that the greatest degree of insight into its 
construction was obtained.  Facilities were constructed swiftly and expediency prevailed in 
equipment selection and assembly.  Premium prices had been paid for assets and software in 
order to expedite the company’s build out.  In some case computer equipment and software 
was never fully deployed or even used.  Cash was spent indiscriminately – in some cases 
foolishly.  Cash constraints led to sale-leaseback agreements with excessive terms and 
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conditions – often bordering on usury.  Accountability and disciplined management was a 
lower priority than the build out.  
 
Facing long-term liabilities of $100 million, but wanting to maximize the proceeds from sale 
of company owned Distribution Center assets with a book value of $60 million and 
assignable software licenses, the board approved a dissolution strategy that focused on 
maximum investor value while avoiding bankruptcy for as long as it made good business 
sense.  By early 2004, the $100 million of liabilities had been settled for less than $8 million. 
 
Concurrent with liability negotiations, the company negotiated the sale of “substantially all 
the assets of the company”.  A key component of the negotiation was the ability to transfer 
software licenses to the buyer. It was a component of the negotiation that added significantly 
to the sales value.  While negotiations were complicated by the unprecedented over 
abundance of unused distribution facilities and assets that resulted from the dot-com 
meltdown and a lethargic economy, SODC facilities and assets were newer and in better 
condition, more centrally located, and more comprehensively integrated.  SODC’s sale 
provided a one-stop shop that, unlike other possibilities, included assignable software licenses 
for sophisticated software systems that were already fully integrated and tested.  Negotiations 
were also complicated by the required participation of landlords and software companies.   
 
In the summer of 2003, negotiations with the buyer irrevocably ended. 
 
At this point, the emphasis shifted from an integrated systems sale of the assets in both 
company distribution centers to the piecemeal disassembly and sale of assets from one 
distribution center while attempting sell the remaining distribution center intact (together with 
the assignable software licenses).   
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Ironically, when disassembly of the first distribution center reach the point of no return, basic 
supply and demand dynamics resulted in a significant increase in interest for the remaining 
integrated asset.  At least ten potential buyers engaged in varying levels of negotiation to 
purchase the second distribution center.  However, economic uncertainty, buyer board 
approval delays, the completion of disassembly of the first distribution center, and the 
continuing depletion of cash made disassembly of the final distribution center the only viable 
economic alternative.   
 
By the spring of 2004 the last strategic objective of the board, that of maximizing investor 
value, had been accomplished:  
• Approximately $100 million of creditors claims, including long-term real property 
lease obligations, were settled for less than $8 million.  
• All personal property assets were sold for approximately $10 million. 
• The company was dissolved and bankruptcy was avoided. 
 
Lessons Learned 
The key lessons from this experience have relevance to any business but most particularly to 
other technology/knowledge-based start-up ventures that presume a new “idea” or technology 
is the sufficient ingredient for a successful business – they may be necessary components of a 
successful business but they are not sufficient.  What is needed is recognition of the 
following:  
1) Cash is a resource that requires highly disciplined and effective management. It is 
the lifeblood of the business.  Systemic overspending, for whatever reason, 
weakens the business and jeopardizes its ability to survive bad time – and bad 
times are a certainty. 
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2) Basic business practices and disciplines are more important than any idea or 
technology. 
3)  Technology is an enabler. Overly sophisticated technology not only unnecessarily 
depletes cash but also adds unnecessary complexity and constraints to a business 
model.  
4) Operational proficiency and integration of technology, people, and supply chains 
are imperative to customer satisfaction.  Knowing how much technology is needed 
to support a business and how to use it is more important than “state of the art” 
capabilities. 
5) Expansion before business operations are solidified, mastered, and properly scaled 
is risky, both from a cash flow/financial perspective and from the perspective of 
meeting customer expectations. 
6) Macro events like the dot-com meltdown, economic slowdowns, and events such 
as 11 September 2001 are beyond the control of any business and can have a huge 
impact of a company’s future. Prudent business management, strategic flexibility 
and adaptability, expeditious and aggressive leadership, and pragmatic creativity 
enhance survivability and provide a strong foundation for future growth. 
7) Being honest, fair, and inclusive with colleagues increases the likelihood of 
success and builds a cohesiveness that can weather the most devastating 
circumstances. 
8) Good, talented, highly motivated people sometimes get on the wrong train and 
good ideas and business model are periodically ahead of their time.  But strong 
leadership and business proficiency produce successful results no matter what 
stage of its lifecycle a business is in.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
University based spin-off firms have long been both subject to scientific investigations and 
part of economic policy programs. Generally spoken there are two main thoughts behind the 
promotion of academic spin-off prozesses: On the one hand it is the rather simple guess, that 
Universities create knowledge about new technologies, techniques or methods, that is 
applicable as an economic basis for private enterprises. On the other hand and from a rather 
long term perspective, academic spin-off firms with business fields to be derived from this 
knowledge are most likely to be involved in innovative market branches, the so called future-
technologies (Knecht, 1997).Though it has to be mentioned that there is no absolut agreement 
on the point that small and medium size enterprises (SME) are the outstanding engines of 
innovation (Harrison, 1997, pointed out the resource advantages of lager firms that gives 
them a dominating position in the innovation prozess), it should be doubtless that by 
engaging in this future-technologies they take part in re-innovating the economic system. Of 
course there is only a relatively small number of academic spin-offs founded on an annual 
basis23, and their absolut contribution to national innovation systems is hardly easy to 
estimate. Nevertheless academic spin-offs take part in a knowledge- and technology-driven 
economical change and by this strengthen the competitiveness of national economic systems. 
                                                 
23 Depending on different definitions of those companies between 800 and 2.600 (Egeln et al., 2003: 157) 
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This is the starting point of future economic development an therefore the basis to maintain 
prosperity in industrialized countries (ADT, 1998: 1). 
To maintain competiveness in their markets, these academic spin-offs are forced to re-
innovate their products and by this their knowledge basis in a steady process. As other studies 
pointed out before, academic spin-offs, especially within the first years after start-up, are 
struggling with a somewhat restricted financial basis. Uncertainties whether the business 
strategies of those firms which are founded on innovative and therefore so far unknown 
products or methods is in fact a sound based basis for economic success, their financial 
standing is rather below the average (Egeln et al., 2003: 141). Because of this internal 
investigations and development of new innovative products or an entry into new market 
branches on their own may well lead to a expenditure that cannot be raised by the spin-off 
itself. Schamp (2000: 50) stresses the risk to produce “sunk costs” that may lead to 
disfavorable allocation of resources. Besides of this risk-avoiding strategy, it is pointed out 
that “learning and creation are [...] social prozesses“ (Bathelt and Glückler, 2000: 168). 
Learning by interacting is one strategy in the innovation prozess and the more specific the 
knowledge basis is the less should one (small) academic spin-off be able to face all 
challenges concerning research and development by itself. So to maintain competiveness and 
avoid risks young academic spin-off enterprises should use interactions with other actors. As 
a result of this, inter-firm co-operations come into focus of the spin-off´s business strategy. 
This paper discusses quantitative and qualitative aspects of such inter-organizational 
relationships by analyzing the co-operations of spin-offs that have been founded from the 
University of Bonn. 
 
2. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Though recently we have seen greater interest in scientific research about academic spin-off 
firms, in my opinion there are still uncertainties concerning the way these enterprises interact 
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with other organizations. An outstanding partner for academic spin-offs should be their 
incubator (Czarnitzki et. al., 2000). The personal contact to former colleagues should be deep 
and their business-field is directly connected to research formerly done during the 
employment at their University instituts. This leads to the assumption that interactions with 
scientific institutions are the most relevant form of co-operation for these enterprises. In deed 
recently we saw many investigations focussing on this interaction prozess. It is characteristic 
of this studies that they are to be undertaken in a certain research method: Subject of 
investigation usually is the density of co-operation between a incubator University and its 
spin-offs (Knecht, 1997, 1998; Czarnitzki et al., 2000; Spielkamp et al., 2002) as shown in 
the left part of figure 1 [insert figure 1]. Surveys of that kind deliver science-centric results 
with solid details about quantitative and qualitative aspects of interactions between a 
scientific organization and it´s spin-offs. But the point is that because of leaving out other 
actors that could well be of importance for the academic spin-off as a co-operation partner 
(e.g. other enterprises), in my opinion the possibility to estimate the scientific organization´s 
relative importance for the spin-off in that special context is missing. 
To achieve information allowing to estimate each co-operation partners´ relative importance 
for academic spin-offs in their business prozesses, the research method to be used in this case 
is designed somewhat more general. By using a definition that ex ante does not exclude any 
conceivable partner, all co-operations of the spin-offs have been included into the survey – no 
matter which kind of organization it was. 
Another aspect of this diploma thesis is the analysis of the importance of spacial proximity in 
the co-operation of academic spin-offs. It is assumed that academic spin-offs founded by 
scientists in contrast to the overall number of start-ups tend to cluster in spacial proximity to 
their incubator (Fromhold-Eisebith, 1992: 141; Egeln et al., 2003: 127). “Geographic 
proximity is said to enhance social proximity by encouraging face-to-face interaction and the 
circulation of new information.” (Staber, 2001: 331). The results of the survey for spin-offs 
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from the University of Bonn underline this supposition with the majority of firms having their 
headquarter in the region of Bonn (defined as an area of 30km around the center of Bonn). It 
should be interesting to analyse whether this geographical proximity between the spin-offs 
and their incubator is reflected in the co-operations. 
Before the interviews were conducted, from December 03 to January 04 a survey has been 
made at the University of Bonn to identify all spin-offs that have been founded since the mid-
nineties. A postal enquiry to all professors at the alma mater contaning the request to send in 
contact details of spin-offs that have been sett up from their institute revealed an overall 
number of 41 real spin-off firms. Here in contrast to other surveys (e.g. “Athene”, ADT, 
1998) spin-off enterprises have been defined as those firms set up by scientists that have been 
working at the University of Bonn and whose business fields are obviously linked to research 
results originating from the University of Bonn. By this enterprises set up by graduates or 
without knowledge-transfer have been excluded from this study. Due to low returns (only 
5,8% of the professors answeared to the enquiry) it ist not possible to estimate whether this 
number in fact reflects the totalitiy of academic spin-offs. However, it is reasonable that this 
number fairly certainly stands for the number of all known spin-offs that have been founded 
out of the University of Bonn24. 
By using a half-standardized questionnaire in personal interviews with 24 spin-offs (58,5% of 
the overall number) data about 81 co-operation partners was generated. The definition for 
“co-operation” to be used in this case is a very general one, as already mentioned before. It 
contained three major key-points that identified the co-operation, while separating it from 
market prozesses. In this study a co-operation is separated from only market orientated social 
interaction by: 
                                                 
24 There is high correspondence between the survey results and the lists of spin-offs to be known to the 
University´s transfer-office and the probability that only those professors were inclined to send in replies that 
actually had spin-off set up from their institute. 
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1. it´s character as a relationship between independent actors that describe themselves as 
partners; 
2. somewhat continuous interactions 
3. monetary reasons (profit motive) not being the major argument for interaction 
An assumption is that the University of Bonn itself will be from a quantitative perspective the 
most important co-operation partner for it´s own spin-offs. This all the more considering 
recently designed economic policy programs that promote academic spin-off foundations by 
strengthening close co-operations between them and their scientific incubator organizations. 
With reference to North Rhine-Westphalia the PFAU program has to mentioned.25 To gain 
comparable data concerning the relationship between a spin-off and it´s incubator, the 
interview partner was allways a founder formerly employed at the University of Bonn. So the 
interviewed entrepreneurs somehow all had the same background concerning the spin-off´s 
incubator. Due to this person normally being in a management postion, the period of time for 
each interviw was set to a maximum of one hour. Therefore only the three most important co-
operation partners in detail have been subject to the survey. For subordinated partners basic 
data sets have been interrogated (e.g organizational type and location of the partner, activities 
of the co-operation). 
 
3. CO-OPERATIONS OF SPIN-OFF FIRMS FROM THE 
UNIVERSITY OF BONN 
The overall result of the survey is quite obvious: co-operation as a business strategy does 
matter for academic spin-offs. Only one of the interviewed firms had no such partner. 
Average number of co-operations is >3 for each spin-off, modi are d1=2 and d2=4 (N=5 for 
each). While the spin off´s age does not show any impact on the quantitative shaping of co-
                                                 
25 For a period of 3 years the spin-off founder is granted an employment status at it´s University comparative to 
the status of a doctorate but without the duty of doing scientific research or giving lectures. By this the new spin-
off can profit by using the internal resources of it´s institute without the need for personal involvement into the 
normal teaching. 
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operations, it is interesting that those spin-offs founded by more than one person in average 
maintain more inter-organizational relationships (3,6 co-operations) than those who were 
founded by a single person (2,3 co-operations). A possible explanation is from my point of 
view the influence of personal networks. The cumulative network of a team of entrepreneuers 
should be greater than the one of a single person. So there are more nodes that relationships 
can be “meshed” with. Another aspect could be that maintenance of a co-operation is labour-
intensive. Inter-organizational prozesses are relayed to certain intra-organizational activities 
(research, production, marketing…). The more inter-organizational relationships a spin-off 
has, the more inter-organizational tasks it has to deal with. Because of team-founded spin-offs 
(both directly after start-up and in the post-start-up phase) having more human resources at 
their disposal, they can manage to conduct more co-operations. 
Purpose of this survey was to gain information about the importance of different types of 
organizations as co-operation partners for academic spin-offs. Figure 2 shows that in overall 
three blocks of organizations have been indentified as partners [insert figure 2]: scientific 
organizations, enterprises and public institutions and associations of all kinds (e.g. comercial 
chambers or lobbies). As a first result it can be pointed out that inter-firm co-operations 
represent a larger number than those co-operations with scientific organziations. As 
mentioned before the partners have been listed by the entrepreneurs due to their importance. 
For co-operations with large enterprises an interesting outcome is that the share of these 
organizations as one of the (three) most important partners is with 21% larger than the overall 
part as shown in figure 2. Though three blocks of organizations have been identified, 
obviously public institutions and associations with only 9% of the co-operations being of this 
combination of actors, are of minor value as partners to academic spin-offs. Considering the 
overall number of 81 co-operations included in this survey, to gain valid information in the 
following chapters only the two blocks of inter-firm co-operations and those with scientific 
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organizations are analysed and compared. This comparison will be made up from a 
protagonistic point of view. 
As pointed out before the spin-offs themselves are concentrated within the region of Bonn (21 
of the interviewed 24 firms). Figure 3 shows that with 42% a large part of the partners also 
has his headquarter within this region [insert figure 3]. So for a part of the co-operations there 
is high spatial proximity between the academic enterprises and their partners. Therefore 
additionally in the following chapters for the mentioned two main blocks of organizations the 
importance of spatial aspects within inter-organizational processes is also analysed. 
 
3.1 Inter-firm co-operations 
In total other firms account for the largest part of co-operations. The 39 inter-firm 
relationships divide by three parts into vertical (with suppliers and customers), horizontal 
(with firms in the industry) and diagonal co-operations (with firms of other industries). 
First contact to these partners in 50% of the cases was realized by the partners themselves. 
Both the University of Bonn and regional public institutions do not play an outstanding role 
in initiating these relationships (overall 4 cases for inter-firm co-operations). Though there 
are networking-initiatives to promote inter-organizational working, from my point of view 
they are not able to bring up real value to the spin-offs because of not being able to judge the 
internal processes and business strategies of each spin-off. By this they are not able to bring 
those persons to the table that actually do have potential interest in a however designed co-
operation. This thesis is underlined by the fact that the only actors playing a significant role in 
building up contacts to new partners are those who already stand in a co-operative 
relationship to the spin-off. They are the only ones possessing of sound based information 
concerning the spin-offs´ internal business processes and needs (ca. 18% of the spin-off´s 
inter-firm co-operations came together through partners acting as bridge-builders). 
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The spin-off´s reasons for the choice of their partners reflect this, too. Complementary 
business and product strategies are the most important reasons to work together with another 
firm (22%, N=54). It is interesting that reasons vary between co-operations to SMEs and 
large enterprises. While for the first personal contacts and sympathy are important (26%, 
N=30), for co-operations to large enterprises exspecially the renommee and market strength 
of the partner are of interest for the spin-offs (20,8%, N=24). 
In general, inter-firm co-operations typically are fixed on an informal basis, though with 
deferences between SMEs and large enterprises. The later are decisively more formal 
intitutionalized (8 out of 12 cases), which reflects minor importance of personal contact and 
sympathie for the formation of this interactions. In this cases uncertainties that result from 
possibly confused internal hierarchies of the larger partner are being reduced by an ex ante 
fixing of the co-operation´s details. This assumption is underlined by the fact that the 
entrepreneurs answeared to the question which were their major hindrances in working 
together with large enterprises, they see disadvantages in long-term decision-making 
prozesses and ignorance about who are relevant contact persons. Another argument for the 
formalized status of co-operations with large enterprises may lay in spatial distances. While 8 
of the 26 SME-partners are located in the Bonn Region, none of the 13 large enteprises that 
the spin-offs identify as partners has his headquarter within this area. So formalization could 
be an instrument to minimize risks resulting from partners being somehow “out of sight”. 
Though from my point of view this is questionable. For both groups of partners the 
entrepreneurs characterized the interaction-rate as between weekly and monthly while mutual 
trust is high. So spatial proximity here does not directly implicate a  higher social proximity. 
Concidering the purpose of this article to identify similarities and differences between co-
operations that academic spin-offs maintain with different kinds of organizations, the main 
question concerning inter-firm relationships is: What are major activities of these co-
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operations? Due to restricted number of cases, activities have been clustered into 6 (7) 
categories: 
1.  Research (basic research, research under licence, research projects in co-operation with a 
partner for a common client) 
2.  Development (of products, of new technologies or methods, quality measures) 
3. Market activities (common presentation, joined sales activities) 
4.  Production (joined projects, common product strategies, bundling of ressources) 
5.  Know-how-Transfer (consulting, exchange of knowledge, training) 
6. Unilateral use of ressources (special case: use of the partner´s ressources without 
equivalent returns) 
7. No details 
 
Table 1 shows the activities of inter-firm co-operations separated by SMEs and large 
enterprises [insert table 1]. In general the spin-offs are at most engaged in fields of R&D 
activities with other firms. Obviously large enterprises are number one partners for joined 
(product) development. From my point of view this reflects the economical power of large 
enterprises. The use of their ressources often is the conditio sine qua non for the small spin-
off firms to realize developments which they have on their agenda but are not able to solve 
them by themselves. So the reziprocal situation in this cases is characterized by the spin-offs 
being able to develop new products which they otherwise could not, while the large enterprise 
on the other hand benefits from the pin-offs specialized knowledge and maybe in a further 
step offer this product on their markets (with paying licence fees to the spin-off). Concerning 
activities with SMEs the majority is laying in the combined fields of joined production and 
common market activities. So while large enterprises are involved as partners in the early part 
of the production chain (R&D), partners that are somehow of the same size (concerning 
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employees) as the spin-off are used for productive and distributive activities, so at a later step 
of of the chain. 
The joined work in production and marketing between the spin-offs and SMEs could well 
lead to unstable relationships due to the possibility of being a directe competitor for the co-
operation partner in his market. At least for the academic spin-offs from the University of 
Bonn this assumption is not true. The entrepreneurs pointed out, that the partners do not 
compete but supplement to each other in respect to their market fields. I think this is a facette 
of flexible spezialisation. The spin-offs use their partners to solve activities they could not 
manage alone. In this particular cases it is exspecially the joined work on projects for a third 
party. One of the partners alone would not have been able to be engaged with the project. 
Only together the spin-off and the other firm can combine their specific strengthes and by this 
manage to receive and fulfill the tasks of their common customer. Competition is excluded 
directly from the beginning by separating the whole task directly from the start into sub-tasks 
to be fulfilled separately by one of the partners itself. 
With only 5,6% the transfer of knowledge between the partners is an activity of minor 
importance. Though overlapping with research and development, which are qua definitionem 
knowledge intensive, this reflects from my point of view two things. On the one hand it is 
said that knowledge transfer, and more specific the transfer of not project bounded and rather 
tacit knowledge, takes place exspecially in face-to-face contacts (Butzin, 2000: 155). It has 
already been said, that the interaction is just on a weekly to monthly rate and consistently the 
type of interaction is dominated by E-Mail or telefon contact, not by face-to-face. So due to 
minor importance of face-to-face contacts knowledge-transfer therefore may also lack of 
importance. There is another reason: knowledge transfer may well be dangerous for the spin-
offs. It is pointed out that exspecially for small enterprises the uncontrolled drain of 
knowledge is dangerous (Koschatzky, 2001: 142). Their economical basis is founded on 
academic research results which are unique and only applicable to them. To grant this 
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knowledge to a co-operation partner may well give him a competitive advantage leading to 
economic disadvantages for the spin-off when the partner uses this information for his own 
interests. Therefore from my point of view it is a kind of risk-minimizing business method of 
the spin-offs to bring in their knowledge into ex ante defined projects and not to give away 
precious knowledge going beyond this project-context. 
 
3.2 Co-operations with scientific organizations 
After having described inter-firm co-operations, in the following this will be compared to 
those with scientific organizations. From a quantitative point of view the later kind of co-
operations with an overall of 35 partners is subordinated to the first, though difference is not 
that meaningful. With 30 cases, most of the scientific partners are Universities. Others are a 
Fachhochschule and some state-run research institutes. Outstanding partner with 21 co-
opertions is the University of Bonn. With 19 of 24 interviewed spin-offs almost every 
enterprise to be established from this incubator maintains in a co-operative relationship to 
him.26 
As already mentioned, academic spin-off foundation is subject to public support programmes. 
At least for the firms established from the University of Bonn there is no measurable 
influence of such incubator-based aid on the co-operation intensity between them. So the 
firms that have not been supported by the incubator do just as well co-operate with him as do 
supported firms. 
In comparison to inter-firm co-operations the subordinated part of partnerships to be 
established on the spin-offs own initiative is striking. Only in one case the spin-off itself built 
up contact to a scientific organization which later on became a co-operation partner. For all 
other cases contact either already existed before start-up (mainly for co-operations with the 
                                                 
26 Note: The difference between the 19 spin-offs maintaining a co-operation to the University of Bonn and the 
overall number of 21 co-operations to this organization is explained by the fact that some spin-offs have a co-
operational relationship to more than one faculty, e.g. biology and medicine – in this cases they have been 
included as two independent co-operations to the survey. 
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incubator) or the partner directly adressed the spin-off and asked for a inter-organizational 
exchange. 
In contrast to the overall number of inter-firm co-operations, those with scientific 
organizations are more formal institutionalized (65%), so founding on contracts or 
agreements. Though this formal protection may lead to the assumption that mutual trust 
between this constellation of partners is lower, it is indeed as high as seen for inter-firm 
relationships before (mainly within the category “very close”). The only difference is that 
trust into the University of Bonn as a partner tends to be higher than to other scientific 
organizations. Long term social relationships and personal contact throughout the years of 
former employment are reflected in this. 
The same can be mentioned for contact-intensity between the partners. While the overall rate 
for all scientific organizations is comparible to inter-firm co-operations (weekly to monthly), 
contact rate to the University of Bonn is between daily and weekly. Spatial proximity in this 
cases simplifies personal interaction.27 
Once again the main question is: What are the co-operations about, in other words what are 
main activities and how do they distinct from inter-firm co-operations – if at all? 
Analogous to chapter 3.1 table 2 shows the activities of exchange prozesses with scientific 
organizations [insert table 2]. As was to be expected, with 59,3% in total the largest part of 
activities is laying in the fields of R&D. This correlates with a comparative figure of a nation-
wide survey analyzing contacts between enterprises and scientific organizations where 60,9% 
of the activities are considered as R&D (Kulicke and Görisch, 2002: 61). Due to their status 
as a public corporation, activties aiming at marketing or joined production are no major 
focuses of co-operations with academic spin-offs. Concerning joined production only the 
incubator organization is of importance for the spin-offs. Here the support programmes 
                                                 
27 Spatial proximity in this cases may also meens that the two partners are situated within the same building. 
Programs like PFAU and exspecially the Bonn-specific “in-house”-model promote this proximity and by this 
foster the contact-intensity. 
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enabling these enterprises to use exspecially technical equipment of the University for their 
own purposes comes to the light. The institute itself benefits as a ruel by the allowance to use 
the good to be produced by the spin-off on it´s equipment. 
An outstanding result is knowledge-transfer only being of relevance for co-operations 
between the spin-offs and their incubator. As already pointed out before, this transfer differs 
from the knowledge transfer bundled to R&D activities by not being connected to any 
specific project or somehow defined field of interaction between the partners. It has been 
mentioned that this exchange of knowledge may well contain the danger of know-how drain 
for the spin-offs. Therefore from my point of view it is an outstanding fact that only the 
relations to the University of Bonn are suitable for this kind of activities. Though mutual trust 
is as high as to other scientific organziations, only the long-term relationships to former 
colleagues at the institutes of the incubator are likely to induce this transfer. While both the 
rate of mutual trust an the rate of face-to-face contacts do not show significant impact on the 
question whether transfer of tacit-knowledge takes place or not, there is a significant 
correlation between this activity and the age of a co-operation. Therefore it can be pointed out 
that the longer a co-operation between the spin-off and a scientific organization lasts, the 
more likely is the exchange of tacit-knowledge between the two actors. Nevertheless it has to 
be mentioned that this no sound based thesis due to low overall number of cases. 
So summarizing co-operations to scientific organizations are mainly focussed on R&D 
activities. Trust and contact intensitiy is comparable to inter-firm co-operations. 
A difference between the two co-operations blocks is the persistence of hindrances. For every 
co-operation partner to be included with detailed data in this survey, main points of 
hindrances or frictions have been interrogated. While the quantitative difference of how many 
hindrances there are refering to inter-firm co-operations or those with scientific organizations 
is not outstanding, the persistence indeed is. Those being characteristic for relationships to 
scientific organizations tend to maintain over time. On the other side the majority of frictions 
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the spin-offs had to face while working together with other enterprises ceased after a period 
of time. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
The first an most obvious result is that two types of organizations play a role as co-operation 
partners for the spin-offs from the University of Bonn. A third block formed by public 
agencies and associations is not important, both from a quantitative and qualitative point of 
view. 
Besides of the results for co-operations with the University of Bonn, it is ovious that personal 
contact in face-to-face situations does not play outstanding roles in the co-operation prozess 
for academic spin-off enterprises. After activities and circumstances of the relationship have 
been fixed, exchange on a more or less weekly basis and mainly by E-Mail or phone is 
sufficient to maintain the co-operation on a stable basis. The minor importance of spatial 
proximity is deduced from this. Leaving out the co-operations with the University of Bonn, 
only 23% of the partners are situated within the Region of Bonn. This is even more 
underlined by the fact that exactly the same part of co-operations is with organizations 
outside of Germany, and still both the rate of mutual trust and fce-to-face contacts to not vary. 
Elsewhere it has been pointed out transfer-agencies and the like do not have the assumed 
influence as contact-establishers for companies (Fritsch and Schwirten, 1998: 255). Here too, 
there is no measurable influence of any intermediary organization playing a role as contact-
establisher for the academic spin-offs. Therefore from my point of view it is doubtful whether 
Universities should engage in such networking-activities aiming at the promotion of co-
operational relationships. Due to not being able to judge all internal business-prozesses of the 
spin-off they should not be able to establish contact to the best-fitting partner organization. So 
by engaging in this activities, transfer agencies may well waste ressouces on a subject which 
they cannot fulfill as good as the spin-off itself. On the other hand I has to be poited out 
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transfer-agencies are welcome as advisers in a later step of the formation of a co-operation, 
namely the legal arrangement behind a inter-organizational relationship. By giving examples 
and maybe best-practice solutions they can deliver real service to science-based spin-off 
enterprises in a field were they possibly lack knowledge and experience. 
Concerning hindrances, the persistence of this factors is the main difference between the two 
co-operation blocks. From my point of view this difference is the result of organizational 
differences. While in inter-firm co-operations tend to be somehow more “the same” (both 
enterprises with profit maximization being to overall main goal), co-operations between the 
spin-off and a scientific organization have to face the problem that they aim at different goals 
(enterprise / public institution). 
The final question left to answear is: Why do the spin-offs of the University of Bonn co-
operate? Generally spoken the answear to this is: The academic spi-offs co-operate because 
they are small. Shortage of ressources, both material and immaterial (e.g. information 
concerning markets, marketing strategies or production methods), are the outstanding main 
resons for the majority of spin-offs to maintain interorganizational relationships. Both with 
other enterprises and scientific organizations, the spin-offs tend to gain access to ressources 
they use to conduct tasks they otherwise cannot or atl east concern them as too risky to invest 
into. 
So co-operating is a business strategy for the (rather small) acadmic spin-off enterprises from 
the University of Bonn to achive flexibility, avoid risks and achieve goals being out of reach 
if they only acted on their own. 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1: Research method to be used for the analysis of the co-operations of academic spin-
offs
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Figure 2: Number of co-operation partners by 
organization (absolut and relative)
SMEs
26 bzw.
32%
Verbände / 
öffentl. Hand
7 bzw. 9%
Scientific 
Organizations
35 bzw. 43%
Large 
Enterprises 
(>200 
employees)
13 bzw. 16%
 
Michael Sondermann: Co-operations of Spin-off Firms from the University of Bonn 
 302
Figure 3: locations of the co-operation partners
Germany
21%
NRW
18%
Foreign Countries
19%
Region of Bonn
15%
City of Bonn
85%
Region of
Bonn
42%
 
 
Table 1: Activities of inter-firm co-operations
Activities SMEs
absolut
SMEs
relativ
large enterprises
absolut
large enterprises
relativ
Total
absolut
Total
relative
Research 7 14,0 3 14,3 10 14,1
Development 13 26,0 13 61,9 26 36,7
Market 
activities
13 26,0 4 19,0 17 23,9
Production 14 28,0 0 0,0 14 19,7
Know-how 
Transfer
3 6,0 1 4,8 4 5,6
unilateral use 
of ressources
0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0
no details 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0
gesamt 50 100 21 100,0 71 100,0
Source: own research  
Table 2: Activities of co-operations with scientific organizations
Activities University of
Bonn
absolut
University of
Bonn
relativ
other scientific 
organizations
absolut
other scientific 
organizations
relativ
Total
absolut
Total
relativ
Reserch 11 28,2 8 40,0 19 32,2
Development 8 20,5 8 40,0 16 27,1
Market 
activities
1 2,6 2 10,0 3 5,1
Prouction 5 12,8 0 0,0 5 8,5
Know-how 
Transfer
10 25,6 0 0,0 10 16,9
unilateral use 
of ressource
4 10,3 1 5,0 5 8,5
no details 0 0,0 1 5,0 1 1,7
gesamt 39 100 20 100,0 59 100,0
Source: own research  
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INTRODUCTION 
The number of women who are self-employed across the European Union is very much 
smaller than that of men and the number of women entrepreneurs with employees is even 
smaller. In 2000 only 8% of the total number of women in work were self-employed. This 
was only half the proportion of men in work who were self-employed. However, there is 
increasing evidence that more and more women are becoming interested in starting a business 
(Franco and Winqvist, 2002). Also in innovative sectors women face the same barriers as 
women entrepreneurs in other areas. The advantages of education and experience do not 
totally compensate for disadvantages they have to face because of their gender. Women lack 
the support and role model effect of other women and need to develop business credibility on 
their own. The single entrepreneur style favoured by women is the antithesis of the teams 
required by university and commercial science. There are fewer women in innovative sectors, 
but this is less related to personal characteristics and abilities and more related to structural 
and experiential factors (Carter, 2003).  
 
Since 2001 a European network co-ordinated by a consortium from Baden-Württemberg 
deals with women entrepreneurship in order to identify good practice in the promotion of  
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female start-ups, to establish innovative support schemes and to receive ideas for new support 
models. The network was supported by the European Commission, DG Enterprise in the 
framework of it's Innovation Programme. 
 
The ProWomEn network involves 16 European regions and is co-ordinated by the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs Baden-Württemberg and Steinbeis-Europa-Zentrum. The member regions 
include such that have already implemented structures to promote women entrepreneurship as 
well as regions that do not have much experience, but recognised a need. Besides the German 
States Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine Westphalia and Thuringia, regions from the Czech 
Republic, Belgium, England, France, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Poland, Spain and Sweden have 
contributed to ProWomEn. Among the members are organisations for economic 
development, technology transfer as well as four universities (Linköping University, 
Polytechnical University of Barcelona, Czech Technical University Prague, Dundalk Institute 
of Technology). 
 
FIELDS OF WORKS 
Four key issues in the promotion of women entrepreneurship were chosen from many 
important aspects: 
• Problem awareness: Which differences in entrepreneurship exist between women an 
man?, How to sensitise support organisations for women specific approaches? How to 
encourage women to consider being self-employed in their private and professional 
decisions? 
• Instruments of Support: Which support do women entrepreneurs need? How to respect 
gender related differences in entrepreneurship support? How to gender mainstream 
support schemes? 
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• Regional networks: Which benefits can be taken from networking? How can female 
start-ups and women entrepreneurs network? How to network among intermediary 
organisations? 
• Education and training: How to respect gender related aspects in entrepreneurship 
qualification? How to reduce gender related problems through education? 
 
THE ProWomEn LEARNING PROCESS 
With a method specially designed for ProWomEn the network members identified critical 
success factors and selected good practice examples. 
 
Figure 1: ProWomEn learning process 
 
The starting point of the project was a detailed survey on women entrepreneurship in the 
participating regions by means of questionnaires. Women specific activities as well as general 
support programmes with focus on gender aspects were gathered in an extensive data 
collection.  
 
The  next step identified critical success factors for all four key issues. Critical success factors 
in this context are seen as "a small number of topics that are influential in determining the 
positive outcome of an activity" or "those few key areas of activity in which favourable 
results are absolutely necessary to reach one's goals". The critical success factors should on 
the one hand meet the requirements of tried an tested scientific methods and on the other hand 
be flexible enough to respect individual regional or personal aspect. Therefore a two-step 
approach to identify critical success factors was chosen. Assisted by creativity methods the 
members looked for factors which appeared important to them, both personally and with 
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regard to their regional framework conditions. The success factors identified were then 
evaluated according to their relation to standard criteria like relevance, effectiveness, 
efficiency, utility or sustainability. By means of this two-step procedure regional peculiarities 
and supra-regional aspects could equally be considered. Between 9 and  14 critical success 
factors for each of the four thematic issues were identified. 
 
Figure 2: Important critical success factors 
 
To identify  good practice the data collection was screened according to the critical success 
factors determined. All examples that meet at least half of the critical success factors were 
considered as good practice. 
 
Figure 3: Selected examples of good practice  
 
Determining whether one of the over 80 examples of good practice is outstanding also 
depends on individual framework conditions and objectives in the regions. Support 
organisations having to achieve certain objectives with a given budget will have another 
opinion on this question than decision makers who seek for activity that creates strong 
publicity. With regard to this fact the members jointly selected three examples for each of the 
thematic issues.  
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In a final step the representatives of the regions developed general implementation plans 
which enabled them to set-up activities they learned about during the ProWomEn project. The 
network members also set up ideas for further joint projects. 
 
RESULTS FROM THE SUB-NETS 
Problem Awareness 
The types of barriers and problems women face when starting their own business seem not to 
differ too much in Europe however their strength varies from region to region. In general two 
types of problems can be identified. Obstacles that prevent women from starting an enterprise 
and problems which arise during the starting process. Lack of role models, difficulties in 
balancing family and work, or economic problems in traditional sectors are reasons why 
women do not start their own business. Those who take the chance often have to face new 
problems like missing networks, male dominated support systems or even real discrimination. 
Long-term solutions have to start in the educational system. For the mid-term, information 
and qualification of intermediary organisations' staff can be helpful. Role models who draw a 
realistic picture of female entrepreneurship can encourage women to take the chance of being 
self-employed. A campaign of information days carried out in Baden-Württemberg, awards in 
Ireland or Poland or a Swedish exhibition on women entrepreneurs could set examples on 
how the whole range of women entrepreneurship can be made visible. 
 
Instruments of support 
In the long run successful support programmes have to pursue the objective of equal 
opportunities for women and men and to promote a culture of women entrepreneurship. 
Women resource centres on local level, national competence centres or agencies for women 
entrepreneurship as well as purposeful public relations, projects in schools and resource 
centres for women entrepreneurs contribute to achieving this goals. But in the mid- and short 
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term, women still need individual help when translating their plans into action, financing their 
projects or accessing networks. Examples like the Swedish "Starting Line" or micro-financing 
programmes existing in England  and Spain can act as good practice just as the "Women 
Entrepreneurs Meetings" existing in various regions of Baden-Württemberg. 
 
Regional Networks 
While men have always used their "old boy's network" to initiate business, to generate 
business contacts and to collect information, women often have scruples about using 
networks for the benefit of their enterprises. They often think being a network member means 
permanent active collaboration and underestimate the strategic aspect of networking. Support 
organisations although have a need for regional and trans-regional networking in order to 
build up competence and to back up and strengthen their activities. Successful networks need 
clearly defined objectives, target groups and organisational structures. Visions, strategies and 
openness for changes are crucial elements of thriving networks. Good examples in this 
context are the English networks "WIN" and "Prowess" as well as virtual "Women 
Entrepreneurs' Portals" in Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine Westphalia. 
 
Education and training 
It is generally agreed that entrepreneurial education should be a long-term objective and has 
to start as early as possible in the education process. School firms and business games support 
entrepreneurial thinking and acting, promote personality development and help to reduce 
gender related problems in an early stage. When preparing for the actual start-up women 
require specific training. Training activities should be based on an interdisciplinary approach 
that builds up on both hard facts and soft skill and also involves successful women 
entrepreneurs. In this context imparting theoretical knowledge and sharing hands-on 
experience is equally important. The "PriManager" competition in Baden-Württemberg and 
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the Belgian "DREAM" project are good examples for school activities. Modular training 
schemes in Belgium, Spain and Baden-Württemberg as well as the "TWIN" mentoring 
project in North Rhine Westphalia give ideas for the design of qualification activities. 
 
RESULTS AND OUTLOOK 
The ProWomEn project identified a great variety of gender specific support activity or 
general support schemes that follow a strong gender mainstreaming approach. Although there 
are regions in Europe where only little gender specific promotion is available, especially in 
the new member states. In regions where entrepreneurship support has to be built up from 
scratch there is often no or only very little focus on specific target groups in the beginning. 
However it might be easier to include gender aspects in new support schemes right from the 
beginning than to add them later on. 
   
In all member regions ProWomEn had positive impact on the promotion of women 
entrepreneurship. For example a mentoring project had been transferred from North Rhine 
Westphalia to Yorkshire or the region of Pilsen organised for the first time a discussion forum 
on women entrepreneurship. Baden-Württemberg could benefit from the co-operation with 
NUTEK the Swedish Business Development Agency. 22 of the good practice examples 
identified in the framework of ProWomEn were described in detail in a "Book of Good 
Practice in the Promotion of Women Entrepreneurship", available in English and German 
(www.prowomen-eu.net). Results of the Networks activities such as examples of good 
practice, case studies and pilot actions were presented at a conference in September 2003 in 
Stuttgart, Germany.  
 
During the work of  ProWomEn it also turned out that support for female start-ups and 
women entrepreneurs mainly focuses on traditional industry sectors often  preferred by 
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women such as trade and services. While a lot of  excellent support schemes for innovative 
and university based start-ups as well as good "women and science" programmes exist nearly 
all over Europe hardly any support for innovative women start-ups is offered. For example 
only two out of  more than 200 projects of the EXIST network supported by the German 
Federal Ministry for Education and Research exclusively target women entrepreneurs 
("deluex" in Lübeck and www.gruenderinnen.de in Karlsruhe). It is a fact that the women 
quota is much lower for university based start-ups than for all start-ups, e.g. in Baden-
Württemberg only 12% of start-ups in university incubators are lead by women while around 
33% of all business starters in the region are female. This expresses that there is a strong need 
for support schemes that target innovative women start-ups and entrepreneurs. Responding to 
these needs a new support scheme for university incubators launched by Baden-
Württemberg's Ministry of Economic affairs puts a strong focuses on gender aspects. For 
every proposal an action plan how to increase the number of female start-ups is a key criteria 
for eligibility and an extra budget will be allocated to pilot actions that have either region 
wide relevance or can act as models for other university incubators. 
 
The  knowledge gained in the ProWomEn project and the lack of support for innovative 
women entrepreneurs were also the base for another European project. The WomEn2FP6 
project aims at bringing women entrepreneurs into European research projects and trans-
national co-operation. The project includes training for women entrepreneurs, brokerage and 
matching of women entrepreneur's profiles and exchange of experience among 
intermediaries. 
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: ProWomEn learning process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Important critical success factors 
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Figure 3: Selected examples of good practice 
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ABSTRACT 
Universities are often sources of spin-off new ventures based upon leading edge research. 
Potential entrepreneurs are academics, research staff, doctoral candidates or students. This 
know-how, human capital, and network access – are critical resources to entrepreneurial 
companies in general. Therefore universities play a major role in generating and coaching 
young start-ups, not only for university spin-offs. Universities can facilitate the transfer of 
critical resources to the business through the process of research commercialization and 
technology transfer. Universities can also organize the critical resources of human capital and 
specific entrepreneurial experience into a separate entity or facility to assist young 
entrepreneurial start-ups for success, called university business incubators (UBI). Depending 
upon the form of cooperation between university, UBI and start-ups, these units can offer an 
additional interesting way to generate income for the university. In this paper we present the 
results of a survey of over 300 university business incubators worldwide. Of the over 130 
respondents, 44% are located in the USA or Canada, 41% in Europe and 15% in the rest of 
the world. The managers of the university business incubators were asked to complete a six-
page questionnaire. 
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INTRODUCTION 
An incubator assists start-ups in setting up their business and starting operations. The specific 
tasks of a start-up firm differ greatly depending upon their industry. Biotech companies tend 
to emphasize R&D investments while a firm with a new “high tech” product wants to achieve 
proof of concept or build a prototype. Incubators assist such firms in the pre-seed and seed 
phase (Klandt, 1999). There is no formal or legal definition of an incubator. However, Smilor 
& Gill’s definition is useful: 
“…an incubator is an apparatus for the maintenance of controlled conditions for 
cultivation. To incubate fledgling companies implies an ability or desire to 
maintain some kind of prescribed and controlled conditions favorable to the 
development of new firms. The incubator seeks to give form and substance – that 
is, structure and credibility – to start-up or emerging ventures”. (Smilor and Gill, 
1986: 1) 
Universities are sources of leading edge research and of potential entrepreneurs, 
formerly academics, research staff, doctoral candidates or students. This know-how, human 
capital, and network access – are critical resources to entrepreneurial companies in general 
(Dowling and Drumm, 2002).  
 
Figure 1: Availability of resources at universities 
 
Therefore universities play a major role in generating and coaching young start-ups, 
not only for university spin-offs. Universities can facilitate the transfer of critical resources to 
the business through the process of research commercialization and university business 
incubators (UBIs) can be distinguished from other public or private incubators, private 
business parks, corporate incubators and “virtual” incubator organizations without a physical 
structure. The priority of public or private science parks is to rent space to young companies. 
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They seldom offer further advice or support to the companies. In comparison, private 
business incubators lack the relationship to an university with its complementary assets and 
services. Corporate incubators are only oriented towards the technological or business focus 
of the related company. 
The first incubators supporting start-up companies were set up in the USA. The oldest 
incubator in the world is “Student Agencies Inc” from Ithaca, New York, which began 
supporting student entrepreneurial initiatives as early as 1942. The first business incubator 
was the “Batavia Industrial Center”, founded in 1959 in Batavia, N.Y., USA. By 1980 there 
were already 12 incubators in the USA, and by 1984 the number had risen to 63 (Allen, 
1985). In 2000 the number of incubators in the USA was estimated by different sources to be 
between 800 and 1000 (McKinnon and Hayhow, 1998).  
 There have been a variety of studies conducted in the US on the influence of incubator 
organizations on company development. These studies show that the success rate is higher for 
start-ups in incubators: 87% of all companies started in an incubator survive the first five 
years successfully (Molnar et al., 1997). Without an incubator, over half of the start-ups 
disappear during the first five years (Smilor and Gill, 1986). As early as 1992 over 50 US 
universities or colleges had their own university incubators (Mian, 1994). According to a 
survey by the NBIA (National Business Incubation Association, 2002), in 1998 approx. 19% 
of all US incubators were run by universities or colleges. 
University-based incubators typically pursue two goals: job creation and its related 
socioeconomic effects (strengthening economic development and diversification, increases in 
tax revenue), and profit, i.e. incubators can be operated purely for financial reasons. Some 
incubators also have other goals, such as technology transfer and research commercialization 
from universities, entrepreneurship education and providing opportunities for external 
research.  
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PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
There is a lack of academic research on business incubation focusing on university based 
incubators. There have as yet been no exclusive UBI surveys conducted globally involving a 
large, comprehensive sample size (Steffensen et al,. 1999). The focus has been primarily on 
technology transfer from universities (Shane, 2002) typically using cases from the US (Bray 
and Lee, 2000). For example, Matkin (1990) focused on the technology transfer mechanism 
at four top US research universities. McMullan, Long and Graham investigated the value 
added by university-based outreach programs from 89 projects of the new venture office at 
the University of Calgary (McMullan, Long and Graham 1986). Mian (1994, 1996a, 1996b, 
1997) investigated 6 US university business incubators in detailed case studies including such 
issues as management and strategy, value added, performance, and organizational aspects. 
Allen and McCluskey (1990) interviewed business incubators from the National Business 
Incubation Association in the US via questionnaire. 15% of the 127 incubators were 
university-related. Culp and Shapira (1997) investigated Georgia´s Advanced Technology 
Development Center (ATDC) as a single case study of an university business incubator. 
Lilischkis (2001) employed a case study approach to compare the University of Washington 
in Seattle, USA to the Ruhr Universität Bochum, Germany, concerning their assistance in 
creating and supporting start-ups from university. Cooper (1985) investigated 161 start-ups in 
the US regarding the influence of their incubator organization, 27 of which came from an 
university. 
The literature on university technology transfer has focused on research universities 
(Lockett et al,. 2003), on gaining income for universities by spin-off companies (Thursby et 
al,. 2001) and on research commercialization issues in general (Colyvas et al,. 2002; Zucker 
et al., 2002). 
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The ‚Resource-Based-View of the firm’ – approach by Wernerfelt (1984) and Penrose (1995) 
sees businesses as a bundle of resources and skills with the purpose of generating a fluent 
rent as result of entrepreneurial acting. Regarding the perception of „Resources“ Penrose sees 
the business as a collection of productive resources, divided into ‚physical’ and ‚human 
resources (Penrose, 1995: 24). Wernerfelt defines resources as everything that can be 
understood as a business’s strong points and weaknesses or more formally: all material and 
intangible assets that are linked with the business semi permanently (Wernerfelt, 1984: 172). 
Basically resources can be divided into tangible, intangible and, as a hybrid, human 
resources. Real estate, liquidity and physical infrastructure represent examples for material 
resources. (Patented) technology, know-how, reputation, clientele and corporate culture 
establish the immaterial resources of a business. Education, experience, flexibility and the 
commitment of the individual staff member belong to the human resources (Portes, 1998)28. 
The four characteristics of resources (valuable, rare, only incompletely imitable and 
not replaceable) contribute to the generation of competitive advantages for businesses. Yet 
such a competitive advantage mustn’t be of indeterminate duration. The individual single 
business stands in the focus of the Resource-Based-View. Resources and skills are looked 
upon as business specific, centering on the business’ properties and collection of resources 
(Lechner, 2001: 34). 
The basic assumptions (recoverability, rareness, incomplete imitability and missing 
replaceability) applied to the Resource-Based-View are also partly valid for the resources of 
young foundations. Especially foundation specific knowledge about organization and funding 
of young businesses is completely substitutable, for example through university business 
                                                 
28 Instead of human resources it is advised to distinguish again into „social capital“ because it 
is not only work force (Portes, 1998) 
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incubators. In addition this resource is totally mobile, but its market29 is very limited. A 
young business foundation usually has single definite resources (Arbaugh and Camp, 2000: 
313)30, e.g. a technological unique selling point. However, especially new foundations are 
characterized by the paradigms liability of newness and resource poverty31. Regarding the 
university business incubator’s resources and additionally applying the Resource-Based-
View, which is about the achievement of sustainable competitive advantage32, it is 
furthermore considered that this view is focused on competing businesses. Because of this, 
the Resource-based View can only be rudimentarily consulted for the explanation of Non-
Profit-Organizations, which are not competing directly on the market. The competitive 
advantage of university business incubators is determined by their general aim33, which in 
turn exclusively applies to incubatees. The securing of survival and additionally the 
encouragement of growth of the incubatees is the primary competitive advantage of an 
university business incubator. Thus it is not the matter of competitive advantages in a 
narrower sense, meaning the realization of an above-average rate of return and the acquisition 
of market shares, but a matter of competitive advantages in a wider, rudimentary sense, 
meaning the securing of survival and the enablement of growth in the business’s early phases.  
The securing of survival is also basically the intention of already existing businesses 
with a history (Barney, 1996: 34). But in doing so these businesses can normally fall back on 
one or the other of their own resources or on an already established instrument, for example 
on an existing product or service, capital stock, clientele or staff pool. In recently founded 
                                                 
29 e.g. of the foundation assistants and the incubators. 
 
30 Arbaugh and Camp (2000: 313) speak of ‚available resources’, ‚controlled resources’ and 
‘required resources’ in the entrepreneurial process. 
 
31 See in detail chapter III.1. 
 
32 As in the transaction costs approach. 
 
33 See chapter III.3.3 orientation of university business incubators. 
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businesses it is not the matter of this basic securing of the business’s survival during the 
business’s progress, but paramount is the securing of survival in a very early phase of the 
venture without the possibility to fall back on one’s own resources. Also the aspired growth 
in this phase is essentially not about prevailing against competitors on the market and gaining 
a share of the market, but primarily about the acquisition of reference customers and the 
assembling/structuring of the founder- and the first staff teams.34 
The Resource-Based-View’s basic assumptions (recoverability, rareness, incomplete 
imitability and missing replaceability) are also partly valid for the foundation specific 
knowledge of university business incubators. Especially, according to the paradigms liability 
of newness and resource poverty, new foundations lack crucial know-how of experience in 
the business foundation process and for growth. This foundation specific treasure of 
experience can only be provided by the employees (and also in a wider sense by the network 
partners) of the university business incubator. 
=> The foundation specific knowledge of the university business incubator’s staff can 
be explained from the Resource-Based-View.  
 
The UBI provides a formal mechanism for embedding start-up companies more quickly in 
entrepreneurial networks and thereby can assist such companies to develop their own set of 
relationships (Schmude, 2002: 256) more quickly. Such relationships increase the probability 
of survival (Hisrich and Smilor, 1988; Uzzi, 1996; Lechner and Dowling, 2003). An UBI 
represents a node in the developing network for a start-up company that includes partners for 
research, financing, consulting, and regulatory matters. The most important success factors to 
be considered for many technology-based firms in UBIs are recruitment of qualified 
employees and the acquisition of external financing. Universities often represent an important 
                                                 
34 In a foundation’s seed phase there are substantial asymmetries of information as well. 
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source of additional personnel for the start-up firms, in particular in the area of R&D, but also 
for other positions. Professors at universities often serve as research or business consultants. 
The university partners may consist of other universities or colleges, research institutions or 
other higher educational institutions. An UBI can also achieve a clustering effect that enables 
its incubator firm to more easily attract financing from venture capitalists, business angels or 
banks. 
 In addition to these direct effects of personnel recruitment and financing, many new 
firms develop cooperative relationships that can be crucial in the early start-up phase and 
development of the company. For example, firms often need to recruit for management or 
board positions or add experienced managers in areas not covered by the founding team. 
Incubators can also provide a link to important external institutions such as government 
agencies, trade associations, foundations or technology transfer offices. Such relationships 
improve the chances that start-up firms can get access to government subsidies. In addition, 
incubators can serve as a network node point for relationships with important external 
consultants, such as tax accountants, patent and other lawyers, business consultants, 
marketing and public relations firms. Such relationships can be crucial to the development of 
the firms. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Selection of Incubators 
Because there is no formal definition of an university business incubator, specific criteria 
were developed to identify such organizations. The criteria are based on the physical and 
legal position of an UBI at an university, the type of relationship to the university and the 
model of an UBI derived from the general business incubator literature. The individual 
criteria used in this study were:  
• a legal or organizational relationship with an university 
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• located on or next to the premises/campus of an university 
• a formal institutional structure (department, profit center) 
• exchange or use of resources with the university 
• business intention is business incubation  
• provision of physical space or services 
• provision of organizational services for start-ups 
 
Furthermore, to be included in our survey the UBIs had to meet the following criteria: 
• external promotion of their services (e.g. via a homepage in English, German or French) 
• identification as an “University Business Incubator” or “University related Incubator” and 
provide the name of the related university 
 
Sample and Study Design 
Since there is no comprehensive list of university business incubators, for this study a 
database of 363 potential UBIs worldwide was created in 2002. 53 organizations did not meet 
the criteria listed above so that the net UBI database contained 310 UBIs, 46% of which are 
located in America (90% of these in the US), 42% in Europe (49% of them in Great Britain), 
10% in Asia, and 2% in Australia. We believe that this database includes almost all existing 
UBIs worldwide. To ensure that the answers had a high validity, the questionnaires were sent 
only to UBI managers. The final sample consists of 130 UBIs (44% response rate).  
 
Potential Bias 
The data from the UBIs was self-reported and only one person per incubator was asked to fill 
out the questionnaire. Incubator managers were also asked to report on employee growth rates 
and sales for their incubatees. A review of the contact data supplied by the person who had 
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filled out the questionnaire confirmed these people were incubator managers. Considering 
that the respondents could have been biased to over-emphasize success when they answered 
the questions about growth measures, a bias analysis was conducted. However, non-
respondents showed no difference between the countries nor any other significant effects.  
 
RESULTS 
The following data show descriptive characteristics of the UBIs studied. Not all respondents 
provided data for every question. In such cases the number of responses is given in 
parentheses. 
 
Age of the UBIs 
Regarding the age of university business incubators the data show that there are two focal 
points in the years of establishment: 1986 and 2000, as shown in figure 2. The second focal 
point is quite obviously due to the new economy hype. 
 
Figure 2: Year of establishment of the UBI 
Profit Orientation 
An important criterion for distinguishing between UBIs is their profit orientation. Of the 130 
responding UBIs 110 (85%) are Non-Profit Organizations (NPOs) and the remaining 20 
(15%) have a for-profit orientation. This description varied greatly by region ranging from a 
28% for-profit orientation in Europe to 5% in America, as shown in Table 1. This might 
reflect the fact that most incubators in Europe were established later than in the US. This 
explanation was suggested by the incubator managers who filled out the questionnaire. 
Categorizing an UBI as having an NPO does not mean that they do not take equity for 
services, however. 
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Table 1: Profit orientation by Region 
 
Organizational Structure and Importance of the Related University  
To maintain a legal or organizational relationship with an university was a formal criterion 
for being included in this study as an UBI. 54.2% of the respondents have a separate legal 
entity, and 37.9% of these are private companies. The related university has equity positions 
in 8% of the UBIs. The average investment is 40.5%. Over half (51%) of the UBIs are located 
on the campus of the related university and 22% of the respondents stated that they were 
located near the university campus. Only 27% are located far away from campus at an 
average distance of 8.6 km.  
 We found that 36 of the related universities have a research focus, 35 universities have 
a teaching focus and 30 universities have a teaching and research focus (n=101). Regarding 
the formal criteria for an UBI to use or exchange resources with the related university, it was 
found that 79.8% of the UBIs use university facilities (n=104). In most cases laboratory space 
and facilities and also IT network, library, conference rooms and catering were used. 
 There is evidence from earlier research that the reputation of an university has an 
effect on the spinoff rate (Sine et al. 2003). The UBIs in this study (Lendner, 2003) rated the 
importance of their related university’s reputation to them at 6.0 on a 7-scale Likert index (n 
= 103). The importance of teaching and training in Entrepreneurship was rated on the same 
scale at 5.2 (n= 103). The entrance and exit criteria of an UBI can also serve as a rating 
criterion for the incubatee (Lendner and Lichtinger, 2004). The university can serve as a 
committee member in the advisory board or investment committee of the UBI. 
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Services provided by UBI 
To provide physical and/or non-material services for start-ups is one of the important 
characteristics for an UBI. The type of services that are critical for start-ups in the seed phase 
or early stages were collected. 74% of the for-profit UBIs stated “Providing seed financing” 
as one of their professional services, whereas only 34% of the non-profit UBIs also offered 
this service. This difference showed no statistical significance. No other professional services 
showed significant differences between non-profit and for-profit UBIs. The frequency of 
provision of the professional services is shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Professional services offered by an UBI 
 
Regarding the organizational services, there was no significant difference for any of the 
services provided between non-profit and for-profit UBIs.  
 
Table 3: Organizational services offered by an UBI 
 
Sources of Financing of the Incubator 
A major characteristic of incubators in general is how they generate their own cash flow 
(Rice, 1995). There are important short-term income streams and interesting long-term 
options available. In the long run the equity investment of the incubators in their firms is a 
potential source of funds if the incubated firms are successful. Our data show that an UBI’s 
main income is the rent or fees paid by their incubatees. 91% of the UBIs said they charge 
their incubatees rent (n=120). 38% of these charge rent at market rate, 57% below market rate 
and the remaining 5% above market rate. About half of the UBIs (53%, n=101) bill their 
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companies for service charges, and 19% of them (n=101) charge consulting fees. 26 % of the 
UBIs said they take equity for services (n=130). The level of equity ranged from 1 - 20%, 
with the mean at 6.7%. 12% (n=101) of the Incubators have sold equity as a source of their 
own cash flow. 22% have a seed fund available to invest in their incubatees (n=105).  
 
University involvements in the university business incubator 
Apart from providing network contacts the related university can provide critical resources. 
• The university can serve as a committee member on the board of directors, in the 
advisory board or investment committee of the university business incubator. 
• In addition to that the university can contribute to the finance of the university 
business incubator by providing equity, grants, subsidies, loans and donations. The related 
university can also contribute to create own cash flow for the university business 
incubator. 
Especially because of the reason that financing by “intelligent capital” is expected to be a 
crucial resource of young companies, the involvement of the related university in the finance 
of the university business incubator may contribute to the success of their companies which 
can be expressed in the employee-growth-rate. The results shown in table 4 underline this 
expectation. UBIs who receive grants or subsidies from the related university do have a 
higher employee-growth-rate of their incubatees (108,93) than UBIs who do not receive 
grants (88,58).  
 
 Table 4: University involvement in funding of UBIs 
 
The same effect is shown if the university is an equity investor in the UBI though effects may 
result in the fact that the university provides some sort of “brain capital”, apart from 
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providing network contacts (97,88). If the university is serving as a committee member in the 
advisory board of the UBI, their incubatees show a higher growth-rate in employees (85,88). 
 
Table 5: University involvement as committee member 
 
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This international study on University Business Incubators (UBIs) has brought new insights 
on the factors that influence success of UBIs and their incubated firms. Our results provide 
initial support for a “Resourced Based View” - explanation of the benefits for start-ups of 
beginning their firm life cycles with the help of an incubator. These results may also be of 
practical relevance for institutions planning to establish, or that are already running an UBI. 
Network ties to financial institutions and other industry and government partners may be the 
key to the success of the firms in the incubator and therefore to the UBI itself. Young firms 
that have a choice should look for an incubator with the strongest set of such relationships. 
 Young firms thinking about joining an UBI should also consider the number and kind 
of professional and organizational services which an UBI offers. Both directly and via its 
network, the UBI also provides its firms with critical resources, such as seed financing and 
human capital. The growth of firms in an UBI will also be positively influenced by the level 
of services in the UBI and its network. There is a valuable impact from the related university 
to the start-ups via the UBI. Representatives of the university can serve as a member in the 
advisory board of the UBI. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
 
  Non-profit For-profit Total  
Europe Number 41 16 57  
 Percent  72% 28% 100%  
America Number 58 3 61  
 Percent   95% 5% 100%  
Rest of world Number 11 1 12  
 Percent  92% 8% 100%  
Total Amount 110 20 130  
Percent of total 85% 15% 100%  
 
Table 1: Profit orientation by region 
 
 
 Professional services provided (Yes/No) All 
 Business plan/development and strategy planning 88% 
 Assistance with starting business operations 86% 
 Assistance with raising external financing 83% 
 Entrepreneurship education 76% 
 Market research, marketing and sales assistance 72% 
 Research and development  63% 
 Accounting, tax and legal assistance 63% 
 Human resource consulting 55% 
 Human resources and organization 42% 
 Providing seed financing 41% 
 
Table 2: Professional services offered by an UBI (Lendner, 2003) 
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 Organizational services provided (Yes/No) All 
 Office and lab space  94% 
 Contacts with public support institutions 91% 
 Organizing networking with external partners 89% 
 Logistics and infrastructure (e.g. IT and telephone) 88% 
 Shared social services (e.g. meeting room, restaurant) 83% 
 Shared services (e.g. secretary, cleaning) 80% 
 Organizing partnering within the incubator 79% 
 
Table 3: Organizational services offered by an UBI (Lendner, 2003) 
 
 
 
Table 4: University involvement in funding of UBIs 
 
 
Table 5: University involvement as committee member 
University members 
as committee significance
MW n MW n MW n
Board of directors 87,83 80 105,6 43 94,05 123 0,199
Advisory
Board 97,88 81 85,88 42 93,78 123 0,390
Investment 
committee 93,85 26 93,82 96 93,83 122 0,999
employee growth of incubatees
yes no avg.
Funding from 
university through significance
MW n MW n MW n
Equity 94,78 32 92,48 95 93,06 127 0,876
Grants / 
subsidies 108,93 28 88,58 99 93,06 127 0,187
Donations 79,43 7 93,86 120 93,06 127 0,607
Own cash 
flow 76,81 26 97,25 101 93,06 127 0,197
no avg.
employee growth of incubatees
yes
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Figure 1: Availability of resources at universities (Lilischkis, 2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Year of establishment of the UBI (Lendner, 2004) 
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ABSTRACT 
With an exploratory study we aim to focus on the research question of which policies 
contribute to the entrepreneurial environment of the State of Thuringia in the near future with 
special reference to public initiatives fostering the encouragement, motivation and 
qualification of (university-based) start-ups. In this paper, we provide a concept for an 
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innovative management of an “Entrepreneurship Center Thurinigia” (ECT). Our concept is 
based on “3Ps” which bring together 
(1) “profile” 
(2) “profit” 
(3) “professionalism”.  
The optimal interaction of the “3Ps” converging in a one-stop institution (ECT) will be 
introduced. We will explore the potentials of our business model, and the effects specifically 
for the encouragement, motivation and qualification of (university-based) start-ups. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
According to recent research findings it can be assumed that local public policies play a 
crucial role in the achievement of regional economic development or, at least, in the 
achievement of regional attractiveness (Audretsch, 2002; Florida, 2003; Porter, 1990; 
Sternberg, 2002). Therefore, local policy-makers constantly aim to improve the 
entrepreneurial environment for start-ups and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
with a wide range of programs and initiatives. In most German states, numerous public 
programs for the promotion of start-ups were initiated and re-designed during the last few 
years in order to improve the entrepreneurial environment after evidence has accumulated 
that national, regional, and urban growth is strongly correlated with a significant rate of 
entrepreneurial activity, as well as a significant turnover rate of old and new firms per year 
(Audretsch et al, 1992; Fritsch et al, 2004a; Fritsch et al, 2004b; Sternberg et al 2000; 
Sternberg et al 2001; Reynolds et al 2001).  
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Smart policies are definitely needed to constantly improve the entrepreneurial environment of 
areas. Smart policies matter to induce economic growth within regions. But what are the key 
components of a smart policy mix which contribute to the attractiveness of regions and the 
entrepreneurial environment? A comprehensive answer is still missing and is difficult to 
achieve. It is impossible and, above all, not useful to develop a one best-practice-policy-mix-
fits-all regions, as well as a one best-practice-management-fits-all regions. Areas have to 
develop their perfect policy mix based on their individual historical, cultural, social, 
economical, and political experiences. 
With the following exploratory analysis we aim to present a policy approach specifically 
designed for an innovative strategic management of a one-stop-shop located in the State of 
Thuringia, the so-called “Entrepreneurship Center Thuringia” (ECT). The ECT is an idea 
developed by the so-called “GET UP Thueringer Existenzgruendungsinitiative”. This 
institution is currently promoting innovative start-ups in Thuringia, and aims to improve 
prevailing entrepreneurship policies. Based on the federal program, “EXIST-University-based 
start-ups,” initiated by the Federal Ministry of Research and Technology, the GET UP 
initiative started its activities in 1999. Since then, the institution established a regional 
university network including all Thuringian universities which are focusing on very different 
research areas. The common goal is the promotion of technology based and innovative start-
ups through a fruitful collaboration of the involved universities, the achievement of synergy 
effects on each other, and the improvement of the entrepreneurial environment in Thuringia. 
With the implementation of a future ECT, along with the transformation of GET UP, 
policymakers aim to install a one-stop-shop specialized in entrepreneurship policies and 
counselling while acting independently from public financing. 
In this paper, special attention will be paid to the future ECT´s organizational structure, 
management and, above all, policies which aim to successfully contribute to the attractiveness 
of this region, and to the encouragement, motivation and qualification of university-based and 
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other start-ups which play a major role for an innovative and economically growing State of 
Thuringia. Evidence from an exploratory comparative German-American study on 
entrepreneurship policies will be integrated in our business model for a future ECT (Grimm, 
2004; Huettche 2004; Grimm, forthcoming).  
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
While econometric theories and models traditionally say that economic growth came from 
firms, jobs, capital, technology, or natural resources, the key resource today is human capital, 
also entrepreneurial human capital. Technology is still an important growth component, but 
other factors came into play (Florida 2003). Therefore, new policies need to be developed and 
old policy approaches need to be re-defined for the strategic management of places 
(Audretsch 2003).  
The ability of start-ups and small businesses to adapt and act quickly in a global world has 
always been striking. Along with the so-called globalization the pressure on the 
entrepreneurial world has increased to develop new products and technologies with 
accelerated speed. Small and innovative firms which are generated and run by creative, 
entrepreneurial people contribute greatly to regional economic growth. They need 
entrepreneurial policies which foster the regional attractiveness and smart policies to survive 
and succeed in a global economy.   
With new policies and strategies local policymakers of the highly industrialized countries 
have tried to improve the entrepreneurial environment for start-ups and small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) during the last few years. Local public policies are getting more and 
more important in a global world in which cities and regions compete for entrepreneurs, 
investors, and consumers. Only the local policy-makers know best how to optimally promote 
their locality. Federal policies may offer an important and useful framework for the 
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promotion of start-ups and SMEs but the main impulse is expected to derive from local 
policies. 
In Germany, the states, regions and urban areas have successfully worked out regional and 
local images and policies to compete inter-regionally and, in a global context, with regions 
and metropolitan areas across the world.  
With our exploratory study we aim to focus on the research question of which policies will 
contribute to the entrepreneurial environment of the State of Thuringia in the near future. We 
aim to provide a model for an innovative management of an entrepreneurial Thuringian 
region supported by a one-stop-institution which is taking care of entrepreneurial matters. 
Our model is based on “3Ps” which brings together 
(4) “profile” 
(5) “profit” 
(6)  and “professionalism.”  
The optimal interaction of the “3Ps” will be introduced. Also, we will explore the potentials 
of the business model, and the effects specifically for the encouragement, motivation and 
qualification of (university-based) start-ups. 
The profile of the ECT is based on its results and successes which are supposed to be 
achieved, on the one hand, by the promotion of a considerable number of start-ups, in 
particular, innovative new businesses and firms and on the other hand, by the provision (a) of 
financial resources for persons starting-up a business and (b) by professional consulting and 
counselling services. To form this profile, the ECT needs sufficient financial resources in 
order to support selected and promising business start-ups that will pay their way during their 
setting-up and business-securing stage.  
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For this reason, the enduring financial securing of the ECT will be in the foreground of the 
concept described. We will introduce an ECT business model taking into account that the 
independence from any public financing is one of the ambitious institutional goals. By 
providing practical examples and calculations we will underline the feasibility and future 
success of our model. 
In addition, we will introduce a professional assessment and evaluation of the services 
rendered by the ECT which plays an important role for the reputation of such an institution. 
Alternative forms of financing will come along – that is our conviction – with a professional 
assessment of the performance of the ECT. This will contribute to the professionalization and 
the development of a success profile of the ECT.  
 
3. HYPOTHESIZED STRATEGY OF AN ECT 
We suggest that the ECT should play a central intermediary role for promoting 
entrepreneurship in Thuringia. This also includes the promotion of technology transfer 
between the universities and the entrepreneurial world by facilitating university-based staff 
and students who intend to start-up a business to leap easily and successfully from the 
university into self-employment. Thus, the ECT initiates successful business start-ups and 
contributes to job creation, as well as, to innovative economic growth within the Thuringian 
region. Packed into a formula this would mean: “ECT picks winners, ECT causes winners, 
and winners pick the ECT” (see Kenneth Flamm, 1999, about the Advanced Technology 
Program; Wessner, 2003). 
The ECT will be distinguished from other facilities by promoting excellent, innovative, 
technology-oriented enterprises. It will contribute to patent development and application and 
to the development of new and innovative product ideas, business concepts etc. as well as job 
creation. 
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The consulting offered by the ECT will perfectly meet the requirements of innovative 
entrepreneurs. Special focus is put on researchers who are currently working and studying at 
local universities. Their entrepreneurial potential to using an innovative (product) idea for 
self-employment should strongly bee promoted by the ECT. An ECT business model is 
required to support talented but “hidden champions” from local universities with 
entrepreneurial capacities. A suitable business model should, therefore, be characterized of 
the following catchwords (“3Ps”): 
 
Profile: The ECT renders high-class services (counselling), establishes and maintains 
networks (networking), and is a reliable intermediary for the provision of capital.  
Professionalization: The ECT is renowned for highly qualified counselling provided 
by service-oriented and professional staff for a transparent company organization 
structure and for achieving excellent results (meaning successful business support) on 
a long-term basis. The services rendered by the ECT will be assessed and evaluated 
which contribute the high degree of professionalization. 
Profit orientation: The ECT focuses its work on the customer's benefit. The goal is 
that an entrepreneur profits along with the assistance of the ECT. Attractive financial 
assistance programs -- public private partnership and professional consulting -- are 
elementary components of the ECT. The profit orientation is a prerequisite for the 
survival and financial independence of the ECT.  
 
4. PROFIT ORIENTATION BY PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
The ECT business model which we have designed is characterized by basic public private 
partnership (PPP) essentials. Therefore the instrument “public private partnership” (PPP) will 
be introduced in the following chapter and its tasks and form of organization will be defined. 
The objectives and fundamental interests of a PPP will be explained.  
Heike Grimm: Smart Policies for Entrepreneurial Regions. Future Strategies for the Promotion of 
Start-Ups with Special Reference to an “Entrepreneurship Center Thuringia” (Germany)  
 340
 
4.1 What does Public Private Partnership mean?  
The term “public private partnership” describes very different forms of cooperation between 
the public and the private sector (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2003). The partners participating in a 
PPP are, on the one hand, public actors, and on the other hand, both private-business actors 
(for-profits) and also nongovernmental actors (non-profits). 
In practice, numerous various types and forms of PPPs have been developed. In literature, 
definitions are provided which usually refer to both a narrow and a broad understanding. 
With the broad understanding of the term PPP, any form of cooperation is understood 
between the private and the public sector (Linder et al 2000). PPP is narrowly defined as the 
cooperation between public institutions and private enterprises exclusively implemented as a 
joint endeavour of more or less equal partners who pursue specific complementary objectives. 
With such a PPP, a qualitatively independent organization form is introduced. (Vogel et al, 
2000: 11) 
A major objective of a PPP is the advanced management of public tasks. The increase in 
private involvement raises expectations that the quality and efficiency of public services will 
increase at the same time. The public and private sector may cooperate “…during the 
planning, the preparation, the financing, the operation, or the utilization of public services 
rendered so far by public institutions” (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2003: 9).  
 
4.2 Characteristics 
An essential criterion for the functionality of a PPP is how and to what extent responsibility is 
shared among the partners. Individual forms of PPPs differ with regard to the influence of the 
private versus the public sector and the responsibility of each participant. Among other 
things, a proper distribution of risk and comprehensive responsibilities of the private partner 
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are considered to be central elements of a PPP. The numerous PPPs which exist in practice 
are distinguished from each other by the different intensity of cooperation. 
A key practical consideration that often shapes PPPs is the desire to attract private investors. 
The financing aspect is often central for founding a PPP. In practice, various forms of private 
financing have been developed contributing to the maintenance of public infrastructures and 
services. Vogel and Stratmann (2000:16) categorize different financing models. With regard 
to the future organizational structure of the ECT, two models are of particular interest: (1) 
Remuneration models including, for example, funds, licence models, leasing, object 
corporations, and the lease model. (2) Fundraising for founding a PPP including, for example, 
donations, sponsoring, benefits from foundations, and the marketing of own resources.  
 
4.3 Triggers and Objectives 
The enthusiasm for the increase in private involvement in public policy fields is rooted in the 
changing requirements to fulfil public tasks. Both in Germany and also in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries the emergence of PPPs is interrelated with the economical, political, and structural 
changes and the emergence of a so-called service economy (Gerstelberger, 1999). Certainly, 
the financial bottlenecks of the public treasuries are dramatically increasing. This contributes 
to the rising attractiveness of PPPs. Globalization along with the development of a knowledge 
society push forward the search for new organizational forms. The interest of the economy in 
PPPs is primarily focused on commercial aspects which may, however, not only be aimed at 
direct profit.  
“Alternatively the business partner may have a concern to develop market credibility by 
being associated with government, or may have political motives such as gaining an 
`insider´ position in policy processes, working to achieve policy outcomes favourable to 
business.” (Carroll et al, 2000:50/51)  
 
With PPPs policymakers pursue very different objectives, among others, the financing and 
administering of formerly purely public duties and services as well as the improvement of 
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innovation processes and an advanced control of administrative and other processes. With the 
help of PPPs, there is practically “an entrepreneurial model introduced in the public sector” 
(Vogel et al 2000). It serves as a vehicle for the reorganization of the public sector and 
contributes to an increased efficiency. PPPs matter with regard to the optimization of 
expenditure and revenue, the improvement of organizational processes, and the pursuing of 
objectives by working applied-oriented and process-oriented. A higher efficiency is achieved 
by an all-embracing approach which permits to bring together the best experts of individual 
disciplines.  
 
4.4 Recommendations for the ECT 
The most prominent PPPs which promote regional economic development exist between the 
private sector and communes, state authorities, universities or technical colleges, Chambers 
of Commerce and Industry, Chambers of Crafts and Trade, and banking and credit 
institutions.  
For the ECT, the following fields of cooperation are, in our opinion, of particular interest:  
 
 An R&D consortium comprising small and medium-sized companies, local 
universities, and – if necessary – the public sector; 
 PPPs between local universities and the public sector for the promotion of 
innovation-led processes, as well as the encouragement of spin-offs from 
Thuringian universities; 
 PPPs between local universities and other public/state laboratories and 
research facilities to encourage the implementation of technology and/or 
knowledge clusters in Thuringia; 
 PPPs between the state public sector, banking and credit institutions and small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in order to provide micro-financing and 
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other early-stage funding options for innovative start-ups. 
 
Since the business landscape in Thuringia is characterized of small and medium-sized 
enterprises, large-sized enterprises do not play a significant role in the above listed 
recommendations. 
 
5. BUSINESS MODEL FOR AN INNOVATIVE ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
MANAGEMENT IN THURINGIA 
In the following, we specify the „3P“ strategy for the “Entrepreneurship Center Thuringia” as 
introduced in chapter 2 while taking into account major features of U.S. public private 
partnerships which can successfully be transferred cross-nationally to Germany and cross-
regionally to Thuringia. In our opinion, the implementation of PPPs at different 
organisational levels will contribute to the sustainability and success of such a one-stop-shop. 
With the ECT concept and “3P” strategy, we aim to introduce a regional policy approach as 
well as an innovative management strategy while bearing in mind the historical, cultural, 
economical and political experience of Thuringia. 
 
5.1 Profile and Profit 
Our concept is based on “3Ps” which bring together “profile”, “profit”, and “professionalism” 
in one institution. We assume that the profile of the ECT is sharpened if professional, 
demand-oriented counseling is provided.  
 
5.1.1 Potential Sources of Revenues  
Individuals who aim to start-up a business need know-how, contacts, and capital. The demand 
for the three assets is dependent on the development status of the enterprise. Know-how is 
achieved by counselling offered by the ECT primarily focusing on operational, 
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organizational, and technical aspects of an entrepreneurial endeavour. The ECT establishes 
contacts between partners from science, industry, financing, and (potential) entrepreneurs. 
For this purpose, formal and informal, regular as well as cursory meetings need to take place. 
Counselling and networking are a necessary prerequisite but not a sufficient component of the 
business model ECT since the revenue potential from the consulting activities is very low. 
We recommend that the first counselling provided to potential start-ups has to be free of 
charge.  
Capital is the trigger for realizing business. Counselling is useful to assess which financing 
sources are existent and, if necessary, how to apply for loan capital. The entrepreneur accepts 
(pre-money) and is able (post-money) to pay for the provision of capital. This source of 
revenue is essential for the sustainability of the ECT on a medium-term and long-term basis. 
At the same time, a successful provision of capital underlines the high potentials of the ECT 
and will raise its reputation. Those entrepreneurs who have (a) been successfully promoted by 
the ECT and (b) received subsidies or loan capital are satisfied customers who may get back 
to the ECT to ask for further excellent services which can be priced accordingly. 
The following simplified numerical example underlines the above-mentioned presumption: 
With a staff of 20 employees, the ECT has a budget of about 2.000.000 Euro. Out of 20 ECT employees, 15 are working 
operatively. Sixty percent of their working time goes to the invoiceable counselling of persons starting-up a business. On 
the assumption of 200 working days, this results in 1,800 man days (200 x 1.800 x 0.60 €). The following table shows the 
required per diem rates provided that the calculation is based on the assumption of (1) no other revenues, (2) 25% of other 
revenues and (3) 37.5% of revenue portion for the provision of capital and 12.5% of other revenues. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Required per diem rate for consulting 
services 
1.110 833 555 
Revenues from the provision of capital 0 0 750.000 
Other revenues 0 500.000 250.000 
Target turnover 2.000.000 2.000.000 2.000.000 
 
The calculations above clarify that an ECT business model which is solely based on 
counselling will not pay its way without any public or other financial support. It is unrealistic 
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to assume that an entrepreneur is able and willing to accept a per diem rate amounting to 
1.110 Euro (calculation model 1).  
With the second calculation we suggest that counselling and other services will be charged by 
the ECT. We assume that all consulting hours which have been performed can be invoiced, 
are invoiced, finally paid and will be charged with 833 Euro (calculation model 2). Also, 
based on the assumption that the ECT organises seminars, workshops, fairs, etc. and charges 
them with an average entrance fee of 50 Euro, it would require (a) 20 paying participants per 
event and (b) such events taking place each working day (this means 250 events per year!) to 
achieve a target turnover of 2.000.000 Euro. In other words, a total number of 500 potential 
entrepreneurs attending these events each month are required.  
If the ECT does, however, act as a service and management agency we can draw a revenue 
model paying its way (calculation model 3). Three to five percent of the gross investment is 
invoiced as commission to the ECT for providing an entrepreneur with loan capital or other 
subsidies. In addition, the so-called “soft expenses” may be added to this commission. This 
means that other costs are liquidated via the issue price of shares which may amount to two to 
eight percent of the fund volume. If the ECT is issuing a fund of a small size with a volume 
of supposedly 10.000.000 Euro it can be awarded with an estimated peak revenue of 
1.000.000 Euro. 
 
5.1.2 Provision of Capital 
In its capacity as a technology agency of the Free State of Thuringia, the ECT promotes 
branch-specific innovations and innovation processes. Public subsidies are offered as an 
award for future innovative projects in selected areas (nanotechnology, opto-electronics etc.). 
Similar to the U.S. Small Business Innovation Research program (SBIR) though tuned to 
Thuringian necessities and pre-conditions we suppose that subsidies should be offered in a 
three-phase process. During phase I innovative ideas and proposals are submitted and 
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evaluated by (university-based) individuals, university laboratories and departments, and 
potentially also small and new enterprises in a standardized way. All proposals are subject to 
a comprehensive and rigorous selection process.  
If the applicant fulfils the previously defined requirements and selection criteria and is 
positively evaluated by reviewers in phase I, the entrepreneur receives a basic amount of 
capital to demonstrate the technological and economic feasibility of his or her project in 
phase II. Only those applicants successfully completing work in the first phase of competition 
are permitted to submit proposals for a basic research effort in phase II. Whether he or she 
has successfully completed work in phase I will be determined by reviewers and by the 
reaching of specified goals.  
Phase II proposals are subjected to a comprehensive and rigorous selection process that 
includes the consideration of an in-depth evaluation which will be conducted by independent 
scientists or engineers and ECT employees knowledgeable in the specific field of technology 
of the proposal. Optimally, this second evaluation is based upon extensive information 
including the success of the phase I effort documented in a final report from the applicant and 
a commercialization plan developed by the applicant. We recommend that only the most 
promising results should be promoted with another subsidy.  
In the third stage (prototype, reference customer), public funds are matched with private 
investments (Wessner, 1999a). The applicant has to find a strategic cooperation partner and 
an investor who provides matching funds. The partner might be a large industrial company, a 
venture capital firm, an individual “angel” investor, the state government, a local or regional 
government or even the federal government or any combination of the above mentioned 
alternatives. Phase III is for product development to commercial markets using private sector 
financing. The creation of public private partnerships is a major goal of the U.S. SBIR 
program.  
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The following figure designed by the National Science Foundation illustrates the three-phase 
process of the SBIR program.  
 
Figure 1 
 
The ECT is in charge of the award process, including the invitation to bid, the selection, and 
the awarding of subsidies. Both the successful award winners and the ECT will be evaluated 
at a continuous basis.  
The ECT needs to receive public funds at the initial stage of its existence. This public support 
contributes essentially to the economic development of the Free State of Thuringia. An 
evaluation of the ECT makes this clear and de-emotionalizes the public discussion whether 
public funding for such an institution really pays off. The success of the ECT can be 
measured in various aspects: economically, politico-economically (local economic 
development) and politico-scientifically (university development) (for other characteristic 
features see Wessner, 1999b:36). The success of innovative, university-based and other 
entrepreneurial persons who successfully participate in the three-phase award process and 
started-up a business reflects the fruitful work of the ECT. As a result, the ECT becomes a 
trustworthy partner of innovative entrepreneurs and private investors.  
 
5.1.3 ECT as Service Agency 
5.1.3.1 Corporate and Innovation Venturing 
“Corporate Venturing” (CV) is, in general, understood as the establishment and development 
of participations by already existing enterprises for strategic and financial considerations 
(Faisst 2002:5). With regard to innovative projects, one speaks of “Innovation Venturing” 
(IV) (Campbell et al., 2003:32). With respect to CV and IV, the ECT establishes research 
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networks between small to medium-sized businesses and enforces the dialogue between 
universities and the business sector.  
5.1.3.2 Entrepreneurial Sponsoring 
The sponsoring of sports events and cultural events has a long tradition. The sponsoring of 
new firms, the so-called “Entrepreneurial Sponsoring” (ES), is relatively unknown, in 
Germany, although it may directly contribute to job creation and is of far superior importance 
than classical sponsoring. In this way, enterprises may demonstrate impressively that they 
assume responsibility for the common good. 
We suppose that funds spent so far for culture and sports are dedicated to other purposes like 
the support of entrepreneurs of the region. The ECT may, then, initiate appropriate projects to 
attract sponsors, and focus on the promotion of selected branches or regions. Also, the ECT 
should set up good media contacts for an effective promotion campaign. 
5.1.3.3 Corporate Hatching 
By “Corporate Hatching,” it is understood that the ECT looks after young, already 
established enterprises until they achieve their organizational independence. These so-called 
early birds are not of high interest to classical Venture Capitalists for the time being (Jugel, 
2003). The ECT accelerates the growth and maturity process of promising technology-
oriented enterprises. Market maturity and orientation are reached in a quicker way by firms 
which have been consulted by the ECT. The companies show a technological lead and 
consolidation of organizational structures. Now a private commitment is worthwhile.  
In its capacity as a service agency, the ECT finances itself by means of remunerations 
charged for various services. In case of the successful provision of capital, young start-ups 
will be charged commissions. 
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5.1.4 ECT as Management Agency 
The ECT sets up owns funds focused on specific branches (opto-electronics fund, media 
fund) or regions (Ilmenau fund). The shares are issued on a small-part basis and offered to the 
citizens as well as to institutional offers. The selling is directly executed via the ECT (by 
telephone, internet) or via the savings banks. 
If the Free State joins as co-financiers, the non-payment risk of the investors is minimized – 
taking into account the tax effect – and a reasonable yield is reached even under considerable 
risks of the seed financing. 
5.1.4.1 Public Private Partnerships for the Promotion of Innovation 
We propose that ECT should raise and administer a “Zukunftsfond Thüringen” (“Future Fund 
Thuringia”).  
 
Figure 2 
 
In the beginning, the Free State should participate as a limited partner of a limited liability 
corporation and buying a share or shares. Private investors may join the fund with a 
contribution of 5.000 EUR or the multiple of this sum as limited partners. Each share which 
has been bought and allocated is matched with a free-of-charge transfer of a share of the Free 
State amounting to the same sum. This procedure is neutral as far as the taxes on income are 
concerned.  
This model leads to a doubling of the available financial assistance funds thanks to the 
recruiting of private funds. Their yield on shares doubles. By including the fiscal effects in 
the case of losses (allocation of losses), the property risk is easy to grasp.  
The ECT liquidates structuring costs of the fund plus margin via the emission prices (we 
propose 5% of the amount subscribed for each time). A variable remuneration is charged for 
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the attendance. If the fund invests into young enterprises, a commission for the intermediary 
can be taken into consideration. 
5.1.4.2 Management of Funds of Third Parties 
If the ECT acquires the status and distinguishes itself as a fund manager, it may also structure 
and attend to funds of third parties. According to the participation model outlined above, it is 
also possible to finance investments and collaborations of the Free State and/or of the 
communities by recruiting private funds. The ECT assumes responsibility for the conception 
and control of the fund. The ECT liquidates structuring costs of the fund plus margin via the 
emission prices as a proposal 5% of the amount subscribed for each time. A variable 
remuneration is charged for the attendance. 
 
5.1.5 Networking 
Establishing an ECT network means, above all, establishing an informal organizational form 
which is characterized by the common interests of its members and which is strongly 
influenced and professionally managed by the ECT.  
 
5.1.6 Entrepreneurial Counselling  
Entrepreneurial counselling is a central task of the ECT. Public counselling for potential start-
ups is heavily dependent on public funding; without this public support, this service has to be 
revised. All and any services offered by the ECT have to be assessed with regard to the 
added-value. Additional value means, on the one hand, profit-making: The person starting-up 
a business pays the ECT an honorarium for a certain service. But added-value means, on the 
other hand, binding effect. The person founding a new firm today will be the entrepreneur of 
tomorrow and, thus, a potential customer who requires qualitatively first-class consulting 
services and/or capital. An adverse counselling (initial counselling) is acceptable if a person 
starting up a business is linked to the ECT with a lasting effect. 
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Without any public financial support, it is required to offer the counselling in a profitable way 
so that at least the costs are covered (profit orientation). Initial consulting activities are 
usually executed free of charge. If consulting services do not have a binding effect, it is 
possible to standardize them and to render them on a more cost-effective basis. The same 
contents are imparted in another form by internet-based counselling. Customers are referred 
to the respective websites and they need to pay for the utilization. If it is possible to reach a 
binding effect in certain consulting segments, links to helpdesks are useful. Then a personal 
consulting session should be arranged with the ECT staff. 
 
5.2 Professionalization 
Profile goes along with professionalism and vice versa. A professional profile of the ECT 
depends on the quality of the organizational structure and of the personnel. Therefore the 
advanced and continuous training of the staff, the establishment of a stringent and transparent 
company organization structure, as well as the permanent evaluation of the institutional work 
and its personnel are preconditions for the success profile of the ECT. 
 
5.2.1 Advanced Training of the Staff 
The ECT aims to gain reputation as a technology agency. The personnel of such an agency 
must have a comprehensive knowledge and understanding of new and innovative 
technologies. They have to be able to assess the economic dimension of a new idea and 
product as well as the potentials of its commercialisation. The specialization on specific 
branches is imperative. The individual employee is the contact person for customers who plan 
to start up a business. If required, he or she establishes contacts with specialized scientists and 
links the innovator to the ECT network. On doing so, the economic dimension of the 
entrepreneurial endeavour will be in the foreground and not any process-technological issues. 
The ECT employee gains a reputation as trustworthy and credible partner having 
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comprehensive knowledge of branch-specific ratios, competitors, leading experts, etc. at his 
or her disposal. From the constant contact with submitted concepts and ideas, the employee 
gains an excellent knowledge of future developments, recognizes innovative trends, and 
branch-specific insights. 
The ECT not only regards itself as a technology but also as service and management agency. 
A professional specialization of the staff is imperative. The more sophisticated the consulting, 
the higher the revenue potential. Accordingly, an advanced and continuous training of the 
staff is an essential element of the ECT business model. Therefore we recommend to 
implement a so-called “revolving-door concept”. This means that the employees of the ECT 
take over managerial functions in young enterprises or on the premises of financial or 
scientific partners for a fixed period with the intent to execute highly qualified tasks 
professionally within the ECT afterwards. Such a revolving-door concept contributes to the 
professional and personal qualification of the staff and the creation of multipliers. 
Information monopolies are prevented.  
 
5.2.2 Evaluation 
The continuous evaluations of (1) the promoted innovators and entrepreneurs, (2) the ECT, 
and (3) its personnel are essential elements of the business model.  
The Assessment Office (AO) of the ECT should inter alia be entrusted with the following 
tasks: 
 
• Planning, elaboration and realization of methods for the evaluation of the influence 
of financial assistance programs of the ECT on local enterprises, specifically on the 
regional economy. 
• Execution and preparation of studies for the identification of outstanding investment 
and research opportunities contributing to the promotion of economic growth. 
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• Observation of the project and business development of promoted participants. 
• Comparison of the ECT three-phase financial assistance program with other financial 
assistance programs (benchmarking) (Wessner, 2001). 
 
The evaluation of the services rendered by the ECT should have high priority. A transparent 
marketing of the achievements of the ECT contributes to the image making process and 
professionalism of this one-stop-shop. 
With the following toolkit we provide a basis for further discussion of which segments should 
be taken into account for future evaluation: 
 
 Statistical collection of the  
• applicants/project partners/projects/participants of the projects  
• technologies/ ideas 
 Continuous and regular evaluation  
• of the project teams  
• of the state of the art of the projects 
 Reports on 
• completed projects 
• current projects 
• projects which have not been promoted by the ECT (!) 
 Case studies on the 
• course of the project 
• question: why does the general public profit from the ECT and its work? 
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The evaluated results and analyses should be made accessible to anyone interested in and 
made available online. By this means, transparency would increase which essentially 
contributes to the image building of the ECT. 
A follow-up on projects which have not been supported by the ECT should be achieved to 
find out whether ECT support is crucial for a successful business start-up. 
 
6. SUMMARY REMARKS 
We have developed an ECT business model which allows the realization of a one-stop-shop 
in Thuringia that professionally contributes to the start up process of technology-oriented, 
university-based enterprises in this region. The dimension and orientation of the model is 
scalable. A restriction to technology-oriented business start-ups can be made but is not a 
necessary prerequisite. The profit-orientation of the ECT is one essential characteristic of the 
introduced model in order to achieve an independent status (meaning independent from 
public subsidies). The suggested measures can be executed within 12 to 18 months.  
We have strongly underlined the need for a public private partnership between different local 
actors keeping in mind that the increasing financial restrictions of the public as well as private 
sector in Germany will inevitably lead to a strong interaction between them. Therefore all 
proposed regional public, non-profit, and for-profit participants are actively involved in the 
promotion of start-ups.  
We have referred to two best practice examples in the U.S., the SBIR and ATP program, 
which have successfully contributed to the promotion of innovative business start-ups in the 
U.S. and have transferred major elements of these two public promotion programs to the ECT 
business model. Both U.S. programs strongly promote the realization of public private 
partnerships which belong to the central instrument of U.S. entrepreneurship policy. Why is 
this not the case in Germany? In general, cultural, historical, but also legal reasons can be 
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given for this fact. The private sector does not gain reputation by contributing to job creation 
and the development of high technologies and therefore does not invest significantly in the 
promotion of the entrepreneurial environment. Potential sponsors do not profit from 
investments in PPPs.  They can not see an image-building effect by investing in the 
promotion of the entrepreneurial environment so far. In the U.S., on the contrary, it belongs to 
the image building of an enterprise to contribute to the economic growth of the country or of 
the region by the promotion of business start-ups.  
We are convinced that a future “Entrepreneurship Center Thuringia” will significantly 
contribute to the regional economic development and to job creation if it manages 
successfully to take up an active financial role with regard to the promotion of business start-
ups, the development of state-of-the-art technologies, and the training of innovative, young, 
university-based and other talents.  
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Figure 2: Zukunftsfonds Thüringen  
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ETeCH AG is a Swiss-based private company investing in and developing emerging 
technologies with academic institutions across Europe, with an excellent track record.  It 
recently published what has been hailed by leading centres worldwide as the definitive 
textbook on technology exploitation: ‘Making Money out of Technology: Best Practice in 
Technology Exploitation from Academic Sources’ (Linde Verlag, 2003). 
 
 
SYNOPSIS 
Why do people continue to believe that founding and running a start-up is the right way to 
commercialize new technologies, when they also know that 90% fail?  We believe there are 
three reasons: a lack of thought about what is the right thing to do as well as the right way to 
do it; a lack of knowledge about other options, propagated by institutions and individuals 
whose rewards lie in company formation; and a lack of understanding that enthusiasm is no 
substitute for commercial intelligence.  
 
ETeCH’s experience is that 90% of new technologies do not pass three simple tests of being 
legally owned, fulfilling market requirements, and being able to attract significant revenues - 
and in 90% of those which do pass, optimal commercialization is via trade sale or licensing, 
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in terms of the probable financial rewards to the originators.  In only 1% of cases should a 
start-up company be even considered as the correct choice. 
 
The focus of many governments, incubators, science parks, managers in most venture capital 
companies, and members of the legal and accountancy professions, is however on start-up 
formation – because this provides immediate ‘company & job creation’ figures – and fees.  
However this short-term attitude, not caring about the failure rate, is compromising long-term 
wealth creation, and should be of concern to these institutions.   
 
Although the majority of start-ups which fail do so because they were the wrong thing to do, 
rather than just being poorly managed, this is also a concern.  Enthusiastic but commercially 
naïve ‘entrepreneurs’ are unacceptable vendors in many markets, and hard work is 
meaningless if the wrong things are done, or by the wrong people.   
 
ETeCH’s alternative approach, involving the precise selection of technologies and then the 
optimal exploitation route, with start-up formation only if this is demonstrably the best 
money-making course, has a proven record of 90% successful investments and >40% IRR 
over the last decade and more.  ETeCH also assists Universities to structure technology 
exploitation to achieve the best financial gains with the least disruption to existing structures, 
staffing and budgets, and has collected performance data to provide international 
benchmarks. 
 
In conclusion: if financial success and long-term wealth creation is desired, start-ups are the 
last thing to do.  To be successful they must fit a much more constrained market niche in 
terms of their professional constitution and behavior than many believe.  Universities should 
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preferably exploit valid technologies via internal development and then licensing or trade 
sale, which is usually more lucrative and less disruptive. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Many people, and in our experience, particularly members of Universities and other academic 
institutions, continue to believe that founding and running a start-up is the right way to 
commercialize new technologies.  Yet they are also aware that 90% of these fail, or, at least, 
fail to deliver their founders the originally hoped-for financial rewards.  Why then is the 
belief in the merit of start-ups maintained, by otherwise intelligent people, in the face of the 
historical facts?  
 
We believe there are three reasons: a lack of dispassionate thought about due diligence and 
the right way to commercialize; a lack of knowledge of, or consideration about, other options, 
where this blinkeredness is encouraged by a number of powerful and vocal institutions; and a 
lack of understanding that, in commercial markets, enthusiasm and energy are unacceptable 
substitutes for proper customer service.  These three acts of willful blindness taken together – 
and set alongside the well-publicized success stories, although these serve to make our point - 
allow the prospective entrepreneur to belief that ‘their case is different’ and ‘the times have 
changed’ and the statistics  - and the rules - do not apply.  They are wrong. We shall thus look 
at these three reasons, in turn, in detail. 
 
Lack of Thought 
Firstly, there is the lack of dispassionate thought - or even, a definite suppression of thought - 
about what is the right thing to do as well as the right way to do it.  This has two elements.    
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The first element is a marked reluctance to conduct proper due diligence, by carefully looking 
at rival technologies, patents, products and companies, by considering actually addressable 
markets, and by considering complete customer requirements. ETeCH’s experience is that 
90% of new technologies which we see from ‘entrepreneurs’ do not pass three simple tests of 
being legally owned, fulfilling market requirements, and being able to attract significant 
revenues.  Of these the first 50% fail the simplest test of all – the technologies are simply not 
novel or legally owned, or have problems with freedom of action.  A further 30% show, on 
proper, careful examination, no technical or commercial benefit over existing technologies, 
and the rest address small and/or difficult market niches – in short, the market may exist, but 
it is unwilling to pay.    
 
ETeCH has formalized its due diligence process for selection of winning technologies – and 
over 90% of our investments are successful – in the ‘ETeCH Technology Bridge’®.  This 
forces us to consider each of key issues in turn, from the point of view of identifying 
applications, markets and customers, without prejudging the route to market.   
 
See Figure 1: ETeCH Technology Bridge® 
 
The second way in which lack of dispassionate thought expresses itself is as post-
rationalization of the start-up choice, fuelled chiefly by greed and ego.  The argument runs ‘I 
have this technology and would like to see it developed – AND commercialised – AND make 
money from it – AND own a company which makes the money – AND run that company – 
AND have the status and all the trappings and recognition of being a CEO – and then people 
will realize how great I am’.  The focus thus rapidly shifts away from the dispassionate 
consideration of what is the right way for the technology to be commercialized - creating the 
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business - towards what the often highly passionate desired way of commercialization by the 
person – creating the company, almost always around themselves.    
 
Few business propositions can withstand such a shift, because even for those propositions 
which do pass the three simple tests of legal ownership, market acceptability, and reasonable 
potential revenues, in 90% of cases optimal commercialization is then clearly via trade sale or 
licensing, in terms of the probable financial rewards to the originators.  When such 
commercialization is instead attempted by a start-up, the desire to form and run the company 
has even actually overtaken the desire for the amount of money the originators would receive. 
 
Trade sale or licensing is appropriate in the majority of cases because either the market is 
already developed, and dominated by large, powerful suppliers, and/or the customers - in fact, 
in most markets - insist on dealing with fully competent, professional companies as their 
suppliers.  Such customers give no consideration for the supplier being a start-up, and in 
many cases will refuse to deal with companies whom they perceive as having any risk for 
delivery of products to the desired specification, quality, price, speed and volume.   Even with 
– indeed, especially with – a desirable product, if the supplier cannot ‘gear up’ fast enough to 
match volume and quality market demands, the customers will not buy.  Hence the ‘classical’ 
model of a new, unstructured, ‘flexible’ start-up trying to sell innovative products to big 
customers is often fundamentally flawed, depending on the markets addressed, because the 
way in which the customers want to buy is not the way in which the start-up thinks it should 
sell. 
 
As a consequence therefore of this lack of dispassionate thought about the true merits of the 
technology and the correct way to approach customers, many technologies which are 
unsuitable for exploitation, or would be better exploited via direct licensing or trade sale, are 
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wrapped into start-up companies.  These companies, even if well run, do not succeed because 
their proposition is unsuitable for the optimal technology exploitation in the chosen target 
markets.  In our experience in only 1% of cases should a start-up company be even 
considered as the correct choice. 
 
Lack of Knowledge 
We thus come to the second reason for the blinkered view of start-ups: a lack of knowledge 
of, or consideration about, other options, where this blinkeredness is propagated by a number 
of powerful, vocal institutions and individuals, acting in their own best self-interest because 
their rewards lie more in the short-term of company formation rather than in the long-term of 
companies running successfully.   
 
Start-up formation is the focus of many governments, incubators, science parks, managers in 
most venture capital companies, and members of the legal and accountancy professions.  
Creating large numbers of start-ups allows immediate and impressive ‘company & job 
creation’ figures to be reported for political advantage – and for the professional services 
providers, lucrative fees to be earned.   
 
Government promotion of innovation and its commercialization, and its encouragement of the 
same by providing a variety of grants and services, is entirely welcome – provided, of course, 
it actually delivers on its promises - sometimes the politicians are good at promising and the 
bureaucrats less than willing to actually pay up. More, government promotion is vital, 
following recent fundamental legal changes in the ownership of intellectual property by 
academic institutions in many European states, which has led to considerable confusion about 
the possible, and highly stretched local resources. However, providing this government 
encouragement in ways largely requiring the ‘forced-card’ option of start-up formation, is far 
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from optimal.  As we have shown, and as the statistics tell us, start-ups are nearly always 
inappropriate.  Consequently the considerable power of government promotion is being 
ineffective in helping to establish sustainable companies and sustainable wealth creation, and 
serves more to sustain the professional and financial services providers.  It is not unusual for 
some 30% of a start-up company’s funds – just as, eventually, it is not unusual for 30% of the 
proceeds from an IPO, should one reach that far – to end up in the hands of the lawyers and 
accountants.  
  
However this short-term attitude, not caring about the failure rate, is compromising long-term 
wealth creation for individuals, academic institutions and nations, and should be of concern to 
these.  It is a key issue for the organizations promoting start-ups that the current 90% failure 
rate should be lowered considerably.  Although a ‘churn and burn’ policy has been 
considered sustainable, for instance by some of the more aggressive late venture capitalists, 
and was certainly to the short-term advantage of certain individuals within these 
organizations, it cannot be maintained indefinitely.  There will be too many ‘burnt’ 
individuals around.  Consequently the long-term sustainability of the start-up approach 
requires, not that it occasionally works spectacularly, but that it often works well, and this 
dependability will also be vital for the survival of many of the institutions and organizations 
themselves, particularly the local ones. 
 
This is a particular concern for European cultures, which have a low tolerance to failure,  
including the reluctance to reinstate academic staff who have tried to spin-out, with the 
consequent disruption to their University teaching and research.  It means that there will be 
few success stories to learn from – one in ten - and even limited opportunities to learn from 
the failures, since no-one will talk about these.  With little learning to be made, individuals 
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will become switched-off, and the negative cycle will continue with just more inappropriate, 
ineffective start-up formation by a new generation of naive young hopefuls. 
 
If the success figure is to be improved, learning must occur.  In our view this demands that 
much greater selectivity must be made with start-ups – that they are the right thing to do, as 
we covered earlier, and that they are to be done in the right way – which brings us to our third 
reason for the irrational view of start-ups, the lack of understanding that, in commercial 
markets, enthusiasm and energy are unacceptable substitutes for proper customer service.   
 
Lack of Understanding 
We have covered this partially before when we described customer demands for dealing with 
companies they view as dependable, and, although as we have seen the majority of start-ups 
which fail do so because they were the wrong thing to do, rather than just being poorly 
managed, doing things in the right way is also a concern.  Much attention has recently been 
focused on this, with so-called ‘entrepreneur training’ for start-up managers, and venture 
capital investors are becoming much tougher on proper financial and other controls, but the 
facts remain that enthusiastic but commercially naïve ‘entrepreneurs’ are unacceptable 
vendors in many markets, and hard work is meaningless if the wrong things are done – or by 
the wrong people.  
 
Even if the start-up is the optimal route, in many if not most cases it can be shown that the 
technology originators (or their ‘middle manager’ friends) are not the individuals best suited 
to run such a company, as is frequently proposed.  The need for the company to be focused on 
the external issues of markets, customers, and customer satisfaction, frequently does not fit 
well with those who wish the focus to be on perfecting the technology, and the need for close 
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customer dialogue – listening to customer desires – is a skill not found in many managers 
whose previous posts did not call for this.   
 
There is also, particularly for those academics unused to the commercial world, a lack of keen 
appreciation of the differences between money given for technology and company 
development as grants, money invested (with the expectation of returns) for technology and 
company development, and money earned from customers – which may then be used for 
further technology and company development.  Those with an internal focus merely see the 
money coming in to allow them to pursue their work: but the financial community is, and so 
the company should be, concerned with where the money comes from and what it is expected 
to purchase.  Grants are not capital, and neither are revenues. 
 
Thus even in the 1% of cases from an original idea where a start-up company would be the 
optimal commercialization route, it is frequently not the sensible choice, simply through the 
inability of the originators to form a team to run a business to make money  - and any 
company should not have any other agenda.   
 
We have been able to determine that, in terms of the probable financial rewards to the 
originators, a well-developed technology typically achieves more than 50% of this very 
rapidly – within two or three years of discovery - and usually before the technology has to 
leave the academic institution, and before company formation.  The fact that most of their 
rewards are created early on is not usually appreciated by those originators who are 
hypnotized by ‘hockey stick’ value growth curves, failing to appreciate also the probable 
dilution of their stake.   Thus even the start-up as a ‘way to become rich’ is, for the 
originators, largely a myth. 
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See Figure 2: The value-versus-time curve 
 
Hence, selling out at this point – without taking on the problems of running a company – is 
almost always the advisable course for the originators and seed investors.  90% of the time 
licensing or trade sale is the optimal course anyway, and for much of the remaining 10% the 
inability to form a reliable business team means that a sale is advisable, for whilst perhaps not 
the most financially rewarding it is the course of lower difficulty, stress and risk.   
 
ETeCH’s ALTERNATIVE APPROACH 
As ETeCH and its progenitor The Generics Group have shown it is, from the points of view 
of making money and avoiding risk and stress, better to develop lots of technologies and sell 
them early, using the proceeds for reinvestment, than to maintain a minor stake in a long-term 
enterprise. 
 
Promoting, investing in, and enabling this alternative route to the start-up is what ETeCH 
does. ETeCH’s approach, involving the precise selection of technologies and then the optimal 
exploitation route, with start-up formation only if this is demonstrably the best money-
making course, has a proven record of 90% successful investments and >40% IRR over the 
last decade and more.  ETeCH also assists Universities to structure technology exploitation to 
achieve the best financial gains with the least disruption to existing structures, staffing and 
budgets. Having collected performance data from around the world, ETeCH is able to provide 
international benchmarks to show how well any University ought to be doing from 
exploitation of its technology assets - and how poor is the achievement, as yet, of many.   
These benchmarks and statistics are given fully in our book ‘Making Money out of 
Technology’, but may be summarized as follows: 
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See Figure 3: Best Performance metric 
See  Figure 4: Comparison: M.I.T., Stanford, Cambridge, Oxford, ETH Zürich 
 
In conclusion, then, if financial success and long-term wealth creation is desired, start-ups are 
the last thing to do.  Certainly they have their place, but to be successful they must fit a much 
more constrained market niche in terms of their professional constitution and behavior than 
many believe.  Universities should rather structure themselves to exploit valid technologies 
via internal development and then licensing or trade sale, which is more lucrative and less 
disruptive for the academic institutions concerned, and start-ups should be limited to those 
cases where the market dynamics clearly show that the start-up is the better course – and the 
individuals concerned have the key abilities of honesty, professionalism, and listening to their 
customers, to be able to create the new business.  
 
ETeCH, 10th May 2004. 
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Figure 1: ETeCH Technology Bridge® 
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Figure 2: The value-versus-time curve 
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Figure 3: Best Performance metrics 
Best performance 
• An average of one research disclosure per professor every two years - achieved 
MIT 2001 
• Converting a third of these into patents 
• Then converting three-quarters of these patents 
– Into license deals at an average of 250,000 Euro each 
– Or into holdings in spin-out companies where a realisable value of 
these could be an average of 1mEuro each 
• This still brings in on average 3-6% of the research budget of a major 
University annually. 
– MIT and Stanford last year 
– MIT and Stanford bring in almost $3m per TT officer per year 
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2001 MIT Stanford Cambridge Oxford ETH Zürich
Researchers 3000 8243 2556 3000 4953 
Senior scientific 
research staff / 
professors 
900 1701 1078 344 
(professors & 
readers) 
Unknown 
Disclosures 446 321 ~100 / ~100 319 Unknown 
Patents 160 123 30  - 40 63 86 
Companies formed 26 (160 total: 
has equity in 
60) 
17 (76 total) 5 /  6 (38 
total) 
8 (33 total) 10 
Licenses 77 (+ 48 
options) 
600 active 
113 30-40 32 (80 active) 29 
Royalty income €26.6m €50m €2.4m €4.2m (inc. 
Ind. R.) 
Not 
published 
Equity disposal 
income  
€55.6m €2.12m Not 
published 
Not 
published 
Not 
published 
Valuation of 
holdings 
Not 
published 
Not 
published 
Not 
published 
Not 
published 
Not 
published 
University research 
budget 
€850m* €573.416m €240m €230m €660m 
% of research 
budget arising from 
TT 
9.7% (4.50% 
as a 3 year 
average) 
9.1% 1% 1.8%, 
including 
research 
Not known 
 
US universities total licence revenue $1.26bn, Top 10 average $71m, Overall average $4m, 
Best European $5.1m 
 
Figure 4: Comparison: M.I.T., Stanford, Cambridge, Oxford, ETH Zürich 
 
 
